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  • Thanksgiving Turkey Outlook: Supply Strong, Prices Stable Heading into the Holiday Season

    Thanksgiving Turkey Outlook: Supply Strong, Prices Stable Heading into the Holiday Season

    As Thanksgiving approaches, many families are beginning to plan their holiday meals and wondering what this year’s turkey prices will mean for their grocery budgets. While food prices remain elevated compared to pre-pandemic levels, current data suggest that turkey supplies are adequate and price increases for most consumers should remain modest.

    One of the best indicators of Thanksgiving turkey availability is the amount of turkey currently held in cold storage. September 2026 cold storage inventories were slightly lower than the same month in 2025, although inventories were somewhat higher earlier in the summer. This pattern may simply indicate that turkey products began moving into retail channels earlier this year.

    While current inventories remain below the average levels observed during the previous four years, supplies appear sufficient to meet holiday demand. Barring unexpected disruptions, consumers should not encounter turkey shortages this Thanksgiving.

    Production Continues at Normal Levels

    U.S. turkey production has remained relatively stable throughout 2026. Aside from a temporary decline during spring 2025, production levels have tracked closely with historical patterns and remain consistent with the past five years.

    Stable production has helped maintain adequate supplies despite ongoing concerns about Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). Commercial turkey operations experienced lower HPAI-related losses in 2025 than in 2024 and impacts during 2026 have been even smaller thus far.

    However, producers remain watchful as the fall migration season progresses. Wild bird migrations have historically been associated with increased HPAI risk, and additional outbreaks could affect fresh turkey availability, as outbreaks tend to effect market age birds. That could place upward pressure on available frozen turkey prices.

    Figure 1. Monthly U.S. Turkey Production, 2021-2026

    Cutline: Turkey production has remained remarkably stable during 2026 and is comparable to production levels observed during the previous five years, suggesting ample supplies for the holiday season.

    What Can Consumers Expect to Pay?

    Wholesale market signals provide a mixed picture. Turkey breast prices have fallen sharply, down approximately 58% from the same period last year and near long-term average levels. This indicates that wholesale breast prices have largely returned to normal following unusually high pricing in 2025.

    Conversely, wholesale prices for whole birds remain roughly 40% above historical averages. Retail price data suggest consumers may see mild increases compared with last year, but the changes are unlikely to significantly affect holiday budgets.

    Retail Turkey Price Comparison

    USDA Agricultural Marketing Service weekly advertised retail price survey, October 2026.

    Product                                                    Oct. 2025Oct. 2026% Change$ Change 
    Frozen whole turkey (16 lb.)$1.08/lb ($17.28)$1.23/lb($19.68)+13.9%+$2.40 
    Frozen whole bone-in turkey breast (7 lb.)$1.26/lb($8.82)$1.36/lb($9.52)+7.9%+$0.70

    Cutline: USDA retail survey data show moderate increases in advertised turkey prices compared with last year. A typical 16-pound frozen turkey costs about $2.40 more than in October 2025, while a 7-pound frozen turkey breast costs approximately $0.70 more.

    Bottom Line

    Current production, storage, and HPAI impacts indicate that turkey supplies should be sufficient for Thanksgiving 2026. Although retail prices are slightly higher than last year, the increases are relatively modest, amounting to less than $3 per turkey in most cases. In addition, many grocery retailers routinely feature turkey as a holiday promotional item, which could further reduce consumer costs. For most families, turkey availability and affordability should not be a major concern this Thanksgiving season.


    Recommended citation format: Brothers, Dennis. “Thanksgiving Turkey Outlook: Supply Strong, Prices Stable Heading into the Holiday Season.” Southern Ag Today 6(47.2). November 17, 2026. Permalink

  • Interest in On-Farm Solar among Alabama Farmers

    Interest in On-Farm Solar among Alabama Farmers

    Authors: Jean R. Francois, Kelli J. Russell, and Mykel R. Taylor

    In recent years, solar energy has received growing attention in agriculture for its potential to diversify energy supplies, lower energy costs, and create additional farm income. But how interested are farmers themselves in installing solar panels on their farm operations? In 2025, we surveyed Alabama farmers regarding their (dis)agreement with the statement “I am interested in installing solar panels on my farm.” We summarize their responses and note differences in interest in on-farm solar across stages of their farming careers and plans for the future of their farming operations.

    Among the 258 farmers who responded to the question, approximately one in five respondents expressed interest in installing solar panels (Figure 1). More than half of the respondents expressed no interest in on-farm solar panels. About one-quarter of respondents remained neutral.

    Figure 1. Respondents’ interest in installing solar panels on their farms (n = 258)

    We examined interest in installing solar panels by retirement and succession plans. We combined two questions to create this measure: one asked farmers whether they planned to retire from or quit farming in the next five years (Yes/No), and the other asked whether they had identified a potential successor to take over their farms (Yes/No). 

    Figure 2. Respondents’ interest in installing solar panels on their farms, by retirement and succession plans. Retiring refers to respondents who reported plans to retire within the next five years. 

    We observed the lowest levels of interest (11%) among respondents who planned to retire and had identified a successor (Figure 2). Interest rose to 20% among retiring respondents without an identified successor, which is similar to those who were not planning to retire but had identified a successor. We saw the greatest interest (27%) with respondents who were not planning to retire and had not identified a successor. That is the only group in which fewer than half of respondents (43%) report being uninterested.

    We were also interested in the age composition of these groups. The younger respondents (18-34 years old) expressed the highest interest (35%) (Figure 3), while respondents aged 65 or older had the lowest percentage (18%) expressing interest in on-farm solar. 

    Figure 3. Respondents’ interest in installing solar panels on their farms, by age group.

    We examined solar interest across farm commodities, using respondents’ report of their primary commodity, that is the single crop or livestock commodity of farm product that provided the most total farm sales in 2024. Interest in installing solar panels was relatively similar across commodities. Twenty-four percent of poultry producers expressed interest, compared to 21% of crop producers and 20% of beef cattle producers. However, only 34% of poultry producers expressed no interest, compared with 59% of crop producers and 58% of beef cattle producers.

    Overall, the results suggest that interest in installing solar panels is limited among the survey respondents, with variation across different age groups and retirement and succession circumstances. These descriptive results do not inform us of the reasons behind these differences. The survey question also did not distinguish between installing solar panels for farm energy use and leasing farmland for larger-scale solar development. Respondents may therefore have interpreted the question differently. These different forms of solar development may involve multiple considerations, including cost of installation, energy needs, expected returns, land ownership, and the anticipated future of the farm, to name a few. Understanding how farmers weigh these considerations may help clarify when and why they view on-farm solar as a worthwhile investment.


    Recommended citation format: Francois, Jean R., Kelli J. Russell, and Mykel R. Taylor. “Interest in On-Farm Solar among Alabama Farmers.” Southern Ag Today 6(47.1). November 16, 2026. Permalink

  • Status of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) Tariff Litigation

    Status of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) Tariff Litigation

    At the onset of 2025, President Trump laid tariffs on Mexico, Canada, and China under a claim of authority from the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). This act, passed in 1977, grants the president the authority to “regulate . . . importation” in response to a declared national emergency. President Trump claimed that “poisonous fentanyl” and “the extraordinary threat posed by illegal aliens” had led to national emergencies in the U.S., which justified the imposition of tariffs under IEEPA. Whether IEEPA actually allowed for a president to implement tariffs was a question raised in multiple lawsuits and eventually the Supreme Court stepped in to provide their answer. 

    The Supreme Court’s Decision 

    Two separate cases were ultimately consolidated in the Supreme Court’s decision regarding the IEEPA tariffs. One casebegan in the Court of International Trade (CIT) when a group of businesses filed a complaint asserting that IEEPA did not authorize the president to impose tariffs. The second case, originally filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, similarly challenged the scope of IEEPA’s authority. After both cases were appealed to the Supreme Court, the Court combined both cases in its decision of Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump. There, the Supreme Court sought to answer the question which had prompted both lower court cases: Does IEEPA authorize the President to impose tariffs? 

    To resolve this dispute, the Supreme Court needed to determine whether “regulate . . . importation” included the authority to lay tariffs. First, the Court noted that the Constitution gives Congress the exclusive power to lay and collect taxes, which has historically included tariffs. According to the Court, when Congress wishes to confer its authority to lay taxes and tariffs it will do so “clearly.” The Court reasoned that “when Congress has delegated its tariff powers, it has done so in explicit terms, and subject to strict limits.” 

    Here, the Court ultimately determined that Congress had not explicitly conferred the authority to impose tariffs through IEEPA. In reaching this conclusion, the Court looked at precedent and the text of IEEPA itself.  First, no President has ever relied on IEEPA to impose tariffs. Given this lack of precedent and the “breadth of authority” now being claimed under IEEPA, the Court concluded that the IEEPA tariffs were beyond the President’s “legitimate reach.” Second, and perhaps most importantly, the word “tariff” is not mentioned anywhere in IEEPA’s text. The Court reasoned that if Congress had intended for IEEPA to include the power to lay tariffs, it would have made that clear in IEEPA’s text, “as it consistently has in other tariff statutes.” Without any historical precedent or clear Congressional intent, the Court concluded in a 6-3 decision that IEEPA did not authorize the President to impose tariffs. 

    The Aftermath 

    The Court’s decision vacated the IEEPA tariffs, however it did not discuss the issue of potential refunds. Considering the massive impact of the IEEPA tariffs, this left many businesses wondering if and how refunds would be issued for the now vacated IEEPA tariffs. Following an order to begin issuing refunds from the CIT, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) outlined its new system for processing and issuing IEEPA refunds. The Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries (CAPE) system is a digital portal where importers can file a refund claim for duties paid while the tariffs were in effect. The CAPE system is being implemented through a “phased development” with system functions being implemented over time. Businesses who paid duties pursuant to the IEEPA tariffs should visit CBP’s website to learn more about potential IEEPA refunds under the CAPE system. 

    Shortly after the Court vacated the IEEPA tariffs, President Trump announced that he would be implementing a global 10% tariff rate. This time, President Trump claimed the tariffs were authorized by Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974. As was the case with IEEPA, no President had ever relied on Section 122 to implement tariffs. Unlike IEEPA, Section 122 does explicitly grant the President the authority to impose tariffs. However, the Section 122 tariffs would still go on to face legal challenges. Currently, the Section 122 tariffs are still in effect at an increased rate of 15%, but this is subject to change depending on the outcome of ongoing litigation. Regardless, these tariffs are indicative of the Administration’s ongoing intent to continue placing emphasis on tariffs in its international trade strategy. 

    Conclusion

    The IEEPA tariffs dominated international trade headlines while still in effect. Reportedly, nearly $140 billion in duties were collected from the IEEPA tariffs by December of 2025. Naturally, this means that many businesses felt their effects. While the IEEPA tariffs may now be vacated, refunds and tariffs enacted under other statutes remain an important issue for many business owners. To learn more about the Supreme Court’s decision to vacate the IEEPA tariffs, click here. To learn more about the aftermath of the Court’s decision, click here. 


    Recommended citation format: Scobey, Will. “Status of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) Tariff Litigation.” Southern Ag Today 6(46.5). November 13, 2026. Permalink

  • Closing the Gap on Cotton Abandonment: The Case for a Harvest Incentive

    Closing the Gap on Cotton Abandonment: The Case for a Harvest Incentive

    Authors: Bart Fischer and Joe Outlaw

    We all know that production agriculture is notoriously risky, with crop insurance having become the cornerstone of the farm safety net.  While crop insurance will pay an indemnity once the actual yield or revenue on a farm falls below the guarantee, indemnities reach their maximum in cases when the crop is so poor that it’s not worth harvesting—a situation known as abandonment. 

    While abandonment is a problem for all crops and all regions, it is particularly acute for cotton producers. Compounding the problem, if a cotton crop isn’t worth harvesting, there are virtually no other options for extracting value from the crop. You can chop a poor corn crop for silage, or you can bale hailed out wheat for hay. None of these are viable options for cotton (and while some have tried grazing and baling, they are of limited value). Most failed cotton ends up simply being destroyed. And, while abandonment is a challenge for producers, it has huge implications for downstream industry as well, from harvest aid manufacturers to chemical applicators to custom harvesters to cotton gins, warehousers, and merchants.

    As noted in Figure 1, from 2016 to 2025, an annual average of 2.8 million unharvested acres of cotton accounted for 24% of planted acres. By contrast, for corn, approximately 8 million unharvested acres (i.e., not harvested for grain) accounted for 9% of planted acres.  However, an annual average of 6.4 million acres of silage closed 80% of that gap.  In other words, after accounting for silage, the net abandonment averaged just 1.8%.

    Figure 1. Unharvested Share of Planted Acres for Corn and Cotton

    Source: NASS QuickStats

    Historically, most of the concerns with abandonment have come at harvest. Crop insurance becomes a factor because a farmer will naturally compare the value of the crop against the cost of harvesting, and a sufficiently low crop insurance appraisal will tip the scales toward abandonment. Again, as noted above, there is no other alternative for salvaging value with cotton. In response, in the mid-1990s, USDA’s Risk Management Agency (RMA) established the Cotton Harvest Incentive (CHI) pilot program for the 1995 and 1996 crop years in select counties in Texas. In general, the pilot allowed producers to exclude the crop they harvest from the production to count for purposes of calculating crop insurance indemnities.[1] RMA revised and extended the pilot program for the 1997, 1998, and 1999 crop years in the same counties. In our view, the approach to addressing late-season abandonment was sound, but the mechanics of the pilot were unnecessarily complicated and overly restrictive, completely undermining the incentive the pilot attempted to provide. Rather than trying to improve the pilot, RMA simply abandoned it starting with the 2000 crop year. 

    While abandonment at harvest has continued to be a problem over the last 26 years since the pilot was terminated, early-season abandonment has also become a major issue.  When we first started working on this issue back in 2024, we discovered that, on average across the United States from 2014 to 2023, 72% of the indemnities paid on Revenue Protection policies for cotton were for unharvested acres. As noted in Figure 2, a significant share of the indemnities were coming from loss situations that were at least materializing very early in the growing season (while acknowledging that this data related to the timing of the cause of loss and not necessarily the timing of indemnities). Regardless, it demonstrates the early-season pressure facing producers, in many cases due to lack of rainfall at/near planting.

    Figure 2. Revenue Protection Indemnities for Unharvested Cotton by Cause-of-Loss Month, 2014-2023

    While crop insurance is tailor made for situations where a producer does their absolute best to raise a crop and it simply never emerges from the ground, not all situations are that clear cut. For example, if a producer is facing the prospect of raising a crop in a tough production environment, they necessarily are also facing the prospect of having to harvest a mediocre crop (at best) that may barely cover the cost of harvest. Facing that prospect, if given a sufficiently low appraisal, they may choose to walk away from the crop at (or near) planting.  Further, if a grower is in a failing Enterprise Unit that has one or two farms that might make it to harvest, they may still choose to take an early appraisal and abandon the crop on those farms rather than trying to take those farms to harvest and also having to wait until the end of the growing season to receive an indemnity. 

    We’ve spent the last three years analyzing if a harvest incentive could help tip the scales toward maintaining a crop and taking it to harvest. In response, the National Cotton Council worked with USDA’s Risk Management Agency (RMA) to develop a new Harvest Cost Endorsement (HCE) that would supplement a producer’s underlying crop insurance policy.  While we will save the mechanics for another day, the bottom line is this: a grower that adds the HCE endorsement could go into the planting season knowing that if they end up with a disappointing crop that triggers a crop insurance indemnity, it would also begin triggering a supplemental indemnity to help offset the cost of harvest.  Naturally, if there is no cotton to harvest at all, the incentive would phase completely out (after all, we don’t want to incentivize producers taking harvest equipment through the field just for the sake of collecting an indemnity).

    While some may argue this isn’t a crop insurance issue, we would strongly disagree. In fact, we can easily envision a scenario where the HCE could end up saving taxpayers a considerable amount of money.  The premise is this: if cotton that is being abandoned is instead taken to harvest, would that sufficiently lower the indemnities being paid to offset (or more than offset) the cost of the incentive? While no one can truly know which way the scales will tip (because none of us know whether cotton that had been abandoned would have ended up making a crop), we suspect that the introduction of an incentive could significantly reduce the amount of crop insurance indemnities being paid for cotton (with the incentive instead encouraging producers to take the crop to harvest and sell it into the market). 

    Where do we go from here? Both the cotton industry and the U.S. Department of Agriculture have worked in good faith over the last two years to develop an HCE product that could be approved by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) as soon as next week.  In our view, this issue has been begging for a solution for far too long. We would be remiss if we didn’t note that the current proposal is being offered as a pilot.  By definition, a pilot is intended to be a vehicle for testing new concepts before committing to widespread adoption. While some might be tempted to simply resurrect the old CHI pilot, it would not meet the added challenge of addressing early-season abandonment. Further, while the temptation also exists to keep studying and tweaking, there is no substitute for the real-life laboratory of introducing a pilot and observing how it functions in the real world. Again, that is the entire point of a pilot. One thing we already know with certainty: if action is not taken soon, producers will be left waiting until 2028 at the earliest to pilot a new endorsement, and in the meantime we will keep paying crop insurance indemnities that we suspect could be avoided.


    [1] For more information, see: https://www.rma.usda.gov/-/media/RMA/Publications/Specialty-Crops/specialty-crop-report-1999.ashx?la=en and https://www.rma.usda.gov/-/media/RMA/Publications/Specialty-Crops/specialty-crop-report-2004.ashx?la=en.


    Recommended citation format: Fischer, Bart L. and Joe Outlaw. “Closing the Gap on Cotton Abandonment: The Case for a Harvest Incentive.” Southern Ag Today 6(46.4). November 12, 2026. Permalink

  • November WASDE Trims Corn Yield: How Much Can Yield Still Change by January?

    November WASDE Trims Corn Yield: How Much Can Yield Still Change by January?

    The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) released the November World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) report on Tuesday, November 10. The main question heading into the report was what USDA would do with yields, especially after a September revision to corn production was announced in late October. This article recaps the changes for corn, soybeans, cotton and rice, and then looks at how much yields have typically changed between November and the final estimates in January.

    November Report Recap

    USDA lowered its projected corn yield by 1.6 bushels to 179.6 bushels per acre. That reverses most of October’s increase from 178.5 to 181.2 bushels and leaves the yield 3.4 bushels below USDA’s initial May projection of 183 bushels. Production fell 141 million bushels to 15.9 billion bushels. USDA also trimmed exports and feed and residual use by 25 million bushels each, so ending stocks fell 91 million bushels to 1,758 million bushels. The season-average farm price was lowered 10 cents to $4.60 per bushel.

    Soybean yields were raised slightly, up 0.2 bushels to 53.3 bushels per acre, adding 12 million bushels of production. A 25 million bushel increase in exports more than offset the larger crop, and ending stocks fell 15 million bushels to 300 million bushels. The season-average price was raised 10 cents to $12.10 per bushel.

    USDA lowered the cotton yield by 15 pounds to 775 pounds per acre, cutting production by 260,000 bales to 13.18 million bales. Domestic use was lowered 100,000 bales and exports were unchanged at 12.3 million bales. Ending stocks fell 100,000 bales to 3.7 million bales. The season-average price was lowered 1 cent to 76 cents per pound.

    Rice changed little. The yield was lowered 4 pounds to 7,664 pounds per acre, while production was nearly unchanged at 157.6 million hundredweight, and ending stocks fell 100,000 hundredweight to 39.9 million hundredweight. The season-average price was lowered 10 cents to $15.10 per hundredweight, but long-grain price was unchanged at $14.00 per hundredweight.

    How Much Could Yields Change by January?

    November is the last yield estimate for corn, soybeans and rice until USDA’s annual Crop Production summary in January; cotton gets one more forecast in December. Figure 1 shows how much the January yield has moved from the November estimate for each crop since 2000. For corn and soybeans, the direction of yield changes have been about 50/50. The January corn yield was adjusted higher in 12 years and lower in 13, with an average change of 1.4 bushels per acre in either direction. Soybeans were higher in 13 years and lower in 12, with an average change of 0.4 bushels in either direction.

    Even average-size moves can shift ending stocks. With 88.5 million harvested acres, each 1-bushel change in the corn yield changes production by 88.5 million bushels, so an average 1.4-bushel move up or down would shift corn ending stocks by roughly 125 million bushels. The largest corn revisions since 2000 were cuts of 3.8 bushels in 2020 and 2024, about 335 million bushels. For soybeans, a 0.4-bushel move is about 35 million bushels, more than 10% of projected ending stocks. Revisions have also been larger in recent years. Since 2020, corn revisions have averaged 1.9 bushels in either direction.

    Comparing yields to trend gives a slight hint on the direction of revisions. In years when the November corn yield was below trend, the January estimate raised it in 7 of 9 years. At 179.6 bushels per acre, this year’s estimate is about 3% below the trend yield of roughly 185 bushels, which leans toward a small increase in January. Soybeans are near trend, so history offers no lean either way. Yield is not the only thing that can change. For the 2022 crop, USDA raised the January corn yield by 1 bushel but cut harvested area by 1.6 million acres, so production fell 200 million bushels. 

    Cotton has the largest historical revisions of the four crops, averaging 28 pounds per acre, or 3.3%, in either direction. Revisions have grown recently, averaging 64 pounds since 2020. This year’s cotton yield is about 13% below trend, and short cotton crops have been raised in January in 10 of 15 years. However, a higher yield does not always mean more cotton. USDA lowered harvested area in 22 of the last 26 years as abandonment came into focus, thus production rose in only 8 of those years. For the 2023 crop, USDA raised the yield by 62 pounds but cut harvested area by 12%, so production fell 5%.

    Since 2000, the January rice yield has been raised in 15 of 26 years. The average change, up or down, has been 75 pounds per acre, about 1%. Like corn, this year’s rice yield of 7,664 pounds is about 3% below trend, and below-trend rice crops have been raised in January in 8 of 13 years. With 2.06 million harvested acres, a 75-pound change in yield would change production by about 1.5 million hundredweight, close to 4% of projected ending stocks.

    While most of the 2026 yield story has been written, USDA will still make changes in January, and history shows those changes can be large enough to move ending stocks. For producers still holding unpriced grain or cotton, the January report is a known risk event. Now is a good time to review marketing plans and decide how much exposure to carry into that report.

    Figure 1. Yield Revisions from November to January


    Recommended citation format: Maples, William E. “November WASDE Trims Corn Yield: How Much Can Yield Still Change by January?” Southern Ag Today 6(46.3). November 11, 2026. Permalink