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  • Bigger Crop, Thinner Wallets: Brazil’s Soybean Paradox

    Bigger Crop, Thinner Wallets: Brazil’s Soybean Paradox

    Brazil’s farmers are under financial strain, yet its soybean crop keeps growing. Here is why, and what it means for U.S. growers.

    Brazil is on track for another record soybean crop. Its farmers are also missing loan payments at a record rate. Both facts are true, and the gap between them holds a lesson for U.S. growers.

    Start with scale. Brazil’s National Supply Company (Conab) expects 6.7 billion bushels in 2026/27, nearly 50% more than the 4.6 billion bushels USDA expects from U.S. fields this year. Brazilian farmers will plant about 122 million acres of soybeans, up 1.4%. That is the smallest increase in 20 years; since 2007/08, area had grown at least 2% every season. Growth is slowing, not stopping. To see why, go back to the boom years of 2020-2022.

    In 2020–2022, Brazilian farmers had the wind at their backs. Brazil’s benchmark interest rate, the Selic, fell to 2%. The U.S.–China trade war steered Chinese buyers toward Brazil. In Mato Grosso, Brazil’s largest soybean state, the cash price averaged about $14.60 per bushel in 2022 and topped $16 that March (Figure 1A). Flush with cash and cheap credit, farmers bought machinery, built storage, and bought or leased more land. 

    Then the cycle turned. By late 2022, the Selic had climbed to 13.75%. Prices slid for three years. By 2025, the Mato Grosso average was about $9.30 per bushel, 36% below its 2022 level. Payments on boom-era machines did not fall with it, and neither did cash rents, so farmers who leased land at boom rents are among the hardest hit.

    Why keep planting? Because cash costs and full costs are different things. The Mato Grosso Institute of Agricultural Economics (IMEA) puts 2026/27 operating costs at about $601 per acre, with an expected 56 bushels per acre. That sets the operating break-even near $7.94 per bushel and the full-cost break-even, which includes land and machinery, near $10.79 (Figure 1B). Early sales near $9.13 fell in between. A farmer may therefore keep planting if the price covers expenses that can still be avoided and financing is available, even if revenue does not cover depreciation and other costs. When a struggling farmer exits, another may take over the acreage.  The acres stay; the operator changes.

    Figure 1. The price boom did not last

    Note: Prices converted to dollars per bushel at each month’s exchange rate (A) and at R$5.50 per dollar (B). Break-evens assume 56 bushels per acre. Sources: Agrolink (2026); Imea & Senar-MT (2026); Banco Central do Brasil (2026). 

    Credit turned the boom into a squeeze (Figure 2). The Center for Advanced Studies on Applied Economics (Cepea) at the University of São Paulo finds that the average rate on rural loans to individuals nearly doubled from 2021 to 2025, to 12.2%, and interest now takes 11.4% of farm income. Defaults followed the squeeze. From 2021 to 2023, only about 1% of rural-loan balances were more than 90 days past due each September. By September 2026, the share was 8.7%, the highest in a decade, and 15.8% on loans at market rates.

    Figure 2. Credit got expensive, and defaults followed

    Note: Panel A shows the average interest rate on rural loans to individuals and their interest payments as a share of farm income. Panel B shows rural loans to individuals more than 90 days past due, as a share of the loan balance, each September from 2016 to 2026. Capped-rate loans carry government-set interest rates under the Plano Safra; market-rate loans are priced by lenders and track the Selic. Sources: Panel A, Cepea/Esalq-USP; Panel B, Central Bank of Brazil, as reported by Valor Econômico (November 16, 2026).

    These are not habitual bad payers. At Banco do Brasil, the largest farm lender, three of every four delinquent farm borrowers are behind for the first time. Most of the money is owed by large, leveraged producers farming leased land: they held 54% of overdue balances but only 8% of problem contracts (Agroicone, 2026).

    Brazil’s safety net is also built differently from ours. It supports farmers mainly through subsidized loans under the Plano Safra, its annual farm-credit program, not through insurance. This year, even that credit is thinning: rural-credit disbursements fell 25.7% from July through October. Subsidized crop insurance covered only about 3% of planted area in 2025, compared with about nine in ten U.S. soybean acres, so an El Niño crop failure would hit farm balance sheets directly.

    What does this mean for U.S. growers? First, Brazil’s distress will not shrink its supply. If anything slows its exports, it will be roads, ports and a growing domestic crush, as discussed in an earlier Southern Ag Today article on Brazil’s supply chain (Calil, 2026). Second, a weak real is not an automatic discount: basis, freight and costlier imported inputs absorb part of it. Third, China still decides much of the split in export share. Brazil supplied 74% of China’s soybean imports in 2025, the United States supplied 15%. China’s purchase pledge helps, but it is not a price floor. Fourth, watch fertilizer and machinery. If the cuts last, relief will come through Brazil’s yields, not its acres.


    Conversions: Brazilian reais converted at R$5.50 per U.S. dollar (Central Bank of Brazil, November 6, 2026) unless noted; one 60-kilogram bag = 2.2046 bushels; 1 metric ton of soybeans = 36.74 bushels; 1 hectare = 2.471 acres.


    References

    Agrolink. (2026). Soja em grão, saca de 60 kg, Mato Grosso: Histórico de cotações [Data set]. https://www.agrolink.com.br/cotacoes/historico/mt/soja-em-grao-sc-60kg

    Alves, L. R. A., & Barros, G. S. A. de C. (2026). Endividamento rural no Brasil, 2013–2026: Custo, composição e concentração da dívida por trás da inadimplência recorde (Texto Ocasional para Discussão No. 4). Centro de Estudos Avançados em Economia Aplicada (Cepea), Esalq/USP. https://www.cepea.org.br/

    Associação Nacional para Difusão de Adubos. (2026). Principais indicadores do setor de fertilizantes [Data set]. ANDA. https://anda.org.br/recursos/

    Banco Central do Brasil. (2026). Taxa de câmbio – Livre – Dólar americano (venda) – Média de período – Mensal (SGS Series 3698) [Data set]. https://www3.bcb.gov.br/sgspub/

    Calil, Y. (2026, March 25). Brazil’s record soybean crop meets a fragile supply chain. Southern Ag Today, 6(13.3). https://southernagtoday.org/2026/02/05/brazils-record-soybean-crop-meets-a-fragile-supply-chain/

    Companhia Nacional de Abastecimento. (2026). Acompanhamento da safra brasileira de grãos: Safra 2026/27, 1º levantamento (Vol. 14, No. 1). Conab. https://www.gov.br/conab/pt-br/atuacao/informacoes-agropecuarias/safras/safra-de-graos/boletim-da-safra-de-graos/1o-levantamento-safra-2026-27/boletim-de-safras-1o-levantamento_2026.pdf

    Instituto Mato-grossense de Economia Agropecuária & Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Rural de Mato Grosso. (2026). Custo de produção agropecuário de Mato Grosso: Soja, safra 2026/27 [Report]. Imea. https://www.imea.com.br/

    Walendorff, R., & Salomão, R. (2026, November 16). Inadimplência avançou com alta dos juros. Valor Econômico, B11.

    World Agricultural Outlook Board. (2026). World agricultural supply and demand estimates (WASDE-677). U.S. Department of Agriculture. https://esmis.nal.usda.gov/sites/default/release-files/796142/wasde1126.pdf


    Recommended citation format: Calil, Yuri. “Bigger Crop, Thinner Wallets: Brazil’s Soybean Paradox.” Southern Ag Today 6(47.4). November 19, 2026. Permalink

  • Growth of Sustainable Aviation Fuel May Create a Potential Market for Miscanthus and Switchgrass in the Southern U.S.

    Growth of Sustainable Aviation Fuel May Create a Potential Market for Miscanthus and Switchgrass in the Southern U.S.

    Authors: Ruiqing Miao, Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, Auburn University, Bijesh Mishra, Postdoctoral Research Associate, School of Public Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology, Mohit Anand, Professor and Chair, Division of Business and Accounting, Miles College, Madhu Khanna, Distinguished Professor, Institute for Sustainability, Energy and Environment, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Fahd Majeed, Postdoctoral Research Associate, Institute for Sustainability, Energy and Environment, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

    Background

    Sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) is a type of aviation fuel that is produced from renewable resources such as animal fats, vegetable oils, grasses, food waste, or agricultural residues. It can be directly used by existing aircraft by blending with conventional jet fuel. SAF has been gaining attention in the United States (U.S.) as European countries and the International Civil Aviation Organization have introduced more stringent environmental regulations. For instance, the European Union (EU)’s ReFuelEU Aviation Regulation requires aviation fuel suppliers at EU airports to supply increasing shares of SAF, from 2% in 2025 to 70% in 2050 (European Commission, n.d.). These regulations also affect U.S. airlines operating international flights from European airports. 

    To help meet growing international demand for SAF, and to support rural economic development, the U.S. federal government has undertaken various initiatives to encourage domestic SAF production. For instance, the SAF Grand Challenge Roadmap Implementation Framework created by the U.S. Departments of Energy, Transportation, and Agriculture set the goal to produce 3 billion gallons of SAF per year by 2030 and 35 billion gallons per year by 2050 in the United States. Moreover, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act extended the $1/gallon tax credit supporting SAF to December 31, 2029. Currently, the 119th Congress is considering several bills that aim to strengthen support for SAF. As a result, the domestic production of SAF has increased dramatically, from about 5 million gallons in 2021 (USDOE, 2025) to 240 million gallons in 2025 (Bracmort, 2026). With continuing policy support and demand from the aviation industry, the production of SAF in the United States is expected to grow.

    An Opportunity for Southern U.S. Farmers 

    This increasing interest in SAF, both internationally and domestically, presents an opportunity for Southern U.S. farmers as biomass feedstock producers. Although most SAF in the United States is currently produced from used cooking oil, animal fats, or vegetable oils (Commercial Aviation Alternative Fuels Initiative, n.d.), high-yielding perennial grasses, such as miscanthus and switchgrass, are promising sources of biomass feedstock for large scale SAF production (U.S. Department of Energy, 2024). The Southern United States has a comparative advantage in producing these crops due to the relatively high yield potential and low land rent in the region. For instance, the yield of miscanthus and switchgrass in the South can reach about 11 and 6 short tons per acre, respectively—about 10-20% higher than yields in other regions (Miao and Khanna, 2014). 

    Based on the yield potential of these grasses, row crop yields, and production cost information, a recent study by Miao et al. (2026) estimates that at a biomass price of around $80 per short ton, U.S. farmers, particularly farmers in the South, will find it profitable to supply sufficient feedstock for producing 3 billion gallons of SAF per year, which requires about 65 million tons of biomass annually. The production costs, including establishment costs as well as fixed and variable costs, are around $45 per ton per year. Miao et al. (2026) find that farmers who switch would be better off by up to 7% compared with growing conventional crops. 

    Figure 1 shows that the projected miscanthus (Map A) and switchgrass (Map B) production at this price is located mainly in the South. Due to the high transportation cost of biomass, biorefineries are assumed to locate near the feedstock production area. Little production would be feasible in the Midwest at $80/ton because of the competition from corn and soybeans. Specifically, for miscanthus, the projected production is located mainly in Oklahoma, Kansas, Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Virginia. For switchgrass, the projected major producing states are the aforementioned states plus Texas, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina. 

    Miao et al. (2026) further show that the projected major producing regions do not vary much with the hypothetical biomass procurement contract types between farmers and biorefineries. Whether it is a fixed-price contract (~$80/ton), a revenue-sharing contract (farmers receive about 35% of revenue from selling SAF), or a land-leasing contract (farmers receive about $180-$190/acre per year of rent from biorefineries), the producing areas are very similar to those shown in Figure 1. Crop insurance for bioenergy crops, if offered by the Risk Management Agency of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, can help farmers manage production risk and facilitate the establishment of the biomass supply chain. 

    Why Might This Time Be Different?

    One may recall that, back in the late 2000s and early 2010s, anticipated cellulosic biofuel development provided potential market opportunities for miscanthus and switchgrass. These opportunities did not materialize due primarily to the high costs of converting cellulosic biomass into fuels. Why might SAF be different this time? One major reason is that, unlike ground transportation, long-distance aviation has very limited alternatives to liquid fuels. For instance, the energy-to-weight ratio of lithium-ion batteries is only about 2% of that of jet fuel (Dalmia et al., 2022), making electric long-distance commercial aviation impractical in the near future.This limitation creates sustained demand for SAF. Moreover, commercial SAF production is already expanding, with the support from the aviation industry’s commitments and U.S. government policy incentives.

    However, the present technological reality for powering long-distance commercial aviation and recent SAF development do not naturally guarantee a market for perennial grasses. Currently, SAF production relies primarily on vegetable oils and animal fats, and technologies remain exploratory for the conversion of switchgrass and miscanthus into SAF at a commercial scale. To establish a reliable biomass market from which Southern farmers can benefit, it is essential to have economically viable biorefineries, appropriate procurement contracts, and risk management tools for biomass production. Nevertheless, while the challenges are real, so is the opportunity. 

    Figure 1. Production distribution of miscanthus (Map A) and switchgrass (Map B) when biomass price is $80/ton (Source: Adapted from Figure 4 in Miao et al., 2026)

    References

    Bracmort, K. 2026. Sustainable aviation fuel (SAF): An overview of current laws and legislation introduced in the 119th Congress (In Focus No. IF12757). Congressional Research Service. Available at: https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/IF12757.html(accessed October 24, 2026).

    Commercial Aviation Alternative Fuels Initiative. (n.d.). Feedstocks. Available at: https://www.caafi.org/feedstocks (accessed November 2, 2026).

    Dalmia, T., Doken, D. N., Kumar, A., Padmanaban, R. M., Sanghi, V., & Shah, H. (2022). Powering the future of electric aviation. Technical Memorandum, National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Available at: https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20220015157(accessed November 2, 2026).

    European Commission. (n.d.). ReFuelEU aviation. Available at: https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-modes/air/environment/refueleu-aviation_en (accessed October 24, 2026).

    Miao, Ruiqing, Bijesh Mishra, Anand, Mohit, Madhu Khanna, and Fahd Majeed. 2026. “Exploring Feedstock Pathways to Three Billion Gallons of Sustainable Aviation Fuel: The Role of Contracts and Bioenergy Crop Insurance.” Applied Economic Perspectives & Policy. doi: https://doi.org/10.1002/aepp.70129

    Miao, Ruiqing and Madhu Khanna. 2014. “Are Bioenergy Crops Riskier than Corn? Implications for Biomass Price”. Choices. 29(1). Available at: https://www.choicesmagazine.org/UserFiles/file/cmsarticle_366.pdf (accessed October 25, 2026).

    U.S. Department of Energy. (2024). 2023 billion-ton report: An assessment of U.S. renewable carbon resources. Edited by M. H. Langholtz. Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Available at: https://doi.org/10.23720/BT2023/2316165 (accessed November 2, 2026).

    U.S. Department of Energy (USDOE). (2025). Federal agencies publish SAF Grand Challenge progress report highlighting historic efforts to grow America’s SAF industry. Available at: https://www.energy.gov/cmei/fuels/articles/federal-agencies-publish-saf-grand-challenge-progress-report-highlighting (accessed October 25, 2026).

    Recommended citation format:

    Miao, Ruiqing, Bijesh Mishra, Anand, Mohit, Madhu Khanna, and Fahd Majeed. 2026. “Growth of Sustainable Aviation Fuel May Create a Potential Market for Miscanthus and Switchgrass in the Southern U.S.” Southern Ag Today x(y). Date. Permalink

  • Thanksgiving Turkey Outlook: Supply Strong, Prices Stable Heading into the Holiday Season

    Thanksgiving Turkey Outlook: Supply Strong, Prices Stable Heading into the Holiday Season

    As Thanksgiving approaches, many families are beginning to plan their holiday meals and wondering what this year’s turkey prices will mean for their grocery budgets. While food prices remain elevated compared to pre-pandemic levels, current data suggest that turkey supplies are adequate and price increases for most consumers should remain modest.

    One of the best indicators of Thanksgiving turkey availability is the amount of turkey currently held in cold storage. September 2026 cold storage inventories were slightly lower than the same month in 2025, although inventories were somewhat higher earlier in the summer. This pattern may simply indicate that turkey products began moving into retail channels earlier this year.

    While current inventories remain below the average levels observed during the previous four years, supplies appear sufficient to meet holiday demand. Barring unexpected disruptions, consumers should not encounter turkey shortages this Thanksgiving.

    Production Continues at Normal Levels

    U.S. turkey production has remained relatively stable throughout 2026. Aside from a temporary decline during spring 2025, production levels have tracked closely with historical patterns and remain consistent with the past five years.

    Stable production has helped maintain adequate supplies despite ongoing concerns about Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). Commercial turkey operations experienced lower HPAI-related losses in 2025 than in 2024 and impacts during 2026 have been even smaller thus far.

    However, producers remain watchful as the fall migration season progresses. Wild bird migrations have historically been associated with increased HPAI risk, and additional outbreaks could affect fresh turkey availability, as outbreaks tend to effect market age birds. That could place upward pressure on available frozen turkey prices.

    Figure 1. Monthly U.S. Turkey Production, 2021-2026

    Cutline: Turkey production has remained remarkably stable during 2026 and is comparable to production levels observed during the previous five years, suggesting ample supplies for the holiday season.

    What Can Consumers Expect to Pay?

    Wholesale market signals provide a mixed picture. Turkey breast prices have fallen sharply, down approximately 58% from the same period last year and near long-term average levels. This indicates that wholesale breast prices have largely returned to normal following unusually high pricing in 2025.

    Conversely, wholesale prices for whole birds remain roughly 40% above historical averages. Retail price data suggest consumers may see mild increases compared with last year, but the changes are unlikely to significantly affect holiday budgets.

    Retail Turkey Price Comparison

    USDA Agricultural Marketing Service weekly advertised retail price survey, October 2026.

    Product                                                    Oct. 2025Oct. 2026% Change$ Change 
    Frozen whole turkey (16 lb.)$1.08/lb ($17.28)$1.23/lb($19.68)+13.9%+$2.40 
    Frozen whole bone-in turkey breast (7 lb.)$1.26/lb($8.82)$1.36/lb($9.52)+7.9%+$0.70

    Cutline: USDA retail survey data show moderate increases in advertised turkey prices compared with last year. A typical 16-pound frozen turkey costs about $2.40 more than in October 2025, while a 7-pound frozen turkey breast costs approximately $0.70 more.

    Bottom Line

    Current production, storage, and HPAI impacts indicate that turkey supplies should be sufficient for Thanksgiving 2026. Although retail prices are slightly higher than last year, the increases are relatively modest, amounting to less than $3 per turkey in most cases. In addition, many grocery retailers routinely feature turkey as a holiday promotional item, which could further reduce consumer costs. For most families, turkey availability and affordability should not be a major concern this Thanksgiving season.


    Recommended citation format: Brothers, Dennis. “Thanksgiving Turkey Outlook: Supply Strong, Prices Stable Heading into the Holiday Season.” Southern Ag Today 6(47.2). November 17, 2026. Permalink

  • Interest in On-Farm Solar among Alabama Farmers

    Interest in On-Farm Solar among Alabama Farmers

    Authors: Jean R. Francois, Kelli J. Russell, and Mykel R. Taylor

    In recent years, solar energy has received growing attention in agriculture for its potential to diversify energy supplies, lower energy costs, and create additional farm income. But how interested are farmers themselves in installing solar panels on their farm operations? In 2025, we surveyed Alabama farmers regarding their (dis)agreement with the statement “I am interested in installing solar panels on my farm.” We summarize their responses and note differences in interest in on-farm solar across stages of their farming careers and plans for the future of their farming operations.

    Among the 258 farmers who responded to the question, approximately one in five respondents expressed interest in installing solar panels (Figure 1). More than half of the respondents expressed no interest in on-farm solar panels. About one-quarter of respondents remained neutral.

    Figure 1. Respondents’ interest in installing solar panels on their farms (n = 258)

    We examined interest in installing solar panels by retirement and succession plans. We combined two questions to create this measure: one asked farmers whether they planned to retire from or quit farming in the next five years (Yes/No), and the other asked whether they had identified a potential successor to take over their farms (Yes/No). 

    Figure 2. Respondents’ interest in installing solar panels on their farms, by retirement and succession plans. Retiring refers to respondents who reported plans to retire within the next five years. 

    We observed the lowest levels of interest (11%) among respondents who planned to retire and had identified a successor (Figure 2). Interest rose to 20% among retiring respondents without an identified successor, which is similar to those who were not planning to retire but had identified a successor. We saw the greatest interest (27%) with respondents who were not planning to retire and had not identified a successor. That is the only group in which fewer than half of respondents (43%) report being uninterested.

    We were also interested in the age composition of these groups. The younger respondents (18-34 years old) expressed the highest interest (35%) (Figure 3), while respondents aged 65 or older had the lowest percentage (18%) expressing interest in on-farm solar. 

    Figure 3. Respondents’ interest in installing solar panels on their farms, by age group.

    We examined solar interest across farm commodities, using respondents’ report of their primary commodity, that is the single crop or livestock commodity of farm product that provided the most total farm sales in 2024. Interest in installing solar panels was relatively similar across commodities. Twenty-four percent of poultry producers expressed interest, compared to 21% of crop producers and 20% of beef cattle producers. However, only 34% of poultry producers expressed no interest, compared with 59% of crop producers and 58% of beef cattle producers.

    Overall, the results suggest that interest in installing solar panels is limited among the survey respondents, with variation across different age groups and retirement and succession circumstances. These descriptive results do not inform us of the reasons behind these differences. The survey question also did not distinguish between installing solar panels for farm energy use and leasing farmland for larger-scale solar development. Respondents may therefore have interpreted the question differently. These different forms of solar development may involve multiple considerations, including cost of installation, energy needs, expected returns, land ownership, and the anticipated future of the farm, to name a few. Understanding how farmers weigh these considerations may help clarify when and why they view on-farm solar as a worthwhile investment.


    Recommended citation format: Francois, Jean R., Kelli J. Russell, and Mykel R. Taylor. “Interest in On-Farm Solar among Alabama Farmers.” Southern Ag Today 6(47.1). November 16, 2026. Permalink

  • Status of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) Tariff Litigation

    Status of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) Tariff Litigation

    At the onset of 2025, President Trump laid tariffs on Mexico, Canada, and China under a claim of authority from the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). This act, passed in 1977, grants the president the authority to “regulate . . . importation” in response to a declared national emergency. President Trump claimed that “poisonous fentanyl” and “the extraordinary threat posed by illegal aliens” had led to national emergencies in the U.S., which justified the imposition of tariffs under IEEPA. Whether IEEPA actually allowed for a president to implement tariffs was a question raised in multiple lawsuits and eventually the Supreme Court stepped in to provide their answer. 

    The Supreme Court’s Decision 

    Two separate cases were ultimately consolidated in the Supreme Court’s decision regarding the IEEPA tariffs. One casebegan in the Court of International Trade (CIT) when a group of businesses filed a complaint asserting that IEEPA did not authorize the president to impose tariffs. The second case, originally filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, similarly challenged the scope of IEEPA’s authority. After both cases were appealed to the Supreme Court, the Court combined both cases in its decision of Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump. There, the Supreme Court sought to answer the question which had prompted both lower court cases: Does IEEPA authorize the President to impose tariffs? 

    To resolve this dispute, the Supreme Court needed to determine whether “regulate . . . importation” included the authority to lay tariffs. First, the Court noted that the Constitution gives Congress the exclusive power to lay and collect taxes, which has historically included tariffs. According to the Court, when Congress wishes to confer its authority to lay taxes and tariffs it will do so “clearly.” The Court reasoned that “when Congress has delegated its tariff powers, it has done so in explicit terms, and subject to strict limits.” 

    Here, the Court ultimately determined that Congress had not explicitly conferred the authority to impose tariffs through IEEPA. In reaching this conclusion, the Court looked at precedent and the text of IEEPA itself.  First, no President has ever relied on IEEPA to impose tariffs. Given this lack of precedent and the “breadth of authority” now being claimed under IEEPA, the Court concluded that the IEEPA tariffs were beyond the President’s “legitimate reach.” Second, and perhaps most importantly, the word “tariff” is not mentioned anywhere in IEEPA’s text. The Court reasoned that if Congress had intended for IEEPA to include the power to lay tariffs, it would have made that clear in IEEPA’s text, “as it consistently has in other tariff statutes.” Without any historical precedent or clear Congressional intent, the Court concluded in a 6-3 decision that IEEPA did not authorize the President to impose tariffs. 

    The Aftermath 

    The Court’s decision vacated the IEEPA tariffs, however it did not discuss the issue of potential refunds. Considering the massive impact of the IEEPA tariffs, this left many businesses wondering if and how refunds would be issued for the now vacated IEEPA tariffs. Following an order to begin issuing refunds from the CIT, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) outlined its new system for processing and issuing IEEPA refunds. The Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries (CAPE) system is a digital portal where importers can file a refund claim for duties paid while the tariffs were in effect. The CAPE system is being implemented through a “phased development” with system functions being implemented over time. Businesses who paid duties pursuant to the IEEPA tariffs should visit CBP’s website to learn more about potential IEEPA refunds under the CAPE system. 

    Shortly after the Court vacated the IEEPA tariffs, President Trump announced that he would be implementing a global 10% tariff rate. This time, President Trump claimed the tariffs were authorized by Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974. As was the case with IEEPA, no President had ever relied on Section 122 to implement tariffs. Unlike IEEPA, Section 122 does explicitly grant the President the authority to impose tariffs. However, the Section 122 tariffs would still go on to face legal challenges. Currently, the Section 122 tariffs are still in effect at an increased rate of 15%, but this is subject to change depending on the outcome of ongoing litigation. Regardless, these tariffs are indicative of the Administration’s ongoing intent to continue placing emphasis on tariffs in its international trade strategy. 

    Conclusion

    The IEEPA tariffs dominated international trade headlines while still in effect. Reportedly, nearly $140 billion in duties were collected from the IEEPA tariffs by December of 2025. Naturally, this means that many businesses felt their effects. While the IEEPA tariffs may now be vacated, refunds and tariffs enacted under other statutes remain an important issue for many business owners. To learn more about the Supreme Court’s decision to vacate the IEEPA tariffs, click here. To learn more about the aftermath of the Court’s decision, click here. 


    Recommended citation format: Scobey, Will. “Status of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) Tariff Litigation.” Southern Ag Today 6(46.5). November 13, 2026. Permalink