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Federal District Court Holds the 2025 Adverse Effect Wage Rate Interim Final Rule Unlawful
On August 25, 2026, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California issued a ruling in United Farm Workers v. United States Department of Labor, 1:25-cv-01614-KES-EGC, holding that the 2025 Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR) Interim Final Rule (IFR) was unlawful under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).

Background

On October 2, 2025, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) published an IFR altering the methodology used to calculate the AEWR for the H-2A Program. There were four key components of the new rule:
1. DOL will utilize the Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics (OEWS) survey, instead of the discontinued USDA Farm Labor Survey (FLS) as its data source for wages.
2. DOL selected five Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) codes that most H-2A jobs are performed under. The job duties that the worker spends most of their time performing will be used to determine which classification code and AEWR they are paid.
3. DOL created a tiered system, dividing H-2A workers into skill level I and skill level II. Each skill level will get a separate AEWR.
4. The new AEWR methodology will include an adjustment on the worker’s hourly wage for the cost of hosting provided by the employer.
Typically, under the APA, final rules must go through a notice and comment period, where the public can submit comments and the agency must consider the comments when promulgating the final rule. For the AEWR IFR, DOL utilized the “good cause” exception under the APA to bypass notice and comment rulemaking.

On November 21, 2025, the plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the IFR violated the APA because it was “arbitrary and capricious,” and DOL “failed to demonstrate good cause to bypass notice-and-comment rulemaking.”

Arbitrary and Capricious Challenge

The plaintiffs alleged that all four components of the IFR are “arbitrary and capricious” under the APA. Under the APA, an agency action is arbitrary and capricious if “the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”[i] The court evaluated each component separately under the arbitrary and capricious standard.

Tiered System

Historically, the DOL set the AEWR at the mean wage for all workers in a specific state or region. Within the IFR, DOL stated that “setting AEWRs at the mean would tend to overstate wages for similarly employed American agricultural workers with less experience and understate wages for similarly employed American agricultural workers with more experience.”[ii] To remedy this, under the new tier system, DOL will set a wage for each of the five SOC codes under two tiers. The wage for a skill level I worker will be set at the 17^th wage percentile for all workers and the wage for a skill level II will be set at the 50^th wage percentile. DOL claims that over 90% of H-2A workers will fall under skill level I. The plaintiffs alleged that setting most H-2A wages at the 17^th percentile would decrease wages below the market-based wage rate and negatively impact U.S. workers who perform the same duties, violating the statutes under the H-2A program. The court agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that while using a tier system is not necessarily unreasonable, the wage rates that DOL used under the tier system it chose are unreasonable, and arbitrary and capricious. The court held that wages under the H-2A program must not adversely affect domestic employees and the “IFR failed to reasonably consider whether its methodology could fulfill DOL’s statutory duty.”[iii]

Housing Adjustment

Under the H-2A Program requirements, employers are required to provide free housing to their H-2A workers and any domestic workers who cannot return to their home within the same day. DOL claims that the housing requirement creates a disparity between H-2A and domestic workers. The IFR will calculate AEWRs with an adjustment in the hourly rate to account for the costs of housing provided to H-2A workers, but will not change its requirements to provide free housing to all H-2A workers and some domestic workers. The housing adjustment will be based on a forty-hour work week and the average fair market rent of a four-bedroom unit within the state. The plaintiffs claim that the housing adjustment is contrary to H-2A program requirements and violates the APA for three reasons. First, the plaintiffs argued that H-2A workers end up being less expensive for employers because of the housing adjustment, which violates the statutory requirement that utilizing H-2A workers cannot negatively impact domestic workers. Second, the plaintiffs argued that the wages set under the IFR charge workers for housing that is supposed to be provided to workers at no cost under H-2A program regulations. Third, the plaintiffs argued that a per hour adjustment for housing charges H-2A workers more than the value of the housing because most H-2A workers work more than forty hours per week. The court also agreed with the plaintiffs on this component, holding that DOL failed to show that the housing adjustment would not create wages for H-2A workers, and therefore adversely affect domestic workers.

OEWS Survey Data Source

Prior to the IFR, DOL utilized the USDA FLS as the data set to set the AEWR because it includes farm establishments in its data set. In August 2025, USDA discontinued the FLS. DOL replaced the FLS with the OEWS because the OEWS provides state or regional level data for agricultural jobs. However, the OEWS only includes data from farm contractors, not farm establishments. The plaintiffs claimed that OEWS is improper for two reasons. First, farm labor contractors only employ a minority of H-2A workers. Second, utilizing data that only includes farm labor contractors would lead to lower AEWRs because “those employed by farm labor contractors are less educated, less likely to be U.S. citizens than employees of farm establishments, and typically have substantially lower wages.”[iv] The plaintiffs provided several alternative data sources or calculations that DOL could have used instead of the OEWR. The court held that DOL failed to consider what problems utilizing the OEWR would cause and reasonable alternatives in its rulemaking, which constitutes an arbitrary and capricious decision.

Greater than 50% Rule

Under the IFR, the worker receives the hourly AEWR for the job that they spend greater than 50% of their time doing. Under prior regulations, the worker received the hourly rate for the highest job classification they worked in no matter how much time they spent doing that job. The plaintiffs claimed that the greater than 50% rule would encourage employers to utilize many H-2A workers to perform higher wage work, instead of having employees whose primary responsibility is the higher paid work, decreasing the average wages, which would adversely affect U.S. workers performing similar work. The plaintiffs identified alternatives to the greater than 50% rule that DOL could have considered. The court agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that “failure to consider such an alternative – and failure to consider whether the greater than 50% rule is consistent with its statutory duty to protect U.S. farmworkers’ wages from the adverse effects of hiring H-2A workers – renders its decision arbitrary and capricious.”[v]

Good Cause Challenge

The plaintiffs further allege that DOL improperly utilized the good cause exception to bypass APA notice and comment rulemaking requirements. Under the APA, notice and comment rulemaking can be bypassed if “the agency for good cause finds that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.”[vi] DOL claimed that it was facing a December 31, 2025 deadline to identify a new data source and lower wages were necessary to solve an agricultural labor shortage. The court concluded that the good cause exception was properly invoked for utilizing a new data source because the prior data source, the FLS, had been discontinued and DOL was required to publish new AEWR by December 31, 2025. The court also concluded that DOL improperly invoked the good cause exception for the housing adjustment, greater than 50% rule, and tiered wage system because these three components were not tied to a December 31, 2025, deadline. Finally, the court held that DOL failed to explain why lowering wages would solve the agricultural labor shortage when H-2A visas are not statutorily capped.

Next Steps

The court held the IFR unlawful but did not vacate the rule. Instead, the court remanded the case requiring DOL to “promptly produce a new methodology for calculating AEWRs for H-2A workers that is consistent with this Order, and to promptly publish new AEWRs under that methodology.”[vii] The court is also requiring DOL to notify all state workforce agencies, employers, and the public, within seven days of the order that employers may be required to backpay their H-2A workers. The plaintiffs asked the court to require employers to backpay H-2A workers for wages paid between the date of notice and the date a new methodology is issued. Lastly, the court is requiring both parties to brief the backpay issue once the new methodology is published. Until a new methodology is published, DOL may continue to utilize the methodology imposed under the IFR, but backpay may be awarded by the court when a new methodology that complies with the court’s order is issued.

[i] United Farm Workers v. United States Department of Labor, 1:25-cv-01614-KES-EGC, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2026) (citing Motor Veh, Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).

[ii] Id.at *10.

[iii] Id. at *14.

[iv] Id. at *17 (citing 75 Fed. Reg. at 6901).

[v] Id. at *21.

[vi] Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B)).

[vii] Id. at *28.

Recommended citation format: Capaldo, Samantha. “Federal District Court Holds the 2025 Adverse Effect Wage Rate Interim Final Rule Unlawful.” Southern Ag Today 6(41.5). October 9, 2026. Permalink
October 9, 2026

What the U.S.-China Board of Trade Could Mean for American Agriculture

In September 2026, the United States and China established the U.S.-China Board of Trade, creating a framework through which government officials can discuss trade issues and oversee trade initiatives between the two countries. Announced during the recent state visit by President Xi Jinping, the Board is intended to provide a regular forum for addressing trade concerns and exploring areas of mutual commercial interest (The White House, 2026). Unlike traditional trade agreements, which typically involve comprehensive negotiations and formal legislative approval, the Board functions as an executive-level arrangement through which officials can meet, exchange proposals, and consider targeted trade initiatives.

The Board’s first major initiative is the 30-for-30 Framework, announced on September 27, 2026. Under this arrangement, officials from both countries identified reciprocal lists of products representing approximately $30 billion in annual bilateral trade value on each side, with a view toward providing more favorable tariff and regulatory treatment. In simple terms, the framework seeks to expand trade in selected products rather than negotiate a broad trade agreement covering entire sectors of the economy. Whether the initiative ultimately leads to substantial increases in bilateral trade remains uncertain, but it establishes a process through which products may be considered for reduced trade barriers (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2026).

How will agriculture fare under the 30-for-30 Framework? China has historically been one of the most important foreign markets for U.S. agricultural products, yet trade was significantly disrupted by the tariffs and trade tensions that emerged in recent years. U.S. agricultural exports to China approached $40 billion in 2022 but declined to approximately $8 billion by 2025 (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2026). Given this decline, the inclusion of agricultural commodities among the products identified for possible tariff relief has attracted considerable attention.

At this stage, any assessment of the framework’s implications for agriculture is necessarily speculative. The arrangement remains a work in progress, and future tariff reductions, product coverage, and implementation details will continue to be shaped by ongoing discussions between the two countries. As a result, it is too early to determine how the framework may ultimately affect agricultural trade. Nevertheless, the product list proposed by the Chinese government may provide some initial insight into the sectors viewed as potential areas for expanded trade.

Table 1 provides a broad overview of the products included in China’s proposed import list under the 30-for-30 Framework. Based on the more than 1,600 tariff lines identified in the translated schedule (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2026), the list appears to be heavily concentrated in food and agricultural products, which account for an estimated 83% of all tariff lines. Forestry products represent approximately 10%, while medical equipment, fibers, and other industrial products comprise relatively small shares. Among individual chapters, live animals, processed fruits and vegetables, wood products, oilseeds and seeds, vegetables, fish and seafood, fruits and nuts, and meats account for the largest number of tariff lines. These estimates should be interpreted with caution because the final product coverage may change. Even so, the composition of the proposed list suggests that agriculture and related sectors are likely to play a central role in any future expansion of U.S.-China trade under the framework.

Table 1. Composition of China’s Proposed 30-for-30 Import List by Broad Sector

Sector	Tariff lines	Share of tariff lines (%)
All Products (total tariff lines)	1,619	100.0
Food and Agriculture (HS 01 to 24)	1,341	82.8
Forestry (HS 44 to 46)	162	10.0
Fibers (HS 50 to 53)	40	2.5
Medical Equipment (HS 90+)	48	3.0
Other Industrial Products	28	1.7

Note: Food and Agriculture is defined according to the World Trade Organization. HS is the Harmonized System Chapters. Estimates are based on the translated product list provided by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Source: Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2026

References

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. 2026. Ambassador Greer Issues a Statement on Announcement of Recommendations from the U.S.-China Board of Trade. Press Releases (September 27, 2026). https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/september/ambassador-greer-issues-statement-announcement-recommendations-us-china-board-trade

U.S. Department of Agriculture. 2026. Global Agricultural Trade System. Foreign Agricultural Service. https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/Default.aspx.

The White House. 2026. U.S.-China Board of Trade. Releases (September 27, 2026). https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/09/u-s-china-board-of-trade/

Muhammad, Andrew. “What the U.S.-China Board of Trade Could Mean for American Agriculture.“ Southern Ag Today 6(41.4). October 8, 2026. Permalink

October 8, 2026

Corn and Soybeans: Is There a Best Month to Price New Crop?

Authors: Julio Bellodi Cortarelli and Grant Gardner

Every year, producers face the same question: when should I price the new crop? Price too early and a summer weather rally can leave you watching prices climb with regret. Wait, and the rally may never come. So, when during the year do good pre-harvest pricing opportunities tend to show up?

In this article, we analyze daily settlement prices (CME Group) for December corn futures across 35 contract years (1990-2024) and November soybean futures across 32 (1993-2024), tracking each contract through the final year of its life, from the day the prior year’s contract expired (the roll) to the day it expired itself. The soybean series starts later because 1993 is the first year in our data with a complete contract of daily prices. We define a good marketing day as any day the price closed in the top quarter of that contract year’s prices. The hit rate is the percentage of each month’s trading days that were good marketing days, adjusted for the differing number of trading days in a month. If good days were spread evenly across the year, every month would sit near 25%.

On average, corn shows a clear pattern (Figure 1). Every month from the December roll through June averages a hit rate at or above 28%, and then the rate falls away: 21% in July, 13% in August, and 12% in September. Soybeans are flatter: every month averages between 20% and 31%, and no month stands out. In both crops, however, the vertical lines matter more than the bars. Every month’s range reaches zero, so even the best months deliver almost nothing in some years, and most months have also topped 80% of their days in their best years. Corn’s late summer is the exception on the upside: even its strongest years rarely pushed August above 40%.

Figure 1 may not line up with intuition. Most producers can remember a year when the best prices showed up in a summer weather rally, and seasonal price averages back that memory up (Maples and Gardner, 2023). Rally years happen, but most years are not rally years, and the average reflects that. What separates one kind of year from another is the balance sheet. When we cut the data into three groups by the marketing year’s final stocks-to-use ratio (ending stocks divided by total use, USDA Economic Research Service), the good marketing days land in a different part of the year for each group (Figure 2).

In tight-stocks years, both crops behave the same way: the good days come at harvest and after. Corn’s harvest window runs a 38% hit rate and soybeans 43%, well above the 25% benchmark, while the winter months in both crops fall well below it.

In average years, the crops part ways. Corn’s opportunities shift to the winter window while its harvest hit rate collapses to 7%. Soybeans instead concentrate in the growing season, the classic weather-market year.

In comfortable years, the good days come earliest. Corn’s good days sit in winter, with a second window during the growing season, and soybeans move almost entirely to winter. Harvest offers little in either crop: a 1% hit rate in corn and 12% in soybeans.

For corn, the lesson is a threshold: waiting for harvest paid off only when stocks were tight. For soybeans, it is a slide: as supplies build, the good days move from harvest to the growing season to winter. In these years, tight meant ending stocks near 9% of annual use for corn and 6% for soybeans; comfortable meant roughly double that. Producers never see the final number in advance, but USDA publishes a running projection each month in the World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) report; the September WASDE puts 2026/27 near 10% for corn and 7% for soybeans.

These patterns matter now because the balance sheet is tightening. After running above its recent norm from 2023 through 2025, stocks-to-use projections for 2026/27 are just below normal for both crops, which puts the year in our average group. In average years the opportunities have come early: corn’s good days concentrated in the winter window and soybeans’ in the growing season. For the 2027 crop, that pattern points to the months just ahead: December through March for corn and the spring and summer months for soybeans, so long as the balance sheet stays near its current range. If supplies tighten further, history says the harvest window comes back into play.

Still, no single month can be counted on. The range lines in Figure 1 show the same month delivering almost no good days in one year and nearly all of them in another. Stocks shift the odds, but they do not remove the risk. These windows tell producers when to pay attention; production costs, expected yield, and insurance coverage tell them when to act.

Figure 1. Average good marketing day hit rate by contract month, December corn and November soybean futures. Bars show the percentage of each month’s own trading days that closed at or above the contract year’s 75th percentile price, averaged across contract years. The dashed line marks the 25% benchmark expected if the calendar did not matter; vertical lines show the 10th–90th percentile range across years. Months marked * and + are the partial months just after the roll and just before expiration, about 10 trading days each. Source: CME December Corn and November Soybean Futures.

Figure 2. Average good marketing day hit rate by marketing window and stocks-to-use category. Contract years are sorted into thirds by ending stocks-to-use relative to its own 11-year median. Windows for corn: winter (Dec–Mar), growing season (Apr–Jul), harvest (Aug–Dec); for soybeans: winter (Nov–Mar), growing season (Apr–Aug), harvest (Sep–Nov). The dashed line marks the 25% benchmark. Source: CME futures; USDA ERS Feed Grains and Oil Crops Yearbooks.

REFERENCES

CME Group. December Corn Futures (1990–2024) and November Soybean Futures (1993–2024), daily settlement prices.

Maples, W.E., and G. Gardner. “Using Historical Price Movements to Inform Marketing Decisions.” Southern Ag Today 3(51.1), December 18, 2023. https://southernagtoday.org/2023/12/18/using-historical-price-movements-to-inform-marketing-decisions/

USDA Economic Research Service. Feed Grains Yearbook and Oil Crops Yearbook (ending stocks-to-use).

Recommended citation format: Cortarelli, Julio Bellodi, and Grant Gardner. ” Corn and Soybeans: Is There a Best Month to Price New Crop?” Southern Ag Today 6(41.3). October 7, 2026. Permalink

October 7, 2026
A Shipload of Beef? Examining the First Tranche of Imports

Last month, President Trump announced a plan to allow 300,000 metric tons of beef to enter the United States over a 90-day period without being subject to out-of-quota tariffs. The plan was part of a broader effort to lower beef prices for consumers. We are now more than a month into the 90-day window and have enough data to examine how much beef has actually been imported under the plan.

The import plan is divided into three monthly tranches, with a new 100,000 metric ton tariff-rate quota (TRQ) available each month. Importantly, this new quota does not apply to beef coming from countries that already have their own treatment under the existing U.S. beef import system. Canada and Mexico are not subject to the beef TRQ, while Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, and Uruguay have country-specific quotas.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection reports weekly imports entered under the “Affordable Beef” quota. As of September 8, 15,370 metric tons had entered under the first 100,000 metric ton tranche. That total increased to 22,156 metric tons by September 14, 31,129 metric tons by September 21, and 37,486 metric tons by September 28. Thus, 37.5% of the first tranche had been filled by the end of September, leaving approximately 62,514 metric tons of the initial 100,000 metric ton allocation unused.

Beyond the obvious observation that the first tranche was well below its allocated quantity, the more important question is how much of the beef imported under the new quota represents beef that would not have otherwise entered the United States. In other words, how much of it is actually “new beef”? As we discussed when the plan was first announced, some beef entering under the Affordable Beef quota may have already been expected to enter the U.S. market but can now do so under the expanded quota rather than being subject to the out-of-quota tariff. Separating those imports from truly additional imports is important for understanding how much the policy has actually increased U.S. beef supplies.

The first graph in this article shows annual U.S. beef and veal imports, along with USDA’s 2026 forecasts from the July WASDE, before the plan was announced, and the September WASDE, after the plan was announced. Between July and September, USDA increased its 2026 beef import forecast by 64,455 metric tons on a product-weight basis. That increase is equivalent to about 21% of the 300,000 metric tons included in the Affordable Beef plan. If we apply that same 21% to the 37,486 metric tons imported under the Affordable Beef quota through September 28, approximately 8,054 metric tons would represent beef that was not already expected to enter the United States this year.

Another way to estimate the amount of new beef is to compare September imports with what the countries eligible to use the Affordable Beef quota have historically shipped to the United States. The second graph shows monthly beef imports from Brazil, Nicaragua, and a group we refer to as “Other Countries.” From 2022 through 2025, September imports from these countries averaged 15,550 metric tons. Through September 28 of this year, 37,486 metric tons had entered under the Affordable Beef quota, or 21,936 metric tons more than the previous four-year September average. This means the amount of “new beef” was considerably larger than the estimate based on the change in USDA’s annual import forecast, but still well below the 100,000 metric tons available under the first tranche of the policy.

There is not a great way to determine exactly how much additional beef this plan from the Trump administration will bring into the United States. The two approaches we used estimate that between 8,054 and 21,936 metric tons were imported in September that would not have otherwise been imported. Of course, both estimates rely on a set of assumptions and use data from the Commodity Status Report, which is subject to change before USDA-ERS publishes its monthly beef trade data.

The main point is that 100,000 metric tons of new beef imports did not materialize in September, and there was no noticeable change in retail beef prices. Even imported beef still has to undergo further processing and move through the marketing system before it is sold to consumers. Increasing the amount of beef that can enter the United States does not mean that the full amount will be imported, nor does it mean that any increase in imports will immediately translate into lower retail beef prices.

Source: USDA WAOB

Source: USDA-ERS.

Recommended citation format: Mitchell, James. “A Shipload of Beef? Examining the First Tranche of Imports.” Southern Ag Today 6(41.2). October 6, 2026. Permalink

October 6, 2026
Irrigation Footprints Across the Southern Region

Authors: Falin Sun, Ph. D Student, Auburn University and Sunjae Won, Assistant professor, University of Arkansas.

Irrigation plays very different roles across the Southern region. According to the 2022 Census of Agriculture, Arkansas, Texas, and Mississippi account for the largest shares of irrigated farmland, while Virginia, Kentucky, and Alabama irrigate comparatively little. These differences reflect the region’s diverse production systems and water resources, making irrigation an important farm-management issue across the South.

Figure 1 compares irrigated farms and irrigated acreage across Southern states. States with the largest irrigated acreage do not necessarily have the greatest number of irrigated farms. For example, Mississippi’s irrigated land is concentrated on relatively few, larger farms, whereas Georgia has irrigation distributed across many more operations. This contrast illustrates how farm size, crop mix, and production systems influence irrigation adoption beyond acreage alone.

Figure 2 highlights where irrigated acreage changed between 1997 and 2022. Declines in West Texas and parts of Oklahoma are consistent with long-term pressure on the Ogallala Aquifer and declining groundwater availability (Hornbeck and Keskin, 2014). In the Rio Grande Valley, unreliable surface-water supplies, increasing municipal water demand, and urban expansion have reduced irrigation opportunities, while improvements in irrigation efficiency do not necessarily reduce total agricultural water use (Ward and Pulido-Velazquez, 2008). Florida experienced substantial declines following the widespread impacts of citrus greening, which has significantly reduced citrus production since the mid-2000s (Bové, 2006). In contrast, counties across the Mississippi Delta and South Georgia recorded notable increases in irrigated acreage, reflecting the availability of relatively shallow groundwater and growing use of irrigation to reduce production risks associated with variable rainfall and periodic drought (USDA ERS, 2022).

These regional areas of transition highlight the difficult farm-management and risk-management decisions of shifting to, or away from, irrigated production. The contrasting trends shown in Figure 2 suggest that producers adapt irrigation decisions to local water availability, production systems, and economic conditions. In water-constrained areas, improving irrigation efficiency and adjusting crop choices may provide greater benefits than expanding irrigated acreage. In regions where irrigation continues to grow, producers should carefully evaluate whether additional investments will remain profitable under changing rainfall patterns, rising pumping costs, and future water availability. Extension programs can further support these decisions by providing region-specific recommendations on irrigation scheduling, technology adoption, and long-term water management.

Figure 1. Irrigated farms and irrigated acreage in Southern states, 2022.

Source: USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2022 Census of Agriculture.

Figure 2. Change in irrigated agricultural land by county, 1997-2022.

Source: USDA Economic Research Service using USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, 1997 and 2022 Census of Agriculture data.

References

U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service. 2022. 2022 Census of Agriculture. https://www.nass.usda.gov/AgCensus/

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. 2022. Trends in Irrigated Agriculture Reveal Sector’s Ability To Adapt to Evolving Climatic, Resource, and Market Conditions. Amber Waves. https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2022/january/trends-in-irrigated-agriculture-reveal-sector-s-ability-to-adapt-to-evolving-climatic-resource-and-market-conditions

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. 2026. Irrigation & Water Use. https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-practices-management/irrigation-water-use/

Bové, J. M. 2006. Huanglongbing: A destructive, newly-emerging, century-old disease of citrus. Journal of Plant Pathology 88(1): 7-37.

Hornbeck, Richard, and Pinar Keskin. 2014. The Historically Evolving Impact of the Ogallala Aquifer: Agricultural Adaptation to Groundwater and Drought. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 6(1): 190-219.

Ward, Frank A., and Manuel Pulido-Velazquez. 2008. Water Conservation in Irrigation Can Increase Water Use. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105(47): 18215-18220.

Recommended citation format: Sun, Falin. “Irrigation Footprints Across the Southern Region.” Southern Ag Today 6(41.1). October 5, 2026. Permalink

October 5, 2026