Author: Christopher Clark

  • Fixtures and Farm Leases

    Fixtures and Farm Leases

    Farm tenants often make improvements to the farm they are leasing. Building or repairing sheds or barns are an example, as is a tenant purchasing and installing irrigation equipment. However, before doing so, tenants should consider the legal status of these investments.  This issue is important as almost 40% of U.S. farmland is rented/leased (Figure 1).

    Legally, property comes in two forms, real and personal. Real property is land and everything growing upon or attached to it. Personal property is essentially everything else. A fixture, however, is personal property that becomes real property by being incorporated into or attached to real property.  Figure 2 provides an illustration of these concepts. 

    Whether an improvement qualifies as a fixture is important because fixtures are owned by the owner of the real property to which they become attached, regardless of who owned them before they were attached. Absent an agreement to the contrary, a landowner is entitled to keep fixtures at the end of a lease. Further, a tenant’s insurance may not cover a fixture, and if the landowner has a mortgage, the landlord’s lender may have a security interest in it, while the tenant’s lender may not.  

    Courts typically consider three factors when determining whether personal property has become a fixture. The first is whether the object is physically or constructively attached to real property. Constructive attachment occurs when the object comprises a necessary, integral, or working part of another object that is physically attached to real property. The second factor is whether the object is adapted to the use of real property. Thus, the more useful an article is to normal operations conducted on the property, the more likely it is to be considered a fixture. However, the most important of the three factors is whether there is evidence that the tenant intended to attach the object permanently. Courts are likely to presume such intent if removing the object would cause material injury to the real property or other fixtures. However, the best evidence of the parties’ intent is a provision in a written lease specifically stating who owns the improvement and what is to happen to it at the end of the lease. Tenants who make improvements without such language risk losing ownership and control of those improvements.

  • Carbon Markets Are Not Like Other Markets

    Carbon Markets Are Not Like Other Markets

    Carbon markets are increasingly viewed as a way to combat climate change and supplement farm and forest landowner income. However, carbon markets differ from most other product markets in meaningful ways. First, buyers in carbon markets will generally be unable to determine product quality, as measured in terms of actual reductions in carbon emissions or increases in sequestration. When buyers in other markets cannot readily observe product quality, they often rely on third parties to provide that information. Governments sometimes play the role of information providers when the quality under consideration has wider social benefits. Examples include automobile fuel efficiency and household appliance energy efficiency.

    Carbon markets also differ from other markets in that both buyers and sellers in carbon markets have an incentive to overstate quality, i.e., the amount of reduction or sequestration that occurs. In voluntary markets, buyers participate to generate goodwill amongst consumers, investors, and policymakers. In regulatory markets, buyers participate to satisfy a regulatory requirement. Thus, buyers are motivated – not by actual emissions reduction or sequestration – but by the “credit” they receive from governmental regulators or the public. 

    Because of these differences, regulators and the public will be unlikely to extend this credit without third-party monitoring and verification. However, thorough but burdensome monitoring and verification will increase transaction costs and discourage market participation. On the other hand, lax monitoring and verification will erode trust in the market. Balancing these two will be critical for market success. Similarly, successful participation by landowners will require balancing potential revenue gains against the implementation, opportunity, and transaction costs of participation.

    Clark, Christopher D. . “Carbon Markets Are Not Like Other Markets“. Southern Ag Today 2(6.5). February 4, 2022. Permalink