Author: Hunter Biram

  • How can crop marketing and crop insurance go together?

    How can crop marketing and crop insurance go together?

    Agriculture is inherently risky, with producers facing a complex array of production, market, and financial risks. These risks can significantly impact farm profitability, necessitating robust risk management strategies. Risk management in agriculture has become a complex system of financial instruments and strategies, with crop insurance and forward contracting serving as two key components.

    Forward contracting allows producers to mitigate price risk by securing a predetermined price and buyer for their grain. This approach can be especially attractive due to the potential weather risk premium embedded in forward contract grain prices. Buyers are often willing to pay higher prices to hedge against weather-related uncertainties affecting crop production, which allows farmers to lock in favorable prices and potentially increase their revenue. However, it’s crucial to note that while forward contracting addresses market risk, it does not directly mitigate production risk. Aggressive use of forward contracting can expose farmers to unexpected yield risk as farmers may be unable to meet contracted quantities, leading to non-delivery penalties imposed by elevators and potentially substantial financial losses.

    Farmers can also purchase crop insurance as a complementary risk management tool to address the production risk associated with forward contracting. The federal crop insurance program offers various products, with yield (YP) and revenue protection (RP) accounting for 71% of the $158.6 billion of liability in 2024 (USDA-RMA, 2024). YP provides production risk management using a farm-specific Actual Production History (APH), while RP additionally provides price risk management using futures prices. Pairing forward contracting with either insurance product could potentially help offset non-delivery penalties and reduce the financial burden on farmers who experience yield shortfalls. The combination of forward contracting and insurance protection allows farmers to confidently engage in more aggressive marketing strategies. By protecting against both price and yield risks with RP and yield risk with YP, this integrated approach could potentially lead to a more stable farm income and improved overall risk management.

    We provide a visual example of how these two risk management tools can work together in Figure 1 below. The red bar is the potential revenue generated from corn production by locking in a price of $4.50/bushel via a forward contract at a farm yield expectation of 200 bushels/acre. If a farmer booked 80% of expected production, the expected revenue from forward contracting would be $720.00/acre. The blue bar behind the red bar shows an RP crop insurance policy at 80% coverage that is layered underneath the expected revenue from forward contracting which guarantees $744.00/acre.

    Figure 1. Layers of Protection Provided by Simultaneously Using Revenue Protection (RP) Crop Insurance and Forward Contracting in the Local Cash Market 

    NOTE: The purpose of this figure is to show two different “layers” of revenue coming from two different revenue risk management tools: forward contracting and RP crop insurance. The forward contracted revenue is in red while the crop insurance revenue guarantee is in blue behind the forward contracted revenue.

    To illustrate the importance of this “layering” strategy, consider when a yield shortfall occurs leaving only 150 bushels/acre to sell at the forward price of $4.50/bushel rather than the 160 bushels/acre promised for delivery. This leaves a 10 bushel/acre shortfall. The local grain elevator is offering a cash delivery price of $4.00/bushel with a $0.05/bushel non-delivery penalty resulting in a non-delivery price of $4.05/bushel, and therefore, a total penalty of $40.50/acre. The resulting harvest revenue is about $635.00/acre (see table 1). Despite the penalty, the RP policy – which is in blue underneath the forward priced grain – provides an indemnity of $121.00/acre at a producer-paid premium of $56.00/acre. This results in a final cash revenue of about $700.00/acre rather than $635.00/acre, showing how the RP policy was able to pull crop revenue almost completely back to the expected amount of $720.00/acre despite the inability to fully deliver the promised amount (see table 2). This finding highlights the benefit of locking in prices during spring time as part of a pre-harvest marketing plan.

    Table 1. Calculating Crop Revenue Using a Forward Price and Non-Delivery Penalty

    Expected Yield (a) 200 bpa
    Booked Yield (b = 80% x  a)160 bpa
    Realized Yield (c)150 bpa
    Yield Shortfall (d = b – c)10 bpa
      
    Forward Price (e)$4.50/bushel
    Harvest Price (f)$4.00/bushel
    Non-Delivery Fee (g)$0.05/bushel
    Non-Delivery Price (h = f + g)$4.05/bushel
      
    Forward -Priced Revenue (i= c x e)$675.00/acre
    Non-Delivery Penalty (w = d x h)$40.50/acre
    Revenue with Penalty (i– w)$634.50/acre
    Note: bpa = bushels per acre

    Table 2. Including Crop Insurance in the Crop Revenue Using a Forward Price and Non-Delivery Penalty

    Revenue with Penalty (a)$634.50/acre
    Crop Insurance Indemnity (b)$121.00/acre
    Revenue + Indemnity (c = a + b)$755.50/acre
      
    Producer Premium (w/subsidy) (d)$56.00/acre
      
    Revenue + Indemnity – Premium (c – d)$699.50/acre

    Biram, Hunter, Andrew M. McKenzie, and Chanda Bhattrai. “How can crop marketing and crop insurance go together?Southern Ag Today 5(24.3). June 11, 2025. Permalink

  • STAX and PLC: A Tale of Price Risk Protection in Two Markets

    STAX and PLC: A Tale of Price Risk Protection in Two Markets

    Commodity programs in Title I of the Farm Bill and the Federal Crop Insurance Program (FCIP) are the primary risk management tools available to agricultural producers. In a previous SAT article, Fischer and Biram (2025) discussed the suite of risk management tools available to cotton producers, the intention of Title I programs to supplement tools in the FCIP, and the different combinations allowed for producers to use in a risk management strategy. Notably, they discuss how base acres enrolled in either Price Loss Coverage (PLC) or Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) cannot be enrolled in the Stacked Income Protection (STAX) program. Since 87% of historical seed cotton base acres have been enrolled in PLC (USDA-FSA, 2025), with nearly all base acres enrolled in 2019 and 2020, this discussion focuses on the complementary nature of STAX and PLC.

    On the surface, STAX and PLC may appear to be similar programs authorized under different pieces of legislation. However, a closer look reveals stark differences. STAX is a tool in the FCIP which provides protection against revenue losses based on a chosen coverage level, a cotton lint futures price, and a county cotton lint yield. PLC is a counter-cyclical target price program under Title I in the Farm Bill which provides only price downside protection determined by the effective reference price (ERP) and a Marketing Year Average Price (MYAP) for seed cotton. The ERP is a function of the statutory reference price determined by federal law and historical market conditions. More specifically, the seed cotton price is a production-weighted average of upland cotton lint and cotton seed prices (see Shurley and Rabinowitz, 2018and Liu, Rabinowitz, and Lai, 2019a). STAX requires a premium to be paid by the producer while PLC requires no out-of-pocket cost for enrollment. STAX pays indemnities based on planted acres and county cotton lint yield and price, while PLC payments are based on base acres and MYAP for seed cotton.

    While STAX and PLC both provide price risk protection, it is in different markets and under different conditions. STAX provides price risk protection against declines in the futures market between planting and harvest with different regions of the country facing different price determination periods – and only to the extent that those declines are not offset by yield gains (see Liu, Chong, and Biram, 2024). PLC provides price risk protection against declines in the cash market within a crop marketing year which is August 1st through July 31st of the following calendar year (USDA-FSA, 2023). PLC protection is triggered when the MYAP falls below the ERP with the PLC payment rate being the difference between the ERP and MYAP.

    Since these two risk management tools provide different forms of price protection, it is no surprise that STAX indemnities based on price losses (i.e., in excess of any offsetting yield gains) differ from PLC payment rates. In the period authorized for risk protection in the 2018 Farm Bill (i.e., 2018-2024P), there was only one year in which both programs triggered, with 2024 projected to trigger at current prices. In 2019, the PLC payment rate for seed cotton was $0.0612/lb (see Figure 1) while the cotton lint STAX indemnity for price loss would have been $0.0310/lb (see Figure 2) which only would be for the 90% coverage level. There were three years when one program would have triggered when the other did not (2018, 2020, and 2022). The remaining two years saw no payments triggered by either program. 

    We acknowledge that these payment rates are based on different triggers (i.e., weighted average seed cotton price versus cotton lint price) and refrain from discussing the magnitude of the differences. Instead, we emphasize the fact that these programs often do not trigger in the same year, reinforcing the idea that these differences imply the need for risk protection in both the cash and futures markets, mitigating basis risk (see University of Arkansas fact sheet). As a result, Congress may wish to consider making both PLC and STAX available for a producer to use in the same crop year since they meet different risk management needs.

    Figure 1. Historical Performance of Price Loss Coverage (PLC) for Seed Cotton (2018-2024P) This figure shows the years in which a seed cotton PLC payment triggered. The orange bars show the MYAP, while the yellow dashes show the ERP. The triangles denote the PLC payment rate recorded that year. When the orange bar is the below the yellow dash, a PLC payment triggers, and the triangle depicts the payment rate.

    Figure 2. Historical Performance of Stacked Income Protection (2018-2024P) This figure shows the years in which a STAX payment would have triggered in a county with constant yields. That is, if the county yield did not fall, it depicts what the Harvest Price would have to fall to in order for an indemnity (i.e., insurance payment) to trigger. The blue and green bars show the price guarantee based on 85% and 90% coverage levels of STAX, respectively, while the red dashes show the RMA Harvest Price. The blue and green triangles denote the STAX indemnity recorded for the 85% and 90% coverage levels, respectively, in a given year. When the blue or green bar is below the red dash, a STAX indemnity triggers, and the triangles depict the payment rate.

    References

    Biram, H.D. and Connor, L. (2023). Types of Federal Crop Insurance Products: Individual and Area Plans. University of Arkansas System Division of Agriculture, Cooperative Extension Service Fact Sheet No. FSA75. https://www.uaex.uada.edu/publications/pdf/FSA75.pdf

    Fischer, Bart L., and Biram, H.D. “STAX and PLC: Should Cotton Producers Have to Choose?” Southern Ag Today 5(15.4). April 10, 2025. Permalink

    Liu, Y., F. Chong, and Biram, H.D. “Cotton Crop Insurance: Unveiling Regional Differences in Projected and Harvest Prices.” Southern Ag Today 4(4.3). January 24, 2024. Permalink

    Liu, Y., Rabinowitz, A. N. & Lai, J. H. (2019). Understanding the 2018 Farm Bill Effective Reference Price. Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Georgia. Report No. AGECON-19-02PR. July 2019.

    Liu, Y., Rabinowitz, A. N. & Lai, J. H. (2019). Computing the PLC and ARC Safety Net Payments in the 2018 Farm Bill. Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Georgia. Report No. AGECON-19-13PR. November 2019.

    Shurley, D. & Rabinowitz, A. N. (2018). MYA Prices and Calculating Payments with the Seed Cotton PLC. Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Georgia. Report No. AGECON-18-03. February 2018.

    U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency. (2023). Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) & Price Loss Coverage (PLC). December 2023. https://www.fsa.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2024-12/fsa_arc_plc_factsheet_1223.pdf

    U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency. (2025). ARC and PLC Data. Date accessed: May 5, 2025. https://www.fsa.usda.gov/resources/programs/arc-plc/program-data

    U.S. Department of Agriculture, Risk Management Agency. (2023). Stacked Income Protection Plan (STAX) for Upland Cotton. January 2024. https://www.rma.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/STAX-Upland-Cotton-Fact-Sheet.pdf


    Biram, Hunter, Bart L. Fischer, Yangxuan Liu, Will Maples, and Amy Hagerman. “STAX and PLC: A Tale of Price Risk Protection in Two Markets.Southern Ag Today 5(19.4). May 8, 2025. Permalink

  • Estimating the Impact of Low Mississippi River Levels on Soybean Basis in the Midsouth

    Estimating the Impact of Low Mississippi River Levels on Soybean Basis in the Midsouth

    Extreme weather events, like drought, jointly impact agricultural production and rural infrastructure, including transportation infrastructure. An important part of this transportation infrastructure is the Mississippi River. It serves as one of the most critical networks for moving agricultural commodities from production to consumption areas, including export markets. In 2020, U.S. agricultural exports totaled $146 billion, increasing 7 percent year over year (U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Foreign Agricultural Service, 2021). Approximately 46 percent of grain exports were moved by barge in 2020. Soybeans, the leading U.S. agricultural export, rely heavily on barge transportation, with 53 percent of exports and 28 percent of total supplies moved by barge in 2020.

    Despite this reliance on barges for moving U.S. grain, little is known about the link between extreme weather, rural transportation infrastructure, and crop prices. In 2022 and 2023, the Lower Mississippi River reached historic lows. In October, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Memphis stream gauge read -12.0 feet and -10.8 feet in 2023 and 2022, respectively. The previous record was set in 1988 when the USGS Memphis stream gauge read -10.7 feet. These record-low water levels increased transportation costs and barge freight rates as documented by previous Southern Ag Today articles (Biram, et al., 2022; Gardner, Biram, and Mitchell, 2023; Biram, Mitchell, and Stiles, 2024). Higher transportation costs are transmitted to row crop producers through lower cash bids or a weakening of local crop basis (calculated as the cash price minus the futures price). Historic lows in Mississippi River levels during the fall harvest of the last three years have highlighted the need to measure the impact of these low river levels on rural infrastructure and communities.

    Mitchell and Biram (2025) measure the impact of low water levels on the Mississippi River using Arkansas soybean basis data across 12 regional grain markets from USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service and stream gauge data from USGS. They use a “low river” status measure that affects a grain market once the river gauge height falls below negative five feet and is weighted by the distance between a grain elevator and the closest public Mississippi River port.  They find that when the river stream gauge in Memphis, Tennessee reads -5 feet, Arkansas soybean basis weakens (widens) by $0.58 per bushel, $0.29 per bushel, and $0.12 per bushel for grain markets that are 5 miles, 10 miles, and 25 miles from the closest Mississippi River port, respectively. Similarly, they find that Mississippi soybean basis weakens (widens) by $0.55 per bushel, $0.28 per bushel, and $0.11 per bushel for the same distances to grain markets. Figure 1 below shows the degree of the impact of low river levels on soybean basis in Arkansas with markets near the river experiencing weaker basis than of those further from the river.

    Figure 1. Impact of Low Mississippi River Levels on Soybean Basis in Dollars per Bushel in Arkansas

    Note: Each line represents a different stream gage height threshold. The term “marginal effect” denotes the change in Arkansas soybean basis, measured in dollars per bushel, for every additional mile between a grain market and a river port.

    References

    Biram, Hunter, John Anderson, Scott Stiles, and Andrew McKenzie. “Low Water Levels in the Mississippi River Result in Abnormally Weak Soybean Basis“. Southern Ag Today 2(45.1). October 31, 2022. Permalink

    Biram, Hunter, James L. Mitchell, and H. Scott Stiles. “Low Rivers Levels on the Mississippi River: Not the Three-Peat We Want.” Southern Ag Today 4(39.3). September 25, 2024. Permalink

    Gardner, Grant, Hunter Biram, and James Mitchell. “Low River Levels, Barge Freight, and Widening Basis.” Southern Ag Today 3(39.1). September 25, 2023. Permalink

    Mitchell, J. L., & Biram, H. D. (2025). The effects of extreme weather on rural transportation infrastructure and crop prices along the Lower Mississippi River. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy.


    Biram, Hunter, and James L. Mitchell. “Estimating the Impact of Low Mississippi River Levels on Soybean Basis in the Midsouth.” Southern Ag Today 5(12.3). March 19, 2025. Permalink

  • Can Yield Upside Risk Eclipse Price Downside Risk Protection in ECO Crop Insurance?

    Can Yield Upside Risk Eclipse Price Downside Risk Protection in ECO Crop Insurance?

    Producers can keep track of their price risk protection through revenue insurance in a given growing season by comparing the Harvest (Fall) Price to the Projected (Spring) Price determined by USDA-RMA. In the broader picture of a marketing plan, revenue crop insurances provide a form of price guarantee at a premium expense similar to locking in a price guarantee using a put option contract (Biram and Smith, 2022). A previous article examined the price protection offered by Revenue Protection (RP), Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO), and Enhanced Coverage Option (ECO) crop insurance for corn and rice (Biram, 2023). That article only considered the change in prices and did not consider the potential change in yield. This article builds on the previous one by considering both the price and yield protection offered by ECO, and providing a snapshot of how changes in county yields can also trigger indemnities.

    ECO is an area-based crop insurance product and must be paired with farm-level insurance like Yield Protection (YP) or RP. The liability insured by ECO is calculated using the same parameters as RP (e.g., APH farm yield and futures prices) at coverage levels of 90% and 95%. The futures price used is based on the higher of the Projected Price and the Harvest Price determined by USDA-RMA. Unlike RP – which triggers indemnities based on farm-level losses –ECO triggers an indemnity based on county-wide losses and will trigger a full indemnity when county-level revenue losses fall to 86%.

    A county-level map is provided in Figure 1, which shows the extent that the final county yield can change relative to the expected county yield and still trigger an indemnity for corn that is equal to the producer paid premium (i.e., breakeven indemnity). In other words, this map answers the question of how much the county yield must change to trigger an indemnity that will at least cover the producer-paid premium. The producer premium was determined for RP at the 75% coverage level (RP-75) under optional units paired with ECO at the 95% coverage level (ECO-95) with the associated premium subsidy rate applied. Projected and Harvest Prices reported by the RMA Price Discovery Tool are used with theassociated price volatility. 

    As an example, a county shaded in the darkest green shows that the final county yield may increase at least 21-26% for an indemnity to trigger which covers the producer premium. This suggests the price decline in the futures market was severe enough to allow for yield upside risk that would offset indemnities triggered on price alone. Conversely, a county shaded in the darkest red indicates that the final county yield must decline at least 6-11% before a large enough indemnity to cover producer premium is triggered. This implies that the price decline was not severe enough to trigger an indemnity on price alone. Most counties have experienced severe enough price declines in corn that yield can increase in comparison to the expected yield and potentially obtain a net indemnity above zero (e.g., yellow and green shaded counties).

    A similar pattern exists for cotton and soybeans (Figures 2-3). Nearly all counties insuring cotton under ECO-95 and RP-75 allow for yield upside risk, or favorable potential, to determine an indemnity equal to producer premium with most counties allowing for 7-10% yield upside risk. The same story holds for soybeans with potential yield upside risk of 9-14% for most counties which indicates the extent of futures price declines for both cotton and soybeans in 2024. Rice is the exception with no counties allowing for yield upside potential in determining an indemnity equal to producer premium (Figure 4). This is expected given there was virtually no change (i.e., $0.002/lb) in the rough rice futures price between planting and harvest.

    This analysis shows that price risk protection, which does not require a crop insurance premium, could be provided through ECO-95 if yields do not increase by more than 5% across most counties. However, given the potential for record yields across most of the U.S., this potential may be largely eclipsed. While this yield upside could be beneficial, it only considers one half of the profit equation, gross revenue. Further, price declines, paired with elevated production expenses, have not been met by risk protection from other farm bill programs, such as Price Loss Coverage and Agriculture Risk Coverage. This underscores the lack of price risk mitigation provided by current farm policy tools and the need for an updated farm safety net.

    Figure 1. Percentage Change in County Yield for ECO-95 to Result in Zero Net Indemnity (Corn)

    This map shows the percentage change in the final county yield relative to the expected yield required to trigger an ECO indemnity that will be equal to producer paid premium. This assumes RP and ECO coverage levels of 75% and 95%, respectively. Click here for an interactive version of this map showing county-specific percentages.

    Figure 2. Percentage Change in County Yield for ECO-95 to Result in Zero Net Indemnity (Cotton)

    This map shows the percentage change in the final county yield relative to the expected yield required to trigger an ECO indemnity that will be equal to the producer paid premium. This assumes RP and ECO coverage levels of 75% and 95%, respectively. Click here for an interactive version of this map showing county-specific percentages.

    Figure 3. Percentage Change in County Yield for ECO-95 to Result in Zero Net Indemnity (Soybeans)

    This map shows the percentage change in the final county yield relative to the expected yield required to trigger an ECO indemnity that will be equal to the producer paid premium. This assumes RP and ECO coverage levels of 75% and 95%, respectively. Click here for an interactive version of this map showing county-specific percentages.

    Figure 4. Percentage Change in County Yield for ECO-95 to Result in Zero Net Indemnity (Rice)

    This map shows the percentage change in the final county yield relative to the expected yield required to trigger an ECO indemnity that will be equal to the producer paid premium. This assumes RP and ECO coverage levels of 75% and 95%, respectively. Click here for an interactive version of this map showing county-specific percentages.

    References

    Biram, Hunter, and S. Aaron Smith. “The Option to Augment the Crop Insurance Price Floor“. Southern Ag Today 2(35.1). August 22, 2022. Permalink

    Biram, Hunter. “Comparing the Harvest Price and Projected Price in Revenue Protection Crop Insurance for Rice and Corn.” Southern Ag Today 3(35.1). August 28, 2023. Permalink


    Biram, Hunter. “Can Yield Upside Risk Eclipse Price Downside Risk Protection in ECO Crop Insurance?Southern Ag Today 4(47.3). November 20, 2024. Permalink

  • Addressing the Gap in Participation Between Whole Farm Revenue Protection and Other MPCI Products

    Addressing the Gap in Participation Between Whole Farm Revenue Protection and Other MPCI Products

    Whole Farm Revenue Protection (WFRP) is a crop insurance product administered by the USDA Risk Management Agency (RMA). WFRP provides protection against the risk of farm revenue generated by all crops falling below a level of guaranteed revenue.  Expected revenue is found by taking the most recently available five-year average of whole farm revenue reported on the Schedule F farm income tax form. For example, the expected revenue for 2024 is found by taking the average of revenue reported in 2018-2022. Subsequently, the expected revenue is multiplied by the producer-elected coverage level to determine the guaranteed revenue or WFRP liability.  The WFRP revenue guarantee is capped at $17 million.

    Like other multi-peril crop insurance (MPCI) products, the WFRP premium is subsidized by rates determined through federal legislation. The subsidy, or portion of the actuarially fair premium rate paid by the government, decreases as the elected coverage level increases. The WFRP producer premium may be further reduced through the Diversity Factor, which is a percentage multiplied by the actuarially fair rate. As the number of qualifying commodities insured increases, the greater the discount in the actuarially fair premium rate. Lastly, the WFRP producer premium may be reduced for those producers who have Beginning Farmer or Rancher or Veteran Farmer Status. Combining all three of these producer premium reductions can result in up to a 90% reduction in the actuarially fair premium.

    While the increasing trend in federal crop insurance participation since its inception can be largely attributed to increases in the premium subsidy rate, not all programs have experienced the same utilization (Yehouenou et al., 2018). Yehouenou et al. (2018) cite the reluctance of crop insurance agents to encourage purchasing STAX as one reason for the lack of participation despite the 80% premium subsidy rate attached to all coverage levels. Whole Farm Revenue Protection also faces a lag in participation and has experienced a decline in purchased liability since its inception in 2015.   Average purchased liability of about $2 billion per year (Figure 1), which is far less than yield protection (YP) and revenue protection (RP) purchased liability which averaged over $100 billion over the same period (Figure 2).

    One issue driving the lack of federal crop insurance participation is a lack of understanding of crop insurance programs. In response to this knowledge gap, RMA set up a number of cooperative agreements to build relationships, enhance understanding, and strengthen the public-private partnership of federal crop insurance across the agriculture community. In 2022, the University of Arkansas partnered on a two-year pilot program with RMA, the Crop Insurance Navigator program. The Navigator project seeks to address “knowledge gaps” of RMA products with a focus on historically underserved producer communities. The partnership is funded by the USDA Risk Management Agency. This southern region focused pilot is primarily designed to address the knowledge gaps present in WFRP and Micro-Farm products on both the part of producers and crop insurance agents. The program uses a cohort of project specialists to engage farmers, ranchers, educators, community-based organizations, and agricultural stakeholders to enhance understanding of federal crop insurance products serving small and historically underserved producer groups. To learn more about the Crop Insurance Navigator program visit https://srmec.uada.edu/navigator.html.

    In an aligned effort to enhance understanding of crop insurance, UA faculty led the development of a workbook covering the fundamentals of federal crop insurance to educate producers, crop insurance agents, and policymakers with chapters on products and opportunities for socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers. To access the workbook follow this link:https://www.uaex.uada.edu/publications/pdf/MP576.pdf

    Figure 1. Whole Farm Revenue Purchased Liability (1999-2023) 

    This figure shows changes in WFRP participation since 1999. Prior to the introduction of WFRP in 2015, Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) was made available in 1999 and provided coverage similar to WFRP.

    Figure 2. Multi-Peril Crop Insurance Purchased Liability (1989-2023)

    This figure shows the changes in MPCI products providing farm-level yield and revenue risk protection such as Actual Production History, Revenue Assurance, Yield Protection, and Revenue Protection.

    References

    USDA-RMA. (2024). USDA-RMA Summary of Business. Retrieved February 20, 2024, from https://www.rma.usda.gov/SummaryOfBusiness

    Yehouenou, L., Barnett, B. J., Harri, A., & Coble, K. H. (2018). STAX appeal?. Applied economic perspectives and policy40(4), 563-584.


    Biram, Hunter, and Ron Rainey. “Addressing the Gap in Participation Between Whole Farm Revenue Protection and Other MPCI Products.Southern Ag Today 4(45.1). November 4, 2024. Permalink