Author: Joe Outlaw

  • Proposed Safety Net Choice Could Add Risk to Farmers

    Proposed Safety Net Choice Could Add Risk to Farmers

    In a January 17th Dear Colleague letter, Senator Debbie Stabenow (D-MI), Chairwoman of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, outlined her proposal for strengthening the farm safety net in the 2024 Farm Bill (found here). The proposal centered around five key principles:

    • programs must be targeted to active farmers;
    • we need to provide farmers choices and flexibility;
    • assistance should be timely;
    • we need to expand the reach of programs to help more farmers; and
    • we need to address the emerging risks farmers face.

    Since the letter was released, considerable attention has been paid to the comments she offered about crop insurance and providing producers expanded safety net choices.  Part of the proposal reads as follows: 

    “The 2018 Farm Bill provided cotton farmers with a choice between the traditional base acre programs and a highly-subsidized and streamlined area-based crop insurance policy. The next Farm Bill should give a similar option to all commodities.”

    There is a considerable amount of detail about the evolution of the cotton program – from removing lint as a covered commodity to adding seed cotton as a covered commodity – that is not contained in the letter.  In this article, I walk through the history to provide more context.  

    First, to resolve the decade-long WTO Brazil cotton dispute (which involved, among other things, the U.S. Government having to pay the Brazilians $147 million per year in cash to fend off retaliation), cotton industry leadership suggested removing cotton as a covered commodity for Title I commodity programs (PLC and ARC) and modifying the marketing assistance loan.  Second, in lieu of ARC/PLC, the 2014 Farm Bill provided cotton producers an industry-proposed area-wide insurance program, the Stacked Income Protection Plan (STAX).  The premium subsidy for STAX was 80%, higher than the 65% subsidy authorized for the Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO) that is available for all crops. Third, upland cotton producers were provided Cotton Transition Assistance Payments (CTAP) for 2014 to aid in the transition to STAX.  

    STAX protection was deemed insufficient to protect cotton producers from collapsing prices, so cotton ginning cost share (CGCS) payments were provided for the 2015 and 2016 crop years. Ultimately, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 restored ARC and PLC protection to cotton producers by adding seed cotton as a covered commodity.  While STAX was still available to seed cotton producers, they could not enroll their seed cotton base in ARC/PLC and still purchase STAX on the farm in the same year – they were required to decide between the two options.  

    Requiring producers to make the choice between ARC/PLC and STAX was a political compromise required at the time to get cotton added back to the farm bill.  While there is certainly merit to expanding STAX to other crops – or simply improving SCO and the Enhanced Coverage Option (ECO) that are already available to all crops – I would argue that now is the time to eliminate the requirement altogether (rather than expanding it to other crops).  While there has long been a prohibition between the purchase of SCO and ARC – because both offer area-wide coverage and they are very similar in design – there is little justification for requiring producers to choose between PLC and area-wide coverage, both of which serve vastly different safety net functions.

    To illustrate the challenges presented by such a choice, consider the following for cotton.  Figure 1 indicates the share of annual upland cotton insurance liability covered by STAX and the share of policies sold.  Producers initially utilized STAX; however, after a few years of unsatisfactory results, the share of liability covered and policies sold declined.  In 2019, when producers actually began a crop year with a choice of ARC/PLC or STAX, the percent of liability covered by STAX, as well as the share of upland cotton policies sold, was relatively low as marketing year average prices (MYAP) were low (Figure 2).  After that, due to Reference Prices not keeping up with input costs (and due to a relatively higher initial insurance price), seed cotton producers moved back to STAX in 2021, 2022 and 2023, with STAX still accounting for just 20% of the policies sold. 

    As for the 2024 growing season – with futures prices currently below the cost of production for most growers – growers must now choose between (1) an ineffective ARC/PLC with Reference Prices that have not kept up with inflation or (2) STAX, which can certainly help, but at most will partially offset significant losses they are almost guaranteed to face (absent well-above-expected prices or yields). In other words, growers are faced with two poor options.

    After nearly 40 years of working on farm policy, it seems clear to me that there is a need for both (1) improving Reference Prices in Title 1 and (2) improving area-wide coverage in crop insurance, particularly since the two were designed to work in tandem.  It certainly isn’t clear that expanding the choice that was forced on cotton producers to everyone else without higher reference prices is much of a choice.

    Figure 1.  STAX Share of Cotton Crop Insurance Liability and Policies Sold.

    Figure 2.  Historic Cotton Prices.


    Outlaw, Joe L. “Proposed Safety Net Choice Could Add Risk to Farmers.Southern Ag Today 4(5.4). February 1, 2024. Permalink

  • Shouldn’t the Farm Safety Net Target Those Feeding the Country?

    Shouldn’t the Farm Safety Net Target Those Feeding the Country?

    In remarks during a March 16, 2023, hearing before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, Secretary Vilsack testified that while “our policies have ensured an increasingly abundant food supply, growth in farm size and consolidation has put extreme economic pressure on small and medium sized farms and our rural communities…. We must ask ourselves: do we want a system that continues to force the big to get bigger and the small and underserved to get out or do we want a build a more innovative system?”

    The United States has grappled with this small-farm versus large-farm debate for decades.

    While many claim that the safety net is targeted toward large farms, it should be noted that (1) the safety net is provided to producers on a per-acre basis regardless of size and (2) Congress has invested a significant amount of resources in helping small, beginning, socially disadvantaged, limited resource, and veteran producers get started in production agriculture. Congress has also significantly curtailed access to the farm safety net for larger farm operations via means testing, actively engaged determinations, and payment limits.

    The U.S. has been on this path of fewer but larger farms since the beginning of the last century.  Data from the 1920 Census indicated there were 6,448,343 farms with an average farm size of 148.2 acres.[1]  According to the 2017 Census of Agriculture, in 2017 there were 2,042,220 farms with an average farm size of 441 acres.[2]  Not only has average farm size been growing, it is also resulting in a shift in the composition of farms.  Figure 1 illustrates that about one-half of U.S. production comes from large-scale family farms that only make up 3.2 percent of farms, versus 94.7 percent (small and moderate size farms) accounting for 26.2 percent of production.  The USDA Economic Research Service (ERS) also noted that small-scale operators depend on off-farm income while large-scale farms derive almost all of their income from the farm. 

    These results have significant policy implications: namely, who is the farm bill – and the farm safety net in particular – intended to benefit?  Washington think tanks argue that Title I benefits in the farm bill should be redirected to smaller farms. This ignores economic reality on the ground, where full-time family operations are putting enormous amounts of capital at risk. We applaud Congress for continuing to focus on full-time family producers who are actually trying to make a living from their operation – all while doing the most to feed the country. 

    Figure 1. Median income of farm households, by income source and farm type, 2021.


    This paper summarizes the farm size part of a paper by these authors entitled “Examining Farm Size & Payment Limits” commissioned by the Southwest Council of Agribusiness.

    [1] 1920 Census of Agriculture. Accessed at h#ps://agcensus.library.cornell.edu/census_year/1920-census/

    [2] 2017 Census of Agriculture. Accessed at

    https://www.nass.usda.gov/PublicaKons/AgCensus/2017/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_US/usv1.pdf


    Outlaw, Joe, and Bart L. Fischer. “Shouldn’t the Farm Safety Net Target Those Feeding the Country?Southern Ag Today 4(1.4). January 4, 2024. Permalink

  • What Would Our Clean-Slate Safety Net Look Like?

    What Would Our Clean-Slate Safety Net Look Like?

    Over the last year we have spoken at more than 100 farm policy meetings across the United States.  This week a simple but thought-provoking question was posed during Q & A after a farm bill presentation at the Council for Agricultural Science and Technology (CAST) Annual Meeting.  The question was simply: if you had a clean slate to create a strong producer safety net, what would it look like? 

    In general, the role of a policy economist is typically not to suggest what Congress should do, but rather to help evaluate the impacts of policy proposals on producers and other stakeholders, estimate costs, and try to discern any unintended consequences of the proposal.  It is the job of Congress to consider all the relevant information and make informed decisions.  Think about all of the meetings with producer groups, hearings, and listening sessions that members of the House and Senate agricultural committees and their staffs have held to determine what should be in the next farm bill.  It is their job to determine what they believe is best for their constituents and producers in general.

    With that said, combined we have more than 50 years of experience working in agricultural policy; surely we have some thoughts on the matter.  Upon some reflection, the three-legged stool of price loss coverage (PLC), marketing assistance loans (MAL), and crop insurance constitutes an effective safety net.  Together they provide a counter-cyclical, low-cost, and adaptable safety net for U.S. crop producers.  Let’s look at why each of these characteristics are important.

    • Counter-cyclical.  These programs step in and help when conditions warrant because of low prices (PLC and MAL) or low yields/revenue (crop insurance), and payments go away when conditions are good.  The U.S. fiscal situation demands that the limited resources made available to agriculture are used wisely and efficiently.  This is why our clean-slate safety net would not continue ARC, which essentially covers the same losses as the Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO), an area-wide insurance policy.
    • Low-cost.  The safety net is not designed to make producers whole from an expected gross receipts standpoint.  Reference Prices that trigger PLC payments due to low prices have been established well below the full cost of production, and MAL Loan Rates are less than one-half the full cost of production for the 23 covered commodities.  While Congress is anticipating increases for both Reference Prices and Loan Rates, the levels under discussion are still well below average costs of production. Payment yields are well below budgeted yields for most producers, and the 85% payment factor further reduces producer payments.  Crop insurance utilizes a substantial deductible that producers have to lose before insurance begins to pay.  And more importantly, with respect to crop insurance, producers pay premiums that are higher or lower depending upon the level of risk in their area/crop and the coverage level chosen.
    • Adaptable.  The components of the safety net need to be adaptable.  While more could be done to ensure that Reference Prices keep up with inflation going forward, Reference Prices have the ability to increase along with market prices due to the Effective Reference Price changes made in the 2018 Farm Bill.  As for crop insurance, coverage is based on prevailing prices in the futures markets and policies can be established/adjusted to keep pace with the changes in cropping practices and risks faced by producers.

    There are a number of other elements or considerations that we could discuss, but it is worth noting that the clean-slate safety net that would ensure producers can weather the tough times is very similar in structure to what we have now.


    Outlaw, Joe, and Bart L. Fischer. “What Would Our Clean-Slate Safety Net Look Like?Southern Ag Today 3(45.4). November 9, 2023. Permalink

  • EWG Takes the Spotlight in the Silly Season

    EWG Takes the Spotlight in the Silly Season

    As discussed in a May 25, 2023, SAT article “The Silly Season Has Begun… Must Be Farm Bill Time,” every farm bill cycle, we run across a report or research geared toward “informing” farm bill discussions that, while not technically wrong, boy does it leave out something kind of important…hence the term “Silly Season.”  This time the article was written by Scott Faber and Jared Hayes of the Environmental Working Group.  Their September 5, 2023, article entitled “Calls to Increase Crop Reference Prices Would Help Fewer Than 6,000 Farmers” caught our attention.

    The authors analyzed individual producer payment data from their database of FSA payment data obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests to arrive at the following conclusions:

    “Increasing price guarantees for major crops would mostly benefit farmers of peanuts, cotton and rice in Southern states, not corn and soybean farmers, EWG has previously found, which further limits the overall benefit of increasing price guarantees.

    Only 5,630 farmers, mostly located in Southern states, received more than $50,000 in 2021 through the Price Loss Coverage, or PLC, program, according to USDA data, and would get more than a few thousand dollars if price guarantees went up.”  

    For the most part, we have few technical issues with what they said based on what they did. However, there are a number of factors – not discussed – that make their results meaningless.  First, they picked 2021, a year where most commodities in PLC did not trigger a payment.  The black line in Figure 1 intersects the marketing year average price for 2021 for the top 5 commodities in terms of base acreage.  All commodity prices are above their respective reference prices, so…no safety net payments would have been made.  If they had picked a year or two prior to 2021, there would easily have been more than 6,000 producers receiving payments.  Second, rather than try to use payment data to draw a conclusion, it would have been more meaningful to use FSA enrolled base acre data.  Figure 2 provides the FSA enrolled base acres for PLC and ARC county and individual for all 23 covered commodities.  While acreage data doesn’t allow one to say definitively how many farmers would be affected, it is pretty clear that in 2021 there were over 140 million acres of base in the PLC program that, depending upon prices, could have benefitted from higher reference prices. That applies to every single farmer with base acres in the United States.  In fact, every farmer would receive assistance in direct proportion to the amount of acres they have at risk, except for mid-to-large-sized operations that are payment limited. However, that is not likely the headline the authors were looking for…

    Figure 1.  Historical and Projected Prices for Five Major Commodities, 2009 – 2023.

    Source:  USDA NASS and FAPRI, “2023 Baseline Update for U.S. Agricultural Markets” September 5, 2023, available at: https://fapri.missouri.edu/publications/2023-baseline-update/

    Figure 2.  Enrolled Base Acres in PLC and ARC, 2015 to 2023.

    Source:  USDA FSA.  Available at: https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/arcplc_program/index

    Outlaw, Joe, and Bart L. Fischer. “EWG Takes the Spotlight in the Silly Season.Southern Ag Today 3(39.4). September 28, 2023. Permalink

  • Have Payment Yields Kept Up with Actual Crop Yields?

    Have Payment Yields Kept Up with Actual Crop Yields?

    Given all the discussion in Washington these days focused on updating crop base acres, it made me wonder whether farm program yields (PFC payment yields) have kept pace with actual crop yields.  Most people refer to the mid-1980s as when crop bases as we currently know them were set based off of a producer’s planting during the early 1980s.  It made sense to start with the U.S. average payment yields from the target price/deficiency payment program from 1985.  The 1985 yields were compared to PFC payment yields from 2021 for the major crops.  As seen in the table, corn (35.2%), rice (26.6%) and wheat (19.7%) experienced the highest percent change in payment yields over the 1985 to 2021 period. Seed cotton, soybeans, and peanuts all became normal program commodities after 1985 so there isn’t a comparison yield for that time period. 

    The percent changes in actual yields were evaluated from 1985 to 2021 for all of the listed commodities with upland cotton replacing seed cotton in the actual yield evaluation.  Several commodities (corn, soybeans, upland cotton, rice, and peanuts) all experienced a significant increase in actual yields.  

    While this is only evaluating 2021 relative to 1985 it does indicate that nationwide, corn, wheat, and rice producers have done a good job of using yield updating opportunities to increase payment yields.  On the other hand, both actual and payment yields for grain sorghum have largely stayed the same over the period.


    Outlaw, Joe. “Have Payment Yields Kept Up with Actual Crop Yields?Southern Ag Today 3(31.4). August 3, 2023. Permalink