Category: Policy

  • If Crop Returns are so Bad, Why Do Farmers Keep Planting?

    If Crop Returns are so Bad, Why Do Farmers Keep Planting?

    We often use Farm Policy Thursdays at Southern Ag Today to address questions we’ve been hearing, either from producers or from the general public. Today is no exception. With all the talk about low crop prices and high input costs, we increasingly are getting questions like these: “If farmers are projected to lose money this year, then why plant anything?  And, isn’t the market telling them there’s too much supply and they should plant less?”  

    On the surface, those are pretty simple and relatable questions.  But, as with most things in agriculture, the answer is much more complex.

    • If a farmer has sufficient cash on which to live and no debt to service, that might work.  But, unless that applies to you or you have a job off the farm that provides supplemental income, shutting down would be guaranteeing no income for the farm/family for the year.
    • U.S. farmers must also contend with the fact that they operate in a global market. If U.S. farmers were to simply sit out this growing season, how would the rest of the world respond? Would they also idle their operations, allowing prices to rise so that everyone could enjoy higher prices together? Of course not. While we could fill pages on this topic, the bottom line is that prices would certainly rise, but other countries would likely ratchet up their production to take advantage of those prices at the expense of U.S. farmers. 
    • Perhaps the most important factor is that farmers are eternal optimists. After all, they are putting a seed in the ground in hopes that sufficient rain will fall for the seed to germinate. They then spend months tending to plants to ensure that weeds and insects don’t choke the plant out. Many spend the rest of the time praying that hail, floods, snow, and hurricanes—you name the disaster—won’t leave the crop in tatters. With that same spirit, they also plant that crop in hopes that the market will turn around by harvest time so they can make enough money to pay off the banker and have enough left over to feed their families and start over again next year.
    • Most farmers we know and work with have chosen that profession—in spite of all the risks and historically low returns—because they want to help their fellow man. Farming isn’t a job…it’s part of who they are. Simply sitting out a crop isn’t really in their DNA.

    We suspect those answers would be followed by this question: “Okay, I understand they can’t totally idle their farm, but can’t they just shift from one crop to another that makes more economic sense?”

    • We would argue that farmers are always considering that option, but that generally only works if those opportunities exist.  At this point, most crops are facing negative returns, and it’s not remotely clear that one crop would be preferred over any other, especially after accounting for all of the things farmers can’t control. 
    • Most farmers that grow multiple crops have a carefully crafted, multi-year rotation that they want to maintain for a variety of reasons (e.g., controlling weeds, maintaining fertility and soil health, controlling erosion, etc). 
    • Often equipment and supporting infrastructure is crop specific, limiting the ability for farmers to substitute crops (or at least serving as a consideration). For example, the only thing you will accomplish by running a cotton picker through a corn field is creating a giant mess.

    In summary, simply not planting a crop is just not a viable option for most farmers, and shifting the crop mix—while always under consideration by farmers—comes with its own set of considerations and challenges. It’s for these reasons, in part, that each Congress and successive Administrations have repeatedly supported farmers when things do not turn out as they planned or hoped.

    Fischer, Bart L., and Joe Outlaw. “If Crop Returns are so Bad, Why Do Farmers Keep Planting?Southern Ag Today 5(43.4). October 23, 2025. Permalink

  • Feral Swine Eradication and Control Pilot Program and Crop Insurance Indemnities

    Feral Swine Eradication and Control Pilot Program and Crop Insurance Indemnities

    Introduction

    Wildlife damage to crops has become a growing concern for U.S. agriculture. Crop insurance records show that payments for wildlife-related losses increased from about $15 million in 2012 to nearly $39 million in 2022. Among the different threats, feral swine stand out as one of the most destructive, causing an estimated $800 million in damages each year to crops, livestock, property, and even natural resources such as water quality and wildlife habitat.

    Feral swine have spread quickly—moving from fewer than 20 states in the early 1980s to more than 30 states today. Because animals often cross property lines, private control efforts, such as hunting and trapping, have been costly and only partly effective. This has created demand for coordinated public programs that can reduce hog populations and restore damaged farmland.

    In response, the 2018 Farm Bill created the Feral Swine Eradication and Control Pilot Program (FSCP) with $75 million in funding to remove feral hogs and restore land. The program began in 2020 in 20 selected counties across 11 southern states and expanded in 2021. These counties were selected based on feral swine presence and notable increases in damages (Figure 1). This article summarizes findings from our recent study (Duncan et al., 2025) that evaluated the impact of the FSCP on crop insurance damages.

    Findings

    Our analysis of USDA Risk Management Agency data from 2013 to 2022 indicates that the FSCP has had an impact, but the benefits are not spread evenly across all crops. The clearest effect was seen in corn. Counties participating in FSCP showed fewer corn acres receiving wildlife-related insurance payments than similar counties without the program. This pattern is consistent with what producers in the field have reported—that corn losses to feral hogs were noticeably lower in areas where FSCP activities were underway.

    For other crops, the story is more mixed. For soybeans, wheat, and peanuts, however, the data looked much the same—whether or not counties participated in FSCP. Cotton did show some reduction in losses in certain years, but the effect was smaller and less consistent than what we observed for corn. These results suggest that while FSCP is helping to address hog damage, especially for corn, it may take more time and continued investment before its benefits can be clearly seen for other crops.

    Implications

    The finding that corn producers benefited the most from FSCP is not surprising. Corn is one of the crops most heavily targeted by feral hogs, and the program’s design, focused on removal and land restoration, appears to be reducing this pressure. For producers, this means that FSCP can serve as a valuable complement to private control efforts that have often proven costly and only partly effective. The lack of clear effects for other crops should not be taken to mean that the program has no value beyond corn. Rather, it may reflect the fact that FSCP is still in its early stages. The program roll out coincided with COVID-19 disruptions which potentially slowed participation and adoption. It is possible that as the program continues and expands, measurable benefits for soybeans, peanuts, and wheat could become more apparent. Also, we should note that a limitation of this study is that only crop damages that were severe enough to trigger crop insurance payments were included. The crop insurance data does not determine the species causing crop damage. We exclude damages that were not severe enough to trigger a crop insurance payment, as well as benefits to livestock health, property, and the environment.

    For policymakers, these results suggest that targeting resources towards corn-producing regions could deliver the greatest near-term return on investment. Continued funding and expansion could strengthen these results and help ensure that the success of the corn program translates more widely throughout US agriculture in the coming years.

    Figure 1. Wildlife-related indemnified crop acres by crop, 2013–2022. Soybeans and corn account for the majority of reported losses.


    Duncan, H., Boyer, C. N., Park, E., & Smith, S. A. (2025). “Evaluating Feral Swine Eradication and Control Pilot Program Impact on Crop Indemnities.” Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy. https://doi.org/10.1002/aepp.70016


    Park, Eunchun, Hence Duncan, Christopher Boyer, and Aaron Smith. “Feral Swine Eradication and Control Pilot Program and Crop Insurance Indemnities.Southern Ag Today 5(41.4). October 9, 2025. Permalink

  • Threat Looms and Urgency Grows as New World Screwworm Inches Closer to the Texas-Mexico Border

    Threat Looms and Urgency Grows as New World Screwworm Inches Closer to the Texas-Mexico Border

    Along with most Southern cattle producers, Southern Ag Today has been tracking the movement of the New World Screwworm (NWS).  An article last November (linked here) provided a history of NWS and discussed implications of import restrictions on feeder cattle from Mexico.  A second article (linked here) continued the discussion as the U.S. closed and re-opened the border to Mexican cattle throughout the spring and summer. 

    Earlier this week, an NWS case was detected 70 miles south of the Texas border in Nuevo Leon, Mexico, approximately 370 miles closer than the previous northernmost case detected in Veracruz, Mexico in July.  As the threat of NWS reaching the U.S. grows, the need for eradication efforts and producer preparedness grow more urgent.  Last year, the USDA estimated an NWS outbreak would result in a $732.6 million loss to Texas producers and a $1.8 billion loss to the Texas economy (APHIS, 2024).  Losses for producers would come from animal deaths, decreased production, additional labor and vehicle costs for animal inspection and treatment, and additional medication and insecticide costs.  Additionally, an NWS outbreak may prompt producers to make production practice changes to minimize NWS infestations.  Recall, NWS cause harm by burrowing into open wounds of live animals.  To minimize open wounds, producers may need to skip standard practices like dehorning, castrating, branding, and ear-tagging.  They may also alter calving season to avoid calving during warm months when the NWS is more prevalent.  The effects on marketing calves under these conditions is unknown. 

    The best and highly supported path forward is eradication. To that end, in June USDA laid out a 5-pronged plan to address NWS (USDA, 2025a).  In summary, the plan included:

    1. Prevention of NWS spreading in Mexico through enhancements to sterile fly production in Mexico; improvements of Mexico’s NWS surveillance; an audit of Mexico’s animal health controls; and limitations on movement of animals. 
    2. Protecting the U.S. border by collaborating with border personnel to gather strays, intercept illegally introduced livestock, and monitor wildlife; preparing laboratories to test for NWS; and continuing live animal inspections at ports of entry. 
    3. Preparing for an outbreak through emergency management plans; training of federal and state responders; and stockpiles of treatment supplies. 
    4. Moving eradication efforts forward by:
      • Building an $8.5 million sterile insect dispersal facility at Moore Air Base in South Texas – to be completed by the end of 2025. 
      • Exploring the possibility of a domestic sterile fly production facility.
      • Investing $21 million in the renovation of Mexico’s sterile insect facility – to be completed in 18 months. 
    5. Planning for the future by exploring new treatments and preventatives; improving sterile insect production and technology; and strengthening partnerships with states and land grant universities.  

    In August, Secretary Rollins announced that USDA would be building on the 5-prong plan, in part, by investing $100 million to identify new innovations for tackling NWS and that USDA will construct a sterile fly production facility in Edinburg, TX, at Moore Air Force Base (USDA, 2025b).


    Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). 2024. New World Screwworm, Ready Reference Guide – Historical Economic Impacthttps://www.aphis.usda.gov/sites/default/files/nws-historical-economic-impact.pdf

    USDA. 2025a. New World Screwworm Domestic Readiness and Response Policy Initiative. https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/nws-visit-policy-brief.pdf

    USDA. 2025b. USDA Announces Sweeping Plans to Protect the United States from New World Screwworm.https://www.usda.gov/about-usda/news/press-releases/2025/08/15/usda-announces-sweeping-plans-protect-united-states-new-world-screwworm


    Graff, Natalie. “Threat Looms and Urgency Grows as New World Screwworm Inches Closer to the Texas-Mexico Border.Southern Ag Today 5(39.4). September 25, 2025. Permalink

  • Measuring the Revenue Risk Reduction of Supplemental Crop Insurance Policies

    Measuring the Revenue Risk Reduction of Supplemental Crop Insurance Policies

    From 2015 to 2023, crop insurance programs played a critical role in protecting American farmers from financial risk, particularly in the face of increasing climate volatility. By combining basic policies—such as Actual Production History (APH), Yield Protection (YP), Revenue Protection (RP), and RP with Harvest Price Exclusion (RP-HPE)—with supplemental options like the Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO) and Enhanced Coverage Option (ECO), producers saw substantial improvements in both revenue stability and risk reduction.

    Under baseline conditions, the integration of these supplemental insurance layers resulted in a 27.9% increase in the chance to receive insurance funds that offset weather revenue losses, compared to farming without insurance. This revenue loss reduction comes from both subsidized premiums and indemnity payments that compensated for losses. More importantly, the variability in farm revenue dropped by nearly half—49.05%—and downside risks were dramatically reduced. Relative downside risk fell by 83.6%, while absolute downside risk declined by 80.98%. These figures reflect a significant buffer against income shocks, achieved at a relatively low cost: an actuarially fair premium rate of just 12.34 cents per dollar of liability, with 63.67% of that cost covered by federal subsidies. Farmers paid only 4.35 cents per dollar out of pocket.

    However, the benefits of crop insurance were not evenly distributed across all crops and regions. Cotton emerged as the crop with the highest reduction in downside revenue risk at 88.47%, followed closely by corn (85.91%), canola (83.41%), and wheat (82.42%). Other major crops such as soybeans, peanuts, and rice also saw meaningful reductions, but were lower than the crops above. Geographically, states like Arizona (cotton), Iowa (corn), Indiana (soybeans), Minnesota (corn), and Illinois (corn) led the nation in risk reduction, with rates exceeding 86%. In contrast, states such as Arkansas, California, Vermont, Louisiana, and West Virginia reported lower reductions, often below 71%.

    Further analysis revealed a trade-off: programs that delivered the greatest risk protection also tended to involve higher revenue transfers and greater out-of-pocket costs for producers. The One Big Beautiful Bill (OBBB or OB3) that passed in July 2025 included an increase in premium subsidy for SCO and ECO, increasing subsidy rates to 80%. Further, underlying basic policy subsidies increased by 5 percentage points. This balance between security and affordability remains a key consideration for producer decision making going forward.

    Together, these results underscore the importance of crop insurance as a cornerstone of agricultural risk management. As climate-related disasters become more frequent and severe, the role of insurance in stabilizing farm income and supporting rural economies will only grow more vital.

    Illustration of supplemental coverage combined with an underlying individual policy at 75% coverage level 


    Tsiboe, Francis, Hunter Biram, and Amy Hagerman. “Measuring the Revenue Risk Reduction of Supplemental Crop Insurance Policies.Southern Ag Today 5(37.4). September 11, 2025. Permalink

  • Why So Much Concern in the Countryside?

    Why So Much Concern in the Countryside?

    A common question we’ve been fielding since passage of the One Big Beautiful Bill: “with all this money coming from the Federal government, why do farmers keep complaining?”  It’s generally followed by: “you just can’t make some people happy.”

    There’s no question the Federal government has provided a robust level of assistance. For example, the American Relief Act in December 2024 provided $30.78 billion in relief—$10 billion for economic assistance and $20.78 billion for natural disaster assistance. The recently-passed One Big Beautiful Billprovided approximately $62 billion (10-year total) in improvements to the farm safety net.[1] While these sound like big numbers—because they are—it’s important to put them in context.

    First, for the $10 billion in economic relief from the American Relief Act—implemented by USDA as the Emergency Commodity Assistance Program (ECAP)—Congress required USDA to calculate losses from the 2024 crop year and then limited the amount of assistance to 26% of the loss. In other words, for losses incurred by producers last year, they were required to shoulder 74% of that loss on their own. 

    Second, for the $20.78 billion in relief for natural disasters in the American Relief Act—implemented by USDA as the Supplemental Disaster Relief Program (SDRP)—Congress limited USDA to covering no more than 90% of losses incurred in 2023 and 2024. While that certainly sounds like a lot, once the total losses were estimated by USDA, they were only able to cover 35% of the losses based on the funding provided by Congress. So, SDRP effectively covers, at most, just under 32% of the loss (or 35% x 90%).  

    Importantly, ARC and PLC also will help cover losses from the 2024 crop year once paid in October 2025, but that assistance is at the old levels last adjusted more than a decade ago in the 2014 Farm Bill. In other words, the relief provided by the American Relief Act was all retroactive for losses already incurred and only covered a portion of the losses.

    What about the 2025 crop year?  While the One Big Beautiful Bill made several improvements to the farm safety net—from increasing reference prices from 10-20% to adding up to an additional 30 million base acres nationwide—most of the improvements kick in with the 2025 crop year. Congress stipulated (using the same schedule that has been in place since the 2008 Farm Bill) that payments cannot be made until October 1 of the year following the end of the marketing year for a crop.  Translation: the new assistance won’t go out the door until October 1, 2026. Yes, you read that right. Further, the magnitude of the projected losses to the 2025 crop are such that the assistance will, yet again, only cover a small portion of the loss. Consider the following example:

    The estimated national average cost of production for soybeans in 2025 is $639.15/ac.[2] Using USDA’s August 2025 World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE), the expected return for soybeans is $535.80/ac (or a planted-acre yield of 53.05 bu/ac x $10.10/bu), for an expected loss of $103.35/ac (or $1.95/bu).[3] The question is how much of that loss will be covered by the new-and-improved ARC and PLC.  At present, PLC is projected to pay $0.61/bu and ARC—assuming average yields—would pay $0.85/bu.[4]  Assuming the farm is fully based—where both ARC-CO and PLC use a payment factor of 85%—you effectively receive $0.7225/bu (or 85% of $0.85/bu).  In other words, while the One Big Beautiful Bill provided significant improvements, in the case of soybeans (and virtually every other row crop to varying degrees), it will cover just 37% (or $0.7225/$1.95) of the loss…when it arrives next year. Losses upon losses. Starting to see why folks are concerned?

    To pull all of this together: yes, significant assistance has been provided to the countryside, but on average, it only covers a fraction of the past/projected losses.  That is why you are hearing a collective groaning in the countryside.  What to do about it?  Absent new trade deals that spur additional demand, a renewed focus on in-kind food aid, or commodity-specific demand levers (think ethanol for corn)—and perhaps in addition to all of those things—we suspect Congress will begin contemplating yet another round of disaster aid this fall and/or the Trump Administration will begin discussing intervening with trade aid. To those asking us the questions at the top of this article and for the record: we’ve never met a farmer who preferred getting their income from the government…and they can’t wait to break this cycle of praying to simply break even.


    [1] According to the Congressional Budget Office’s estimates of outlays in Subtitles C (Commodities), D (Disaster Assistance), and E (Crop Insurance) in Title 1 of the One Big Beautiful Bill (https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2025-07/61570-pl119-21-2025Recon-CLB.xlsx).

    [2] https://ers.usda.gov/sites/default/files/_laserfiche/DataFiles/47913/cop_forecast.xlsx?v=30009

    [3] https://www.usda.gov/oce/commodity/wasde/wasde0825.pdf

    [4] PLC: https://www.fsa.usda.gov/documents/2025-plc-pdf; ARC: 90% of $12.17/bu (or $10.95/bu) less $10.10/bu.


    Fischer, Bart L., and Joe Outlaw. “Why So Much Concern in the Countryside?Southern Ag Today 5(35.4). August 28, 2025. Permalink