Category: Policy

Recently we were emailed a publication regarding the lack of progress on the farm bill that really gave us pause.  As is normally the case, we agree with much of the article; however, one specific sentence (below) in the conclusions cannot go unaddressed.   

“Farm Bill reauthorization has failed to launch; it is the hidden demand for increasing reference prices, not matched by any actual proposals and shielded from public scrutiny, that blocks any potential for progress.”

There are two problems with this sentence.  First, the demand for higher reference prices isn’t really “hidden.”  Last year the House and Senate Agriculture Committees held multiple hearings and listening sessions regarding what producers want in the next farm bill.  The hearings that focused on Title I of the farm bill were on April 26^th in the House of Representatives and May 2^nd in the Senate.  

In the House hearing, of the nine witnesses representing covered commodities that receive safety net protection from ARC (Agriculture Risk Coverage) and PLC (Price Loss Coverage) for their crops, only three didn’t explicitly ask for higher statutory reference prices in the next farm bill (USA Dry Pea and Lentil Council, U.S. Canola Association and National Corn Growers Association (NCGA)).  However, the NCGA witness asked to “strengthen the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) effective reference price ‘escalator’” which would cost money and result in higher reference prices for corn.  Thus 7 out of 9 wanted higher reference prices.

In the Senate hearing, there were seven witnesses representing covered commodities that receive safety net protection from ARC and PLC.  Six of the seven explicitly asked for higher reference prices with the NCGA witness again asking to strengthen the PLC effective reference price escalator. In other words, seven out of seven witnesses from national groups asked to increase the reference price for their commodity.

The second problem with the statement is this notion that the demand for higher reference prices is “not matched by any proposals and shielded from public scrutiny.”  At this point, the agricultural committees are at the mercy of House and Senate leadership who have provided little to no additional funds for developing the next farm bill.  Committee leadership and staff have been left to “find” savings from other areas of the farm bill to fund higher reference prices.  Thus far, it appears none of the sources of funds found to fund reference price increases have been acceptable to their counterparts across the aisle.  If anything is responsible for the failure of farm bill reauthorization to launch, it is that impasse. As for higher reference prices, the demand is abundantly apparent. Once the impasse is broken, only then will the stage be set for fulsome discussions on the extent to which the reference prices can be raised.

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Outlaw, Joe, Bart L. Fischer, and Katelyn Klawinsky. “Demand for Raising Reference Prices Not Hidden Very Well.” Southern Ag Today 4(9.4). February 29, 2024. Permalink

As the saying goes: a picture is worth a thousand words.  We present to you Figure 1.

Figure 1: Farm Safety Net and SNAP Spending, 1962 to 2026F

Any serious student of farm policy is taught very early on that nutrition policy and farm policy go hand in hand…and that you can’t get a farm bill done that doesn’t include both.  Why?  The argument goes like this: there are not enough rural votes to pass a farm bill, and including nutrition brings along urban votes that otherwise would not vote for a farm bill. Figure 1 paints an interesting picture of how this relationship has changed over time. Following are our observations:

• For 40 years, spending on the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and the farm safety net were roughly equivalent.^[1] Remarkably, over the 40-year period from 1962 to 2001, SNAP spending edged out farm safety net spending by just 2/10^ths of 1 percent ($439.28 billion versus $438.39 billion). Interestingly, the House was controlled by Democrats for 33 of those 40 years.

• In contrast, over the past 20 years (2002-2021), SNAP spending has outpaced spending on the farm safety net by 242% ($1,231.87 billion versus $360.14 billion).  While part of this increase is certainly attributable to the Great Recession and COVID, it was also the subject of considerable scrutiny during both the 2014 and 2018 Farm Bills. Interestingly, the significant increase in SNAP spending occurred despite the fact that Republicans controlled the House in 14 of the last 20 years.

• In spite of the politically-charged concerns over SNAP spending levels in each of the last two farm bills, in 2021 the Biden Administration revised the Thrifty Food Plan market basket which was estimated to further increase spending on SNAP by $254 billion from 2022 to 2031.^[2] As a result, according to the last estimates from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), over the next 6 years, SNAP spending is projected to outpace farm safety net spending by 508% ($787.44 billion versus $129.49 billion). Notably, that provision was estimated to be budget neutral in the 2018 Farm Bill.

• With respect to the farm safety net, spending over the last 20 years has been flat. In inflation-adjusted terms, spending is actually declining.

While we are simply making observations, the purpose in doing so is to help paint a picture for why it has become so painfully difficult to get a farm bill done. In our judgement, this latest administrative action – against the backdrop of what had already been a considerable amount of angst over SNAP spending levels – is putting a significant amount of strain on that historic coalition.  At the same time, grower comments at listening sessions across the country over the last two years have repeatedly highlighted what is self-evident in the chart below: the farm safety net is lagging behind. 

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^[1] For purposes of this article, we are equating farm income stabilization (budget subfunction 351) and the farm safety net.

^[2] https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/msr_fy22.pdf

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Fischer, Bart L. and Joe Outlaw. “Farm Bill Fault Lines: Why is the Farm Bill Debate Stuck in Neutral?” Southern Ag Today 4(7.4). February 15, 2024. Permalink

In a January 17^th Dear Colleague letter, Senator Debbie Stabenow (D-MI), Chairwoman of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, outlined her proposal for strengthening the farm safety net in the 2024 Farm Bill (found here). The proposal centered around five key principles:

• programs must be targeted to active farmers;
• we need to provide farmers choices and flexibility;
• assistance should be timely;
• we need to expand the reach of programs to help more farmers; and
• we need to address the emerging risks farmers face.

Since the letter was released, considerable attention has been paid to the comments she offered about crop insurance and providing producers expanded safety net choices.  Part of the proposal reads as follows: 

“The 2018 Farm Bill provided cotton farmers with a choice between the traditional base acre programs and a highly-subsidized and streamlined area-based crop insurance policy. The next Farm Bill should give a similar option to all commodities.”

There is a considerable amount of detail about the evolution of the cotton program – from removing lint as a covered commodity to adding seed cotton as a covered commodity – that is not contained in the letter.  In this article, I walk through the history to provide more context.  

First, to resolve the decade-long WTO Brazil cotton dispute (which involved, among other things, the U.S. Government having to pay the Brazilians $147 million per year in cash to fend off retaliation), cotton industry leadership suggested removing cotton as a covered commodity for Title I commodity programs (PLC and ARC) and modifying the marketing assistance loan.  Second, in lieu of ARC/PLC, the 2014 Farm Bill provided cotton producers an industry-proposed area-wide insurance program, the Stacked Income Protection Plan (STAX).  The premium subsidy for STAX was 80%, higher than the 65% subsidy authorized for the Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO) that is available for all crops. Third, upland cotton producers were provided Cotton Transition Assistance Payments (CTAP) for 2014 to aid in the transition to STAX.  

STAX protection was deemed insufficient to protect cotton producers from collapsing prices, so cotton ginning cost share (CGCS) payments were provided for the 2015 and 2016 crop years. Ultimately, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 restored ARC and PLC protection to cotton producers by adding seed cotton as a covered commodity.  While STAX was still available to seed cotton producers, they could not enroll their seed cotton base in ARC/PLC and still purchase STAX on the farm in the same year – they were required to decide between the two options.  

Requiring producers to make the choice between ARC/PLC and STAX was a political compromise required at the time to get cotton added back to the farm bill.  While there is certainly merit to expanding STAX to other crops – or simply improving SCO and the Enhanced Coverage Option (ECO) that are already available to all crops – I would argue that now is the time to eliminate the requirement altogether (rather than expanding it to other crops).  While there has long been a prohibition between the purchase of SCO and ARC – because both offer area-wide coverage and they are very similar in design – there is little justification for requiring producers to choose between PLC and area-wide coverage, both of which serve vastly different safety net functions.

To illustrate the challenges presented by such a choice, consider the following for cotton.  Figure 1 indicates the share of annual upland cotton insurance liability covered by STAX and the share of policies sold.  Producers initially utilized STAX; however, after a few years of unsatisfactory results, the share of liability covered and policies sold declined.  In 2019, when producers actually began a crop year with a choice of ARC/PLC or STAX, the percent of liability covered by STAX, as well as the share of upland cotton policies sold, was relatively low as marketing year average prices (MYAP) were low (Figure 2).  After that, due to Reference Prices not keeping up with input costs (and due to a relatively higher initial insurance price), seed cotton producers moved back to STAX in 2021, 2022 and 2023, with STAX still accounting for just 20% of the policies sold. 

As for the 2024 growing season – with futures prices currently below the cost of production for most growers – growers must now choose between (1) an ineffective ARC/PLC with Reference Prices that have not kept up with inflation or (2) STAX, which can certainly help, but at most will partially offset significant losses they are almost guaranteed to face (absent well-above-expected prices or yields). In other words, growers are faced with two poor options.

After nearly 40 years of working on farm policy, it seems clear to me that there is a need for both (1) improving Reference Prices in Title 1 and (2) improving area-wide coverage in crop insurance, particularly since the two were designed to work in tandem.  It certainly isn’t clear that expanding the choice that was forced on cotton producers to everyone else without higher reference prices is much of a choice.

Figure 1.  STAX Share of Cotton Crop Insurance Liability and Policies Sold.

Figure 2.  Historic Cotton Prices.

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Outlaw, Joe L. “Proposed Safety Net Choice Could Add Risk to Farmers.” Southern Ag Today 4(5.4). February 1, 2024. Permalink

On November 16, 2023, President Biden signed H.R. 6363 – the Further Continuing Appropriations and Other Extensions Act of 2024 – into law. The bill extended the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (2018 Farm Bill), reauthorizing programs like the Agriculture Risk (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC) programs through September 30, 2024. Producers will have an opportunity to make a one-time election between ARC and PLC for the 2024 crop year. USDA opened the election and enrollment period on December 18, 2023, and it runs through March 15, 2024.^[1]

The ARC/PLC decision for 2024 is against the backdrop of a general softening in prices, but the implications vary by crop. For some crops, the decision may be clear-cut. In this article, we illustrate the case of wheat (Figure 1). While Effective Reference Prices are projected to climb starting next year for wheat, it is important to remember that you are making a one-year decision for crop year 2024, where the Statutory Reference Price remains at $5.50/bu. With a projected Marketing Year Average Price (MYAP) of $6.63/bu, it is unlikely (though not impossible as we are very early in the growing season) that PLC will trigger. While some may be tempted to elect ARC as a result, note that the 86% trigger threshold is at a price of $5.34/bu, largely indicating that any hope of receiving an ARC payment would rest on very low yields. In other words, in the case of wheat, it’s unlikely that either ARC or PLC will trigger (unless there is a disaster that results in low yields).

Figure 1. Historical and Projected Wheat Prices and What They Mean for the ARC/PLC Decision.

As we have noted in the past,^[2] we highly encourage you to also look at tools like the Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO) or the Enhanced Coverage Option (ECO), both of which provide area-wide coverage for part of the deductible not covered by your underlying policy. Importantly, if you elect ARC, you cannot purchase SCO. In other words, you are essentially evaluating ARC versus PLC + SCO. Even if PLC is not expected to trigger, you may still choose to elect it and purchase SCO, particularly if the value of SCO is expected to exceed that of ARC. 

For cotton producers, we continue recommending that you first evaluate the Stacked Income Protection Plan (STAX) before making decisions about ARC/PLC. In the case of cotton, STAX cannot be purchased on any farm where the seed cotton base has been enrolled in ARC or PLC for that crop year. As we will discuss at the Red River Crops Conference in Altus, OK, later today, in a scenario where the crop is a total loss, the area-wide policies can provide considerably more coverage than ARC. For example, as noted in the example for Jackson County, OK, in Table 1, STAX can provide more than twice as much support as ARC in a total loss scenario.

Table 1. ARC versus STAX Comparison for Cotton in 2024, Jackson County, OK

Practice	Maximum Possible ARC Payment	STAX				Ratio:  STAX-to-ARC
		Expected County Yield (lint lbs/ac)	Maximum Possible Indemnity	Producer-Paid Premium	Maximum Possible Net Indemnity
IRR	$126	1,273	$243	$30	$213	1.69
DRY	$31	385	$74	$9	$65	2.08

As always, we aren’t in the business of telling you exactly what to do because, frankly, we don’t know what will end up being the best choice. But, as with previous years, we do have a decision aid available at www.afpc.tamu.edu where you can input your info, and it will show you expected payments under as many different price scenarios as you want to look at. We also have students who will input your information for you and call you to discuss results. All you need to do is call (979) 845-5913 and ask for decision aid help.

Hopefully we have given you something to think about as you consider your signup decisions. We wish you luck, and don’t hesitate to call for assistance.

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^[1] https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/arcplc_program/index

^[2] https://southernagtoday.org/2023/03/02/strongarc-plc-sign-up-deadline-just-weeks-away-strong/

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Fischer, Bart L., and Joe Outlaw. “Making the ARC/PLC Election for 2024.” Southern Ag Today 4(3.4). January 18, 2024. Permalink

In remarks during a March 16, 2023, hearing before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, Secretary Vilsack testified that while “our policies have ensured an increasingly abundant food supply, growth in farm size and consolidation has put extreme economic pressure on small and medium sized farms and our rural communities…. We must ask ourselves: do we want a system that continues to force the big to get bigger and the small and underserved to get out or do we want a build a more innovative system?”

The United States has grappled with this small-farm versus large-farm debate for decades.

While many claim that the safety net is targeted toward large farms, it should be noted that (1) the safety net is provided to producers on a per-acre basis regardless of size and (2) Congress has invested a significant amount of resources in helping small, beginning, socially disadvantaged, limited resource, and veteran producers get started in production agriculture. Congress has also significantly curtailed access to the farm safety net for larger farm operations via means testing, actively engaged determinations, and payment limits.

The U.S. has been on this path of fewer but larger farms since the beginning of the last century.  Data from the 1920 Census indicated there were 6,448,343 farms with an average farm size of 148.2 acres.^[1]  According to the 2017 Census of Agriculture, in 2017 there were 2,042,220 farms with an average farm size of 441 acres.^[2]  Not only has average farm size been growing, it is also resulting in a shift in the composition of farms.  Figure 1 illustrates that about one-half of U.S. production comes from large-scale family farms that only make up 3.2 percent of farms, versus 94.7 percent (small and moderate size farms) accounting for 26.2 percent of production.  The USDA Economic Research Service (ERS) also noted that small-scale operators depend on off-farm income while large-scale farms derive almost all of their income from the farm. 

These results have significant policy implications: namely, who is the farm bill – and the farm safety net in particular – intended to benefit?  Washington think tanks argue that Title I benefits in the farm bill should be redirected to smaller farms. This ignores economic reality on the ground, where full-time family operations are putting enormous amounts of capital at risk. We applaud Congress for continuing to focus on full-time family producers who are actually trying to make a living from their operation – all while doing the most to feed the country. 

Figure 1. Median income of farm households, by income source and farm type, 2021.

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This paper summarizes the farm size part of a paper by these authors entitled “Examining Farm Size & Payment Limits” commissioned by the Southwest Council of Agribusiness.

^[1] 1920 Census of Agriculture. Accessed at h#ps://agcensus.library.cornell.edu/census_year/1920-census/

^[2] 2017 Census of Agriculture. Accessed at

https://www.nass.usda.gov/PublicaKons/AgCensus/2017/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_US/usv1.pdf

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Outlaw, Joe, and Bart L. Fischer. “Shouldn’t the Farm Safety Net Target Those Feeding the Country?” Southern Ag Today 4(1.4). January 4, 2024. Permalink