Category: Trade

Authors: Landyn Young and Luis A. Ribera

On July 7^th, the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) chose to leave in place anti-dumping policies for imports of preserved mushrooms from Chile, China, India, and Indonesia (Andberg, 2026). The initial ruling took place in December 1998. Dumping occurs when a producer sells their products at a lower price internationally than they do in their home country or below their production costs. A week after the ruling for preserved mushrooms was continued, on July 14^th, it was announced that a preliminary determination had been reached regarding dumping of fresh mushrooms in the U.S. market from Canada (Federal Register, 2026). The USITC implemented an 8.26% preliminary antidumping tariff on most fresh mushrooms from Canada, following a separate 2.84% countervailing duty for alleged unfair subsidies. In 2025, the United States imported 91.2 thousand metric tons (TMT) of mushrooms, valued at $416.9 million. Based on imports from Canada in 2025, it is estimated that 81 percent of fresh mushroom imports could face antidumping tariffs, with Agaricus mushroom imports being 92 percent.

Since 2019, between 96 and 98 percent of U.S. grown mushrooms were the Agaricus variety, which is primarily grown in Pennsylvania and California. Around 69 percent of total production of Agaricus mushrooms occurred in these two states in 2025, or 205 thousand metric tons (TMT) of the 304 TMT grown nationwide. The remaining 31 percent is spread throughout the United States.

In 2025, 91.2 TMT of mushrooms were imported, with 79.2 TMT being Agaricus; the other 12 TMT were other varieties. By far the largest exporter of fresh mushrooms to the United States was Canada, which sent an estimated 74.2 TMT of mushrooms to the United States worth $345 million. It is estimated that imports accounted for as much as 23 percent of all fresh mushrooms available in the United States in 2025, up from 16.8 percent in 2019.  On the other hand, exports have dropped considerably since 2020, while consumption has remained relatively steady. With production on the decline and the reliance on imports rising, this could negatively impact prices for consumers of fresh mushrooms but may also be a windfall for mushroom growers in the United States trying to stay competitive.

Volume of U.S. Mushroom Imports, 2011 – June 2026

Volume of U.S. Mushroom Exports, 2011 – June 2026

Share of U.S. Mushroom Consumption from Imports, 2019 – 2025

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Sources:

Andberg, Jennifer. United States International Trade Commission. “USITC Makes Determinations in Five-Year Reviews Concerning Preserved Mushrooms from Chile, China, India, and Indonesia.” Published July 2026.

Federal Register. “Fresh Mushrooms From Canada: Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations and Alignment of Final Determination With Final Antidumping Duty Determination.” Published July 2026.

Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS). Global Agricultural Trade System (GATS). Online Database. Online public database accessed August 2026.

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Recommended citation format: Young, Landyn, and Luis Ribera. “USITC Maintains Anti-Dumping Order on Fresh Mushrooms.” Southern Ag Today 6(33.4). August 13, 2026. Permalink

Authors: K. Aleks Schaefer and Rylee Smith

Last week, the USDA announced it would resume Mexican cattle imports under a phased reopening beginning in August. This is a somewhat controversial, but scientifically sound choice. When the United States suspended imports of live cattle from Mexico, the objective was straightforward: keep New World Screwworm (NWS) out of the country for as long as possible. The policy accepted significant economic costs in exchange for delaying one of the livestock industry’s most damaging pests.

That question looks very different today. With NWS now confirmed inside the United States (USDA APHIS, 2026), policymakers are no longer deciding whether the border closures prevent introduction; they are deciding whether the restrictions provide enough benefit to justify their economic costs. Our previous research estimated the economic cost of the border closures and how much delay in pest establishment would be required for those costs to be worthwhile (Sumner et al., 2026). Those findings provide a framework for evaluating today’s policy debate.

Border Closures Significantly Tightened Feeder Cattle Supplies: Mexico has long served as one of the largest suppliers of feeder cattle to U.S. feedlots, with roughly 1.2 million head imported annually before the restrictions (Sumner et al., 2026). When the border closed, those cattle disappeared from the market. At the largest point of disruption, monthly imports were more than 150,000 head below what historical market relationships would have predicted (Sumner et al., 2026).

Feeder Cattle Prices Climbed Well Above Expected Levels: With fewer feeder cattle entering the United States, domestic supplies tightened quickly. Our analysis shows that the border closures pushed feeder cattle prices much higher than expected. Prices initially followed normal market trends but increased rapidly, reaching nearly $100 per hundredweight above what would have been expected by July 2025 (Sumner et al., 2026).

Border closures put substantial upward pressure on feeder cattle prices. Changes in Mexican cattle imports had lasting effects on feeder cattle prices, demonstrating how closely U.S. and Mexican cattle markets are connected (Sumner et al., 2026).

Figure 1. Impacts of the import ban on U.S. Feeder Cattle Markets

With confirmed cases of New World Screwworm now detected within the United States (USDA APHIS, 2026), policymakers face a different decision. The question is no longer whether the border can keep the pest out entirely, but whether continued restrictions on Mexican cattle imports meaningfully slow its spread, reduce the likelihood of reinfestation from neighboring regions, or provide enough additional time for response efforts to outweigh the ongoing costs on the cattle industry.

Over nine months, the border closures reduced feeder cattle imports, tightened supplies, and increased feeder cattle prices (Sumner et al., 2026). Those impacts continue to accumulate with restrictions in place.

Policymakers must weigh the market disruptions against the biosecurity benefits that the restrictions provide. If the remaining benefits are limited, the economic case for prolonged border closures becomes weaker. If, however, the restrictions significantly reduce additional introductions, protect infestation-free regions, or improve the effectiveness of eradication efforts, continued restrictions may still generate benefits.

Biosecurity policies are rarely static. As conditions change, so should the economic questions used to evaluate them. The challenge is no longer asking “Did the border closure buy enough time?” It is asking “How much additional protection does the closure provide today and is that protection worth its continuing economic cost?”

REFERENCES

Sumner S., Jones S., Islam T., and Schaefer K.A. (2026) “Delaying the Inevitable? U.S. Screwworm Closures and Feeder Cattle Market Dynamics,” Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, https://doi.org/10.1002/aepp.70111.

USDA APHIS. 2026. “Confirmed Detections of New World Screwworm.” https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animals/animal-health/livestock-and-poultry-disease/current-status/us-confirmed-cases-new-world.

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Recommended citation format: Schaefer, K. Aleks, and Rylee Smith. “Reopening the Border to Mexican Cattle Imports is the Right Decision.” Southern Ag Today 6(31.4). July 30, 2026. Permalink

Established following the May 2026 summit between President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, the U.S.-China Board of Trade is a new bilateral initiative aimed at rebuilding commercial ties between the U.S. and China by reducing trade barriers, addressing tariff disputes, and encouraging trade between countries (USTR, 2026). Implementation details, including which products will be covered, how procurement commitments will be measured, and how compliance will be enforced, are still being finalized. 

In a recent bipartisan letter to U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, members of Congress urged the Administration to explicitly include “American hardwood lumber” in the newly established framework, to ensure that China’s procurement commitments prioritize U.S. hardwood lumber. The lawmakers argue that restoring access to the Chinese market is critical for the U.S. hardwood industry. As noted in the letter, the industry has suffered nearly $10 billion in lost sales and a 48% decline in domestic hardwood lumber production since the onset of the U.S. trade war with China in 2018. See the following link for a full copy of the letter: https://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ustr_hardwood_letter.pdf. 

The importance of this letter becomes clearer when viewed in the context of the hardwood industry and declining export sales, especially to China. 

The U.S. is one of the world’s leading producers and exporters of hardwood logs and lumber, with exports providing an important source of income for forest landowners, sawmills, and rural communities. Hardwood exports are particularly significant in the U.S. South, a region characterized by abundant timber resources and a strong dependence on international markets for sales. For instance, the largest hardwood export category, oak lumber (red and white), was valued at $873 million in 2025, led by exports from the South ($327 million) where North Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee, and Kentucky are top suppliers. It is important to note that prior to the 2018 trade war, U.S. oak lumber exports were $1.3 billion. In 2017, China accounted for more than 60% of U.S. oak lumber exports. This decreased to 34% in 2025 (USDA, 2026).

Trade data show just how important the Chinese market has been for southern hardwood producers (See Figure 1). Exports of hardwood products from the South experienced strong growth after 2010, driven largely by rising demand from China. Southern hardwood lumber exports to all destinations increased from roughly $500 million in 2010 to more than $1.2 billion in 2017, while exports to China alone grew from less than $200 million to nearly $700 million over the same period. This pattern highlights the central role that China played in expanding markets for southern hardwood producers. Hardwood log exports also benefited from Chinese demand, although growth was more modest than for lumber.

The 2018 trade war marked a clear turning point. Following retaliatory tariffs imposed by China, hardwood lumber exports to China fell sharply, dropping by nearly half between 2018 and 2019. Exports have never returned to their pre-trade-war levels and continued to decline through 2025. Lumber exports from the South to all countries also trended downward after 2018, suggesting that losses in the Chinese market were only partially offset by sales to other destinations. Southern hardwood log exports have also weakened, although they have generally been more stable than lumber exports. Overall, the figure shows how deeply the southern hardwood industry depended on China before 2018 and how the trade war fundamentally altered exports. 

Rebuilding trade with China could help strengthen the southern hardwood industry. Among overseas markets, China emerged as one of the most important destinations for U.S. hardwood products. Expanding furniture manufacturing and increasing demand for high-quality wood materials contributed to a substantial rise in U.S. hardwood exports to China. As a result, many U.S. hardwood producers became increasingly reliant on Chinese demand. These exports supported employment, investment, and forest management activities throughout southern states. 

Figure 1. U.S. Hardwood Exports from Southern States to All Countries and China: 2010-2025

For more information:

Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) (2026). USTR Seeks Public Comment on the Scope and Operation of a Mechanism to Promote Balanced and Reciprocal Trade with China. Press Release (June 02, 2026). https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/june/ustr-seeks-public-comment-scope-and-operation-mechanism-promote-balanced-and-reciprocal-trade-china

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) (2026). Global Agricultural Trade System. Foreign Agricultural Service. https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/default.aspx

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Recommended citation format: Muhammad, Andrew. “Can the U.S. South Regain Its Hardwood Market in China?” Southern Ag Today 6(29.4). July 16, 2026. Permalink

Authors: Landyn Young and Luis A. Ribera

The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) began July 1, 2020. The trade deal was a replacement for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which was done to help create reciprocal trade policies between the partner countries, increase trade and stimulate growth of their economies. While the deal is set to expire, unless an extension occurs, in 2036, the agreement will face review on the first of July. Both Canada and Mexico administrations have expressed their support of the trade agreement while the U.S. administration has expressed its reservations. Regardless of the results, it does not mark a true conclusion unless one member gives a formal intention to withdraw.  

In 2019, the final full year of NAFTA, $41.3 billion of agricultural exports left the United States for Canada and Mexico, 29.3 percent of total U.S. agricultural exports (Figure 1). Since USMCA has been signed, annual agricultural exports totaled $59.3 billion in 2025, 34.6 percent of total U.S. agricultural exports. The largest category of products exported to Mexico and Canada since 2021 in terms of volume and value are grains and feeds which has accounted for 34.1 MMT of agricultural exports annually, or $13.9 billion (Figure 2). Grains and feeds ranked second during NAFTA, totaling 25.6 MMT worth $8.91 billion. Prior to USMCA, the largest export category to members in terms of value was animal products at $9.53 billion, estimated at around 3.87 MMT.

Imports from Canada and Mexico under USMCA have averaged 76 MMT annually worth $199 billion (Figure 3). The same timespan during the final years for NAFTA imports averaged 64.3 MMT worth $131 billion. In 2019, agricultural imports under NAFTA were 39.7 percent of total U.S. agricultural imports, while in 2025 they represented 39.1 percent under USMCA. Imports have increased across the board with each product category retaining a similar import share to that in NAFTA (Figure 4). Vegetables continue to hold the highest share of imported agricultural products from Canada and Mexico at 18.2 percent or $14.2 billion annually, as well as totaling 10.7 MMT. Under NAFTA, vegetable imports from the two partners totaled $9.25 billion and 8.6 MMT.  Overall, both NAFTA and USMCA have been successful when you look at the overall objectives of the trade agreement, reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers and increase trade among member countries.

Figure 1. U.S. Value of Agricultural Exports, 1990-2025

Figure 2. Comparing NAFTA and USMCA Agricultural Trade, U.S. Export Value

Figure 3. U.S. Value of Agricultural Imports, 1990-2025

Figure 4. Comparing NAFTA and USMCA Agricultural Trade, U.S. Import Value

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Recommended citation format: Young, Landyn, and Luis A. Ribera. “From NAFTA to USMCA.” Southern Ag Today 6(27.4). July 2, 2026. Permalink

Prior to 2019, the United States consistently recorded an agricultural trade surplus, meaning exports exceeded imports in value terms. For example, in fiscal year (FY) 2014, U.S. agricultural exports totaled about $152 billion, while imports were roughly $109 billion, yielding a surplus of $43 billion. This surplus steadily narrowed in subsequent years, falling to less than $5 billion by 2019. Since then, the trend has reversed, with the United States posting agricultural trade deficits over the past three years, culminating in a record deficit of approximately $44 billion in FY 2025, a stark contrast to the surplus observed a decade earlier (USDA-ERS, 2020; 2026).

Given the current White House Administration’s emphasis on bilateral trade imbalances, leadership at the U.S. Department of Agriculture has followed suit, increasingly framing the reduction of the agricultural trade deficit as a key policy objective. However, focusing on the agricultural trade deficit as a target can be misleading, as it obscures the broader economic forces shaping trade flows—a point discussed in previous Southern Ag Today articles. For instance, rising U.S. imports of agricultural goods may reflect not declining competitiveness, but stronger consumer demand for a more diverse set of products, including off-season fruits and vegetables as well as higher-value items such as beer, wine, and spirits. Moreover, a narrow emphasis on the trade deficit ignores the highly integrated nature of modern agricultural supply chains. For instance, the recent import ban on Mexican feeder cattle may contribute to a reduction in the agricultural trade deficit, but it would be difficult to argue that the U.S. beef sector is necessarily better off as a result.

That said, it is still useful to examine the agricultural trade deficit more closely. Recent year-to-date trade data (January–April) suggest a narrowing of the deficit compared to the same period last year. As of April 2026, the agricultural trade deficit stood at $7.5 billion, down 62% from $19.7 billion over the same period in 2025. On the surface, this could be interpreted as evidence of improvement, or even as an indication that current trade policies are working. However, caution is warranted in drawing such conclusions. 

Figure 1 presents year-to-date percentage changes in U.S. agricultural exports and imports, both in aggregate and across major export destinations and import suppliers. The data indicate that the narrowing of the deficit is driven more by declining imports than by strong export growth. Total U.S. exports increased modestly (+5.5%), while imports fell sharply (−11.5%), with particularly large declines in imports from the EU (−27.1%), Brazil (−24.6%), and Southeast Asia (−23.8%). What is driving these changes? The increase in exports is mostly China (+35.2%) due to a strong recovery in soybean and sorghum exports, both of which dropped to negligible levels in 2025. The decline in imports also appears to be concentrated in specific products, including beer, wine, spirits, and essential oils from the EU; coffee and beef fat from Brazil; and beverage sweeteners and cocoa products from Southeast Asia (USDA-FAS, 2026).

This raises an important question: are we truly better off if the narrowing deficit is driven primarily by declining imports rather than broad-based export growth across markets and products?

Figure 1. 2026 Year-To-Date (January–April) Percentage Changes in U.S. Agricultural Exports and Imports, Total and Major Partners

For more information:

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA-ERS) (2020). Outlook for U.S. Agricultural Trade. Economic Research Service. https://www.ers.usda.gov/media/10231/aes-111.pdf?v=93939

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA-ERS) (2026). Outlook for U.S. Agricultural Trade. Economic Research Service. https://www.ers.usda.gov/media/20882/aes-136.pdf?v=85005

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA-FAS) (2026). Global Agricultural Trade System. Foreign Agricultural Service. https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/default.aspx

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Recommended citation format: Muhammad, Andrew. “A Narrowing Agricultural Trade Deficit in 2026 – But Are We Better Off?” Southern Ag Today 6(25.4). June 18, 2026. Permalink