Southern Ag Today

Author: Hunter Biram

  • Estimating the Impact of Low Mississippi River Levels on Soybean Basis in the Midsouth

    Estimating the Impact of Low Mississippi River Levels on Soybean Basis in the Midsouth

    Extreme weather events, like drought, jointly impact agricultural production and rural infrastructure, including transportation infrastructure. An important part of this transportation infrastructure is the Mississippi River. It serves as one of the most critical networks for moving agricultural commodities from production to consumption areas, including export markets. In 2020, U.S. agricultural exports totaled $146 billion, increasing 7 percent year over year (U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Foreign Agricultural Service, 2021). Approximately 46 percent of grain exports were moved by barge in 2020. Soybeans, the leading U.S. agricultural export, rely heavily on barge transportation, with 53 percent of exports and 28 percent of total supplies moved by barge in 2020.

    Despite this reliance on barges for moving U.S. grain, little is known about the link between extreme weather, rural transportation infrastructure, and crop prices. In 2022 and 2023, the Lower Mississippi River reached historic lows. In October, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Memphis stream gauge read -12.0 feet and -10.8 feet in 2023 and 2022, respectively. The previous record was set in 1988 when the USGS Memphis stream gauge read -10.7 feet. These record-low water levels increased transportation costs and barge freight rates as documented by previous Southern Ag Today articles (Biram, et al., 2022; Gardner, Biram, and Mitchell, 2023; Biram, Mitchell, and Stiles, 2024). Higher transportation costs are transmitted to row crop producers through lower cash bids or a weakening of local crop basis (calculated as the cash price minus the futures price). Historic lows in Mississippi River levels during the fall harvest of the last three years have highlighted the need to measure the impact of these low river levels on rural infrastructure and communities.

    Mitchell and Biram (2025) measure the impact of low water levels on the Mississippi River using Arkansas soybean basis data across 12 regional grain markets from USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service and stream gauge data from USGS. They use a “low river” status measure that affects a grain market once the river gauge height falls below negative five feet and is weighted by the distance between a grain elevator and the closest public Mississippi River port.  They find that when the river stream gauge in Memphis, Tennessee reads -5 feet, Arkansas soybean basis weakens (widens) by $0.58 per bushel, $0.29 per bushel, and $0.12 per bushel for grain markets that are 5 miles, 10 miles, and 25 miles from the closest Mississippi River port, respectively. Similarly, they find that Mississippi soybean basis weakens (widens) by $0.55 per bushel, $0.28 per bushel, and $0.11 per bushel for the same distances to grain markets. Figure 1 below shows the degree of the impact of low river levels on soybean basis in Arkansas with markets near the river experiencing weaker basis than of those further from the river.

    Figure 1. Impact of Low Mississippi River Levels on Soybean Basis in Dollars per Bushel in Arkansas

    Note: Each line represents a different stream gage height threshold. The term “marginal effect” denotes the change in Arkansas soybean basis, measured in dollars per bushel, for every additional mile between a grain market and a river port.

    References

    Biram, Hunter, John Anderson, Scott Stiles, and Andrew McKenzie. “Low Water Levels in the Mississippi River Result in Abnormally Weak Soybean Basis“. Southern Ag Today 2(45.1). October 31, 2022. Permalink

    Biram, Hunter, James L. Mitchell, and H. Scott Stiles. “Low Rivers Levels on the Mississippi River: Not the Three-Peat We Want.” Southern Ag Today 4(39.3). September 25, 2024. Permalink

    Gardner, Grant, Hunter Biram, and James Mitchell. “Low River Levels, Barge Freight, and Widening Basis.” Southern Ag Today 3(39.1). September 25, 2023. Permalink

    Mitchell, J. L., & Biram, H. D. (2025). The effects of extreme weather on rural transportation infrastructure and crop prices along the Lower Mississippi River. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy.

    Biram, Hunter, and James L. Mitchell. “Estimating the Impact of Low Mississippi River Levels on Soybean Basis in the Midsouth.” Southern Ag Today 5(12.3). March 19, 2025. Permalink

  • Can Yield Upside Risk Eclipse Price Downside Risk Protection in ECO Crop Insurance?

    Can Yield Upside Risk Eclipse Price Downside Risk Protection in ECO Crop Insurance?

    Producers can keep track of their price risk protection through revenue insurance in a given growing season by comparing the Harvest (Fall) Price to the Projected (Spring) Price determined by USDA-RMA. In the broader picture of a marketing plan, revenue crop insurances provide a form of price guarantee at a premium expense similar to locking in a price guarantee using a put option contract (Biram and Smith, 2022). A previous article examined the price protection offered by Revenue Protection (RP), Supplemental Coverage Option (SCO), and Enhanced Coverage Option (ECO) crop insurance for corn and rice (Biram, 2023). That article only considered the change in prices and did not consider the potential change in yield. This article builds on the previous one by considering both the price and yield protection offered by ECO, and providing a snapshot of how changes in county yields can also trigger indemnities.

    ECO is an area-based crop insurance product and must be paired with farm-level insurance like Yield Protection (YP) or RP. The liability insured by ECO is calculated using the same parameters as RP (e.g., APH farm yield and futures prices) at coverage levels of 90% and 95%. The futures price used is based on the higher of the Projected Price and the Harvest Price determined by USDA-RMA. Unlike RP – which triggers indemnities based on farm-level losses –ECO triggers an indemnity based on county-wide losses and will trigger a full indemnity when county-level revenue losses fall to 86%.

    A county-level map is provided in Figure 1, which shows the extent that the final county yield can change relative to the expected county yield and still trigger an indemnity for corn that is equal to the producer paid premium (i.e., breakeven indemnity). In other words, this map answers the question of how much the county yield must change to trigger an indemnity that will at least cover the producer-paid premium. The producer premium was determined for RP at the 75% coverage level (RP-75) under optional units paired with ECO at the 95% coverage level (ECO-95) with the associated premium subsidy rate applied. Projected and Harvest Prices reported by the RMA Price Discovery Tool are used with theassociated price volatility. 

    As an example, a county shaded in the darkest green shows that the final county yield may increase at least 21-26% for an indemnity to trigger which covers the producer premium. This suggests the price decline in the futures market was severe enough to allow for yield upside risk that would offset indemnities triggered on price alone. Conversely, a county shaded in the darkest red indicates that the final county yield must decline at least 6-11% before a large enough indemnity to cover producer premium is triggered. This implies that the price decline was not severe enough to trigger an indemnity on price alone. Most counties have experienced severe enough price declines in corn that yield can increase in comparison to the expected yield and potentially obtain a net indemnity above zero (e.g., yellow and green shaded counties).

    A similar pattern exists for cotton and soybeans (Figures 2-3). Nearly all counties insuring cotton under ECO-95 and RP-75 allow for yield upside risk, or favorable potential, to determine an indemnity equal to producer premium with most counties allowing for 7-10% yield upside risk. The same story holds for soybeans with potential yield upside risk of 9-14% for most counties which indicates the extent of futures price declines for both cotton and soybeans in 2024. Rice is the exception with no counties allowing for yield upside potential in determining an indemnity equal to producer premium (Figure 4). This is expected given there was virtually no change (i.e., $0.002/lb) in the rough rice futures price between planting and harvest.

    This analysis shows that price risk protection, which does not require a crop insurance premium, could be provided through ECO-95 if yields do not increase by more than 5% across most counties. However, given the potential for record yields across most of the U.S., this potential may be largely eclipsed. While this yield upside could be beneficial, it only considers one half of the profit equation, gross revenue. Further, price declines, paired with elevated production expenses, have not been met by risk protection from other farm bill programs, such as Price Loss Coverage and Agriculture Risk Coverage. This underscores the lack of price risk mitigation provided by current farm policy tools and the need for an updated farm safety net.

    Figure 1. Percentage Change in County Yield for ECO-95 to Result in Zero Net Indemnity (Corn)

    This map shows the percentage change in the final county yield relative to the expected yield required to trigger an ECO indemnity that will be equal to producer paid premium. This assumes RP and ECO coverage levels of 75% and 95%, respectively. Click here for an interactive version of this map showing county-specific percentages.

    Figure 2. Percentage Change in County Yield for ECO-95 to Result in Zero Net Indemnity (Cotton)

    This map shows the percentage change in the final county yield relative to the expected yield required to trigger an ECO indemnity that will be equal to the producer paid premium. This assumes RP and ECO coverage levels of 75% and 95%, respectively. Click here for an interactive version of this map showing county-specific percentages.

    Figure 3. Percentage Change in County Yield for ECO-95 to Result in Zero Net Indemnity (Soybeans)

    This map shows the percentage change in the final county yield relative to the expected yield required to trigger an ECO indemnity that will be equal to the producer paid premium. This assumes RP and ECO coverage levels of 75% and 95%, respectively. Click here for an interactive version of this map showing county-specific percentages.

    Figure 4. Percentage Change in County Yield for ECO-95 to Result in Zero Net Indemnity (Rice)

    This map shows the percentage change in the final county yield relative to the expected yield required to trigger an ECO indemnity that will be equal to the producer paid premium. This assumes RP and ECO coverage levels of 75% and 95%, respectively. Click here for an interactive version of this map showing county-specific percentages.

    References

    Biram, Hunter, and S. Aaron Smith. “The Option to Augment the Crop Insurance Price Floor“. Southern Ag Today 2(35.1). August 22, 2022. Permalink

    Biram, Hunter. “Comparing the Harvest Price and Projected Price in Revenue Protection Crop Insurance for Rice and Corn.” Southern Ag Today 3(35.1). August 28, 2023. Permalink

    Biram, Hunter. “Can Yield Upside Risk Eclipse Price Downside Risk Protection in ECO Crop Insurance?” Southern Ag Today 4(47.3). November 20, 2024. Permalink

  • Addressing the Gap in Participation Between Whole Farm Revenue Protection and Other MPCI Products

    Addressing the Gap in Participation Between Whole Farm Revenue Protection and Other MPCI Products

    Whole Farm Revenue Protection (WFRP) is a crop insurance product administered by the USDA Risk Management Agency (RMA). WFRP provides protection against the risk of farm revenue generated by all crops falling below a level of guaranteed revenue.  Expected revenue is found by taking the most recently available five-year average of whole farm revenue reported on the Schedule F farm income tax form. For example, the expected revenue for 2024 is found by taking the average of revenue reported in 2018-2022. Subsequently, the expected revenue is multiplied by the producer-elected coverage level to determine the guaranteed revenue or WFRP liability.  The WFRP revenue guarantee is capped at $17 million.

    Like other multi-peril crop insurance (MPCI) products, the WFRP premium is subsidized by rates determined through federal legislation. The subsidy, or portion of the actuarially fair premium rate paid by the government, decreases as the elected coverage level increases. The WFRP producer premium may be further reduced through the Diversity Factor, which is a percentage multiplied by the actuarially fair rate. As the number of qualifying commodities insured increases, the greater the discount in the actuarially fair premium rate. Lastly, the WFRP producer premium may be reduced for those producers who have Beginning Farmer or Rancher or Veteran Farmer Status. Combining all three of these producer premium reductions can result in up to a 90% reduction in the actuarially fair premium.

    While the increasing trend in federal crop insurance participation since its inception can be largely attributed to increases in the premium subsidy rate, not all programs have experienced the same utilization (Yehouenou et al., 2018). Yehouenou et al. (2018) cite the reluctance of crop insurance agents to encourage purchasing STAX as one reason for the lack of participation despite the 80% premium subsidy rate attached to all coverage levels. Whole Farm Revenue Protection also faces a lag in participation and has experienced a decline in purchased liability since its inception in 2015.   Average purchased liability of about $2 billion per year (Figure 1), which is far less than yield protection (YP) and revenue protection (RP) purchased liability which averaged over $100 billion over the same period (Figure 2).

    One issue driving the lack of federal crop insurance participation is a lack of understanding of crop insurance programs. In response to this knowledge gap, RMA set up a number of cooperative agreements to build relationships, enhance understanding, and strengthen the public-private partnership of federal crop insurance across the agriculture community. In 2022, the University of Arkansas partnered on a two-year pilot program with RMA, the Crop Insurance Navigator program. The Navigator project seeks to address “knowledge gaps” of RMA products with a focus on historically underserved producer communities. The partnership is funded by the USDA Risk Management Agency. This southern region focused pilot is primarily designed to address the knowledge gaps present in WFRP and Micro-Farm products on both the part of producers and crop insurance agents. The program uses a cohort of project specialists to engage farmers, ranchers, educators, community-based organizations, and agricultural stakeholders to enhance understanding of federal crop insurance products serving small and historically underserved producer groups. To learn more about the Crop Insurance Navigator program visit https://srmec.uada.edu/navigator.html.

    In an aligned effort to enhance understanding of crop insurance, UA faculty led the development of a workbook covering the fundamentals of federal crop insurance to educate producers, crop insurance agents, and policymakers with chapters on products and opportunities for socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers. To access the workbook follow this link:https://www.uaex.uada.edu/publications/pdf/MP576.pdf

    Figure 1. Whole Farm Revenue Purchased Liability (1999-2023) 

    This figure shows changes in WFRP participation since 1999. Prior to the introduction of WFRP in 2015, Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) was made available in 1999 and provided coverage similar to WFRP.

    Figure 2. Multi-Peril Crop Insurance Purchased Liability (1989-2023)

    This figure shows the changes in MPCI products providing farm-level yield and revenue risk protection such as Actual Production History, Revenue Assurance, Yield Protection, and Revenue Protection.

    References

    USDA-RMA. (2024). USDA-RMA Summary of Business. Retrieved February 20, 2024, from https://www.rma.usda.gov/SummaryOfBusiness

    Yehouenou, L., Barnett, B. J., Harri, A., & Coble, K. H. (2018). STAX appeal?. Applied economic perspectives and policy, 40(4), 563-584.

    Biram, Hunter, and Ron Rainey. “Addressing the Gap in Participation Between Whole Farm Revenue Protection and Other MPCI Products.” Southern Ag Today 4(45.1). November 4, 2024. Permalink

  • Low River Levels on the Mississippi River: Not the Three-peat We Want

    Low River Levels on the Mississippi River: Not the Three-peat We Want

    The Mississippi River level measured at Memphis, TN, has dropped to severe low levels for the third year in a row. As of 11:35 AM on September 23, 2024, the river level fell to -10 feet. In the past ten years, the Mississippi River has fallen below the established zero level[1] during harvest (i.e., August 1 through November 30) seven times. However, the level has only fallen to the “low” stage – defined by the National Weather Service as -5 feet – four times (2015, 2017, 2022, and 2023). The river level has serious implications for cash basis, or the local cash price offered by a grain elevator less the futures price traded on a global market.

    Barge freight rates are established by the U.S. Inland Waterway System using a percent of tariff system. Benchmark rates are based on the tariff rates from the Bulk Grain and Grain Products Freight Tariff No. 7, entered into in 1976 between the U.S. Department of Justice and Interstate Commerce Commission (USDA-AMS, 2024).  While these rates are no longer directly applicable, they are still used to calculate the percent of tariff.  Calculating the percent of tariff consists of dividing today’s tariff rate by the 1976 tariff rate. The 3-year average percent of tariff rates indicates the weekly barge freight rate tends to be near 360 percent of tariffs, or about $11.23/ton[2] (USDA-AMS, 2024). Low Mississippi River levels have a negative effect on corn and soybean basis through the barge freight rate (Figure 1). For example, the week of September 26, 2023, the barge freight rate was 1,689 percent of tariff, or $53.03/ton, which means the cost to transport grain from Cairo, IL, or Memphis, TN, to the port of New Orleans was four times higher than the three-year average for the same week. 

    Figure 1. The relationship between the Mississippi River level and barge freight rates for moving cargo from Cairo, IL or Memphis, TN 

    Figure 1 plots the Mississippi River level measured at Memphis, TN, for the period August 1, 2023, through September 3, 2024. This figure also provides the weekly average freight, as well as the expected barge freight rate measured by the non-drought three-year average freight rate (i.e., 2019-2021). As the gage height falls, barge freight rates increase, and vice versa.

    The relationship between the futures price and the price at local cash markets can change abruptly due to economic or environmental events, such as low river levels. Local cash bids offered by elevators on the Mississippi River tend to be influenced by river level in periods of drought, because it is more expensive to ship the same amount of grain in more loads due to reduced barge draft (Biram, et al., 2022; Biram, 2023; Gardner, Biram, and Mitchell, 2023). Figure 2 shows the soybean basis response to low river levels in Helena, AR, in 2022 and 2023 with another downward trajectory for 2024 as of September 20, 2024.

    Figure 2. Daily Soybean Basis at Helena, AR in Harvest Window

    Figure 2 shows the historical daily basis for soybeans during the months of July through November. The blue, orange, purple, and green lines denote the 2021, 2022, 2023, and 2024 crop years, respectively. The solid red line denotes the non-drought five-year average basis for a grain elevator in Helena, AR. The non-drought five-year-average provides the “normal,” or “expected,” basis. The dashed vertical line denotes the basis most recently reported (-26) on September 10, 2024, which is 5 cents below the five-year-average basis of -31 cents.

    While it may appear that the current basis in the heart of the Midsouth Delta region is similar to the non-drought five-year-average, this should be interpreted with caution. Upon closer inspection, the 2022 crop year also saw relatively strong basis at this time, but a steep decline followed. The relatively strong basis in the first week of September is likely due to only 30% of the midsouth soybean crop being harvested with the remaining occurring by mid-November, along with recent rains, including those from Hurricane Francine. 

    A potential option farmers might have is to store grain in the bin and market grain in the post-harvest window as described at length in previous Southern Ag Today articles (Gardner, 2023; Gardner and Maples, 2023; Gardner, 2024). Historically, futures and basis tend to recover in the months when there is little domestic production to buy and stocks are drawn down. We note that the USDA Marketing Assistance Loan (MAL) program may be an additional tool to add to a post-harvest marketing strategy. A benefit to using MALs is the offered interest rates are below the market average saving potential interest expense. Since grain sitting in the bin is not paying off the operating loan taken at the beginning of the crop year, interest accrues on the operating loan, creating the opportunity cost of storage in addition to the explicit costs of handling and drying (Gardner, 2023; Smith, 2024).

    [1] According to the National Weather Service, silt may deposit in a river channel filling it up, or the channel may be washed deeper due to strong currents. Establishing a gauge zero level maintains consistency in river level measurements over time (National Weather Service, 2024).

    [2] This figure is found by multiplying the percent of tariff, which in this example is 3.60, by the benchmark rate for the Cairo-Memphis ports which is $3.14.

    References

    Biram, Hunter, John Anderson, Scott Stiles, and Andrew McKenzie. “Low Water Levels in the Mississippi River Result in Abnormally Weak Soybean Basis“. Southern Ag Today 2(45.1). October 31, 2022. Permalink

    Biram, Hunter. “Flooding in the Upper Mississippi River is Associated with Relatively Weak Soybean Basis in the Midsouth.” Southern Ag Today 3(21.1). May 22, 2023. Permalink

    Gardner, Grant, Hunter Biram, and James Mitchell. “Low River Levels, Barge Freight, and Widening Basis.” Southern Ag Today 3(39.1). September 25, 2023. Permalink

    Gardner, Grant. “Interest Rates and Grain Storage.” Southern Ag Today 3(26.1). June 26, 2023. Permalink

    Gardner, Grant. “To Store or Not to Store? Old Crop Exit Strategies.” Southern Ag Today 4(35.1). August 26, 2024. Permalink

    Gardner, Grant, and William E. Maples. “River Levels and Off-Farm Storage Disbursement.” Southern Ag Today 3(43.1). October 23, 2023. Permalink

    National Weather Service. “How can a river stage be negative?” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service. Accessed September 16, 2024. Permalink

    Smith, Aaron. “Storing corn or soybeans: what is the futures market incentivizing?” Southern Ag Today 4(33.1). August 12, 2024. PermalinkUSDA-AMS. 2024.  Grain Transportation Repots. Available at: https://www.ams.usda.gov/services/transportation-analysis/gtr

    Biram, Hunter, James L. Mitchell, and H. Scott Stiles. “Low Rivers Levels on the Mississippi River: Not the Three-Peat We Want.” Southern Ag Today 4(39.3). September 25, 2024. Permalink

  • Commodity Program Payment Limits, Farm Entity Creation, and Implications for the Next Farm Bill

    Commodity Program Payment Limits, Farm Entity Creation, and Implications for the Next Farm Bill

    Payment limitations are not a novel policy tool.  Modern day limits have been imposed since the 1970 Farm Bill, with multiple changes to the payment limit in subsequent farm bills (Congressional Research Service, 2020; Ferrell, Fischer, Lashmet, 2024). We provide an example of what incentivizes a producer to create a new entity to receive potentially forgone commodity program payments and how it could be completed in practice when appropriate.  It should be note that there are rules in place that prohibit farmers from restructuring just to avoid payment limits.

    Suppose a producer is one of three members (with equal ownership shares) of Dead and Company, LLC, located in Lawrence County, Arkansas. The entity has 2,800 acres of long grain rice base; the county average Price Loss Coverage (PLC) payment yield is 63 cwt/ac[1], and the payment rate is $2.10/cwt. This would result in a total PLC payment for Dead and Company, LLC of $370,440[2]. However, under current rules, Dead and Company, LLC is subject to a $125,000 payment, and each member is also subject to a personal payment limit of $125,000, however, based on their one-third share they are limited to $41,667. In this example, Dead and Company, LLC receives the full $125,000 payment limit, effectively forgoing $245,440 ($81,813 per member) of the total payment. A visual example is provided in Figure 1 below.

    Figure 1. Example of Payment Limit Distribution and Forgone Payment under an LLC

    If it makes sense within the operation of the business, the three members of Dead and Company, LLC could choose to reallocate the 2,800 base acres to different entities to increase their individual payment received and stay within the $125,000 individual payment limit. This could be done by creating two new entities, HRE, LLC and Lucky 13, LLC, which have the same three members as Dead and Company, LLC. The three individuals are now members of three different LLCs, each containing 933 acres, or an even share of the 2,800 base acres, resulting in a total payment per entity of $123,436, below the $125,000 payment limit per LLC. While there are three entities that have separate payment limits, one should note that the three entities have to maintain separate sets of books.  In other words, while setting up additional entities is relatively easy with the help of a lawyer, the additional time associated with the requirement to maintain separate records for each farm also needs to be taken into consideration.  In addition, while the math on this exercise is fairly easy, there are significant rules and procedures that have to be followed when reorganizing to avoid the appearance of reorganizing to take advantage of payment limit rules.  Figure 2 shows how the forgone payment due to current payment limit rules increases per individual as each person receives an additional payment from a different entity. In short, each individual receives $41,145 in three PLC payments under Dead and Company, LLC, HRE, LLC, and Lucky 13, LLC.

    Figure 2. Payments to each member under base reallocation from Dead and Company, LLC to Lucky 13, LLC and HRE, LLC

    The 2014 farm bill provides a unique setting for studying the impact of payment limits on entity creation. First, producers had to make a one-time decision in 2014 for the commodity program to place their base acres in (i.e., ARC or PLC), which would not change for the life of the 2014 farm bill. Second, for a given crop year, all entities would receive a PLC payment if a payment was triggered for a crop in which base acres were enrolled. Third, historical plantings directly tied to the land determine the number of base acres, and enrolled entities are free to dissolve and be created. Therefore, while these conditions do not allow for reallocation to a new program election (i.e., switching from PLC to ARC), they can allow for base acreage reallocation to different entities.

    While considering the individual payment limit itself is important in discussions that include higher statutory reference prices, it is also important to consider the number of entities allowed to receive payments. This is because of rules such as the “3-entity-rule” which existed prior to the 2008 farm bill, which repealed this rule. Understanding why a producer would create a new farm entity and how this can be done in practice is important as increasing farm size could limit the whole farm protection provided by commodity program payments and threaten farm income stability.

    References

    Congressional Research Service, 2020, U.S. Farm Programs: Eligibility and Payment Limits, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46248. Accessed 22 May 2024. 

    Ferrell, Shannon L., Tiffany Dowell Lashmet, and Bart L. Fischer. “Paved with Good Intentions: Unintended Impacts of Farm Bill Payment Limitations.” Southern Ag Today 4(19.4). May 9, 2024. Permalink

    [1] This value was taken from USDA-FSA data files and could be converted to bu/ac using a conversion factor of 2.22. In this case, this same yield in bu/ac is 140 bu/ac.

    [2] This value is found by multiplying the total base acreage, the payment yield, and the payment rate.

    Biram, Hunter, Ryan Loy, and Eunchun Park . “Commodity Program Payment Limits, Farm Entity Creation, and Implications for the Next Farm Bill.” Southern Ag Today 4(32.3). August 7, 2024. Permalink