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  • What Determines a “Good” Price?

    What Determines a “Good” Price?

    A common question producers ask is, “What is a good price to sell at?” The best answer is that there is no single number that fits every farm. A “good price” is not defined solely by price. It is defined by individual cost structure, yield expectations, and financial goals. One producer with a lower production cost may lock in soybeans at $10.50 per bushel and achieve the same profit margin as another producer who needs $11.50 per bushel to cover higher expenses. The difference is the unique financial conditions facing the operation. Thus, producers must consider various factors when deciding on a “good” price for marketing. 

    When setting price goals, the cost of production should be the starting point, as it determines the breakeven price when combined with an expected yield. A breakeven price forms the foundation of any pricing decision. Previous Southern Ag Today articles have discussed how to use enterprise budgets to estimate costs and calculate breakeven prices, including Estimating Cost of Production and Breakeven Prices with Enterprise Budgets and Enterprise Budgeting. We encourage producers to revisit these resources to better understand their numbers before establishing price targets.

    Once breakeven prices are determined, they must be adjusted to meet the farm’s broader financial goals. An operation cannot remain viable if it only breaks even year after year. Starting with breakeven, producers should begin layering in profit targets that reflect debt obligations, capital replacement needs, working capital goals, and desired returns to management and equity. This stage provides an opportunity to align the marketing plan with the overall financial health and strategic direction of the farm business.

    The condition of the farm balance sheet also influences price targets. Producers focused on improving liquidity or reducing leverage may prioritize securing modest but reliable margins. Others in a stronger financial position, or those pursuing expansion, may be willing to target higher price levels before committing bushels. In either case, price targets should reflect the operation’s financial needs and risk tolerance rather than a single benchmark price.

    It is also important for producers to understand their local basis when determining price targets. While cash contracts can be used to manage price directly, any futures-based marketing strategy requires accounting for basis risk. Ignoring basis can lead to missed expectations, even if the futures market reaches the targeted level. 

    Seasonality can help structure tiered price targets. As shown in Figure 1, the 10 year average soybean futures price, using the November contract pre-harvest and a nearby series post-harvest, tends to rise through the growing season as weather uncertainty builds, soften ahead of harvest pressure, and often strengthen again after harvest as stored supplies are rationed. While this pattern is not guaranteed in any given year, it provides useful context for historically favorable pricing windows. Producers might consider setting an initial pre-harvest target in the spring or early summer when weather-driven volatility supports prices, with additional tiers near typical post-harvest seasonal highs. However, post-harvest targets must account for carrying costs, including storage, interest, shrink, and quality risk, since higher futures prices do not necessarily translate into higher net returns if those costs outweigh the seasonal gain.

    Ultimately, a good price is influenced by farm-specific factors unique to each operation. By grounding price targets in cost of production, financial goals, basis expectations, and seasonal tendencies, producers can move from asking “Is this a good price?” to confidently knowing when a price meets their operation’s needs.

    Figure 1. Ten-Year Average Soybean Futures Prices Across the Pre- and Post-Harvest Marketing Window

    Note: Pre-harvest prices reflect the November soybean futures contract. Post-harvest prices are based on a continuous nearby futures series.

    Maples, William. “What Determines a “Good” Price?Southern Ag Today 6(10.3). March 4, 2026. Permalink

  • Heavy Cattle Weights and Fewer Head

    Heavy Cattle Weights and Fewer Head

    Authors Josh Maples and David Anderson

    For the many industry watchers who have long wondered how much bigger cattle slaughter weights could get, the latest trends suggest 2026 could see weights continue to rise. Steer dressed weights averaged 984 pounds during the second week of February. Assuming a 62.5 percent dressing percentage, that implies an average live steer weight of 1,575 lbs. As shown in the chart, this is up from a year ago and also up from earlier years. 

    Federally inspected slaughter has been trending lower due to tight supplies of cattle. For the first two months of 2026, total cattle slaughter is 7.3 percent below the same period of 2025, which includes an 8.6 percent decline in steers, a 6.9 percent decline in heifers, and a 17 percent decline in beef cows. Only dairy cow slaughter is up (6.9 percent) from a year ago. Due to heavier weights, beef production this year is only down 5.5 percent compared to the same period last year. The current market is defined by two clear themes of heavier weights and fewer cattle.

    Seasonally, we’d expect steer weights to decline during the first half of the year, but that has not yet happened. Dressed weights are well above the 2020–2024 average and continue to trend higher at a time when they would normally be easing. Despite the strong prices, cattle are staying on feed longer. In the current environment of strong fed cattle prices and relatively manageable cost of gain, feedlots appear willing to add pounds rather than market cattle lighter. Packers need cattle but have not broadly begun to pull cattle through faster in a way that would lead to declining average weights.  The winter storm in late January does not appear to have impacted dressed weights either.

    As we move further into the year, the key question will be if/when weights will break seasonally. For now, cattle dressed weights are historically high, slaughter is lower, and overall supplies remain very tight.


    Maples, Josh, and David Anderson. “Heavy Cattle Weights and Fewer Head.Southern Ag Today 6(10.2). March 3, 2026. Permalink

  • 2026 Agricultural Credit and Farmland Conditions Update

    2026 Agricultural Credit and Farmland Conditions Update

    Authors Kevin Kim and Brian Mills

    According to the latest forecast from USDA ERS, net farm income in 2026 is expected to decline modestly, even after factoring in substantial government payments. If realized, this would represent several consecutive years of compressed profitability, particularly for row crop producers. In this context, what do current indicators reveal about emerging farm financial stress?

    A recent survey conducted by Mississippi State University Extension offers additional insight into agricultural credit conditions in Mississippi and Alabama. Because these states are not included in the agricultural credit surveys published by the Federal Reserve Banks of Dallas or Kansas City, this regional data provides a valuable perspective. The survey gathered responses from commercial banks, Farm Credit System institutions, agricultural consulting firms, and insurance companies operating across the region.

    Source: 2025 Mississippi State University Agricultural Credit Survey

    Farm loan repayment performance worsened in 2025, with none of the respondents reporting that the loan repayment rates had improved when compared to the previous year. Farm loan renewals generally showed signs of stability to modest softening relative to 2024. Compared to the most recent agricultural surveys conducted by the Federal Reserve Banks of Dallas and Kansas City, there were more respondents who answered that the loan repayment rates were worse than the year before. 

    Source: 2025 Mississippi State University Agricultural Credit Survey

    Liquidity and solvency measures provide indicators of short- and long-term financial stress. Several respondents reported that liquidity and solvency positions for crop producers weakened in 2025 relative to the previous year, whereas livestock producers were more often characterized as stable or slightly improved. These differences reflect the commodity-specific price trends observed over the past year.

    Source: 2025 Mississippi State University Agricultural Credit Survey

    Despite lower crop receipts, farmland values remain resilient. Most respondents reported that irrigated and non-irrigated cropland values either increased or held steady in 2025 relative to 2024, and there was no reporting of decreased cropland value. Expectations for the next six months are largely neutral to slightly positive despite the expected low price outlook in 2026. Pasture values followed a similar pattern.

    Overall, the newly conducted survey shows that the agricultural credit environment reflects tighter margins and growing financial stress, but not widespread financial disaster. Continued monitoring of repayment trends, working capital positions, and interest rate movements will be essential as producers and lenders navigate the production cycle.


    Kim, Kevin, and Brian Mills. “2026 Agricultural Credit and Farmland Conditions Update.Southern Ag Today 6(10.1). March 2, 2026. Permalink

  • Prime Soils Mitigation for Solar Development

    Prime Soils Mitigation for Solar Development

    As pressure for change in use on historically agricultural lands continues unabated, state and local governments and agricultural stakeholders wrestle with the extent prime soils classification may legally factor into development plans and permitting decisions to discourage changes in surface use. Prime farmland soils are generally defined by USDA, under authority of the Farmland Protection Policy Act (FPPA) via 7 CFR § 657.5, as possessing the optimal physical and chemical characteristics for high-yield food and fiber production. Prime soils have renewed focus as a policy matter at the intersection of utility-scale solar development and agricultural production, with efforts to limit their non-farm use and mitigate their impact. 

    As a matter of federal policy, the FPPA requires federal agencies (such as the FAA or HUD) to minimize the “unnecessary and irreversible conversion” of prime soils to non-agricultural uses. Designation manifests through the Land Evaluation and Site Assessment (LESA) system, which scores potential sites. Projects exceeding a specific threshold are flagged, theoretically forcing agencies to consider alternative locations that spare high-quality soils. 

    State governments have used prime soils (sometimes designated as soils of statewide importance) to positively score conservation easements applications, though prime soils as a factor in restricting development patterns (e.g. housing densities) and permitting decisions may draw more challenges. In Virginia, prime soils designation has found policy footing in the solar development realm with a new statutory and regulatory mitigation requirement for disturbed prime soils in solar development, requiring a 1:1 ratio of land to be protected under conservation easement (or a fee in lieu to fund conservation easement protection) for each acre developed, as a permitting requirement. It is yet to be seen what legal challenges lie ahead for that mitigation policy. Beyond the solar development realm, one may continue to expect local governments in some states to factor in prime soils as a land attribute that guides development, and perhaps legal challenges may illustrate whether such actions amount to impermissible land use regulations under constitutional takings standards.


    Branan, Robert Andrew. “Prime Soils Mitigation for Solar Development.Southern Ag Today 6(9.5). February 27, 2026. Permalink

  • When China Stops Buying: Is this the New Reality for U.S. Cotton?

    When China Stops Buying: Is this the New Reality for U.S. Cotton?

    U.S. cotton is among the most export‑dependent agricultural commodities, with more than 80% of annual production moving into global markets rather than being used domestically (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2026a). Although China has not always been a consistent buyer, importing less than 15% of U.S. cotton exports in some years and more than 30% in other years, it has nevertheless remained a somewhat reliable partner, accounting for nearly 30% of U.S. cotton exports in more recent years (2020–2024) (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2026b). 

    Once the most important market for U.S. cotton, China has become a far less reliable partner in 2025, as recent import patterns show greater volatility and reduced engagement with the U.S. agricultural sector. In 2025, China’s purchases of U.S. cotton fell from $1.5 billion to just $0.2 billion, an 85% decline, while its import volume dropped at nearly the same rate, from 0.8 million metric tons (MMT) to 0.1 MMT. In contrast, exports to markets outside China expanded substantially over the same period. The value of U.S. cotton exports to non‑China destinations rose from $3.5 billion to $4.6 billion, a 32% increase, while quantities surged 51%, from 1.7 MMT to 2.6 MMT (Table 1) (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2026b). 

    Why did China sharply reduce its imports of U.S. cotton? While the trade war and subsequent political tensions certainly accelerated the decline, the underlying shift runs deeper than tariffs. China’s overall import strategy has fundamentally changed as its domestic cotton sector has undergone major structural adjustments since 2010. Over the past decade, China has increased production, drawn down its massive state-held stockpiles, and reduced its dependence on foreign fiber. Since 2021 alone, domestic output has risen by more than 30% (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2025a). As a result, China is increasingly able to meet the needs of its textile and apparel industry with domestic cotton rather than imports. Taken together, these developments suggest that China’s reduced reliance on U.S. cotton is not simply a temporary response to trade tensions but part of a longer-term realignment. 

    Table 2 makes clear that the steep decline in U.S. cotton exports to China was not simply the result of tariffs or bilateral tensions, but part of a much broader contraction in China’s overall import demand. China’s total cotton import value fell from $5.3 billion in 2024 to $1.9 billion in 2025, while import volumes dropped from 2.6 million to 1.1 million metric tons. Every major supplier experienced significant losses: Brazil’s shipments fell by more than 50%, India’s collapsed by over 90%, and Australia also recorded substantial reductions.

    The across‑the‑board declines underscore a structural shift in China’s sourcing strategy rather than a U.S.-specific outcome.

    Table 1. U.S. Cotton Exports: 2024 and 2025

     20242025Change% Change
    Value ($ billion)
    China$1.5$0.2-$1.3-85.1%
    Total (w/o China)3.54.61.132.0%
    Total (w/ China)5.04.8-0.1-2.8%
    Quantity (million metric tons)
    China0.80.1-0.6-84.6%
    Total (w/o China)1.72.60.951.0%
    Total (w/ China)2.52.70.29.6%
    Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture (2026b)

    Table 2. China’s Cotton Imports (Major Exporting Countries): 2024 and 2025

    20242025Change % Change
     Value ($ billion)
    Total$5.3$1.9-$3.4-63.6%
    Brazil2.20.8-1.4-63.4%
    U.S.1.90.2-1.6-87.8%
    Australia0.70.6-0.1-13.8%
    India0.10.0-0.1-91.1%
    Turkey0.10.10.03.7%
    Quantity (million metric tons)
    Total2.61.1-1.5-59.2%
    Brazil1.10.5-0.6-57.8%
    U.S.0.90.1-0.8-86.8%
    Australia0.30.30.00.2%
    India0.10.0-0.1-90.9%
    Turkey0.10.10.0-4.1%
    Source: Trade Date Monitor®(2026) 

    References

    Trade Data Monitor®. (2026). https://tradedatamonitor.com/

    U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) (2026a). PSD Online. Foreign Agricultural Service. https://apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/app/index.html#/app/advQuery

    U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) (2026b). Global Agricultural Trade System. Foreign Agricultural Service. https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/default.aspx


    Muhammad, Andrew. “When China Stops Buying: Is this the New Reality for U.S. Cotton?Southern Ag Today 6(9.4). February 26, 2026. Permalink