On Monday, December 8th, President Trump and USDA Secretary Rollins announced the creation of the Farmer Bridge Assistance (FBA) Program, a new round of economic assistance totaling $12 billion for the 2025 crop, with $11 billion for row crop farmers. While details such as individual commodity payment rates have not been made available, it was announced that the structure of FBA would be similar to the Emergency Commodity Assistance Program (ECAP) that producers received earlier this year due to low commodity prices received for the 2024 crop. Recall the ECAP program provided assistance based on a producer’s planted acres of eligible commodities and 50% of acres that were prevented from being planted. According to USDA, acres that were prevented from being planted will not be eligible for FBA.
Individual payment rates are expected to be announced the week of December 22nd. Payments are expected to be released by February 28, 2026. It was announced that payment limits would be different from ECAP. Payment limits will be $155,000 per person or legal entity, and the AGI limits will be $900,000. In ECAP, producers could double their limit if 75% of their AGI was from farming. The new assistance does not have this provision.
The last two years have been terrible financial years for most crop farmers across the United States. While producers will be grateful for the assistance, their estimated losses for the 2025 crop exceed $40 billion. The previous ECAP program paid 26% of losses to producers for the 2024 crop. Based on the estimates of loss for the 2025 crop, it appears the newly announced program will likely cover a similar portion of producer losses.
The announcement and subsequent details of the program when released will allow lenders to include the amount of the assistance in producer’s loan packages which should help those producers who are trying to secure operating loans for the 2026 crop year.
On the evening of November 27, 2025, the CME’s electronic trading system had a major outage. Trading in corn and soybean futures stopped and then came back before the market opened the next morning. Many farmers and merchandisers wondered whether the first hour after the market reopened looked normal or if it showed signs of stress.This article uses one-minute price and volume data to describe what happened during the first hour of trading on Friday, November 28, 2025.
To understand whether the morning after the outage was unusual, I compared one-minute futures data for the first hour (after the 8:30 a.m. Central Time open) on November 28 against similar data for two simple benchmarks: (i) the previous ten trading days in 2025, and (ii) all trading days in 2025. For each comparison, I looked at how much futures contract prices moved minute-to-minute and how many contracts traded in that hour. For each day, I focused on the main contract with the most trading volume during the daytime session.
For corn, the first hour after the CME came back was far from normal. Table1 summarizes how large the first hour was compared with a typical morning. Compared with the previous ten trading days, the amount of price movement was a little more than five times larger than usual, and the total up-and-down movement over the hour was more than three times larger. Trading volume during that first hour was almost nine times the recent ten-day norm. Even when compared with all trading days in 2025, corn still shows very large numbers: more than three times the usual price movement and about ten times the usual first-hour volume. These findings match what many people felt in real time. The market did not simply return to normal after the outage. Corn, in particular, showed the kind of price swings and volume that look more like a stress event than a routine morning. Soybeans also showed more activity than usual, but the increase was not as dramatic as in corn. Compared with the previous ten trading days, soybean price movement was a little under three times the recent median, and volume was just under three times. Against the full 2025 distribution, soybean price movement was a little more than four times the median, and volume was about five times. Soybeans were active, but they did not spike as sharply as corn.
For farmers, merchandisers, and elevators, there are a few practical lessons when a technical problem occurs the night before the market opens. The first hour can be the most unstable time of the day when orders that could not be processed during the outage may all come in at once when trading resumes. That argues for extra caution with large orders right at or just after the open on such days.
Finally, this type of simple analysis, checking how big the first hour is compared with recent days and the full year, can be a useful monitoring tool. Co-ops and elevators could use similar checks to decide when to widen quotes, slow down hedging, or adjust risk limits when the market appears unusually active.
Table 1: How Big Was the First Hour After the CME Outage?
Corn
Last 10 trading days
about 5.4×
about 3.2×
about 8.9×
Corn
All 2025 trading days
about 3.5×
about 2.3×
about 10.1×
Soybeans
Last 10 trading days
about 2.8×
about 2.0×
about 2.8×
Soybeans
All 2025 trading days
about 4.3×
about 2.3×
about 4.8×
* “First-hour price movement” measures how much prices bounced around minute-to-minute in the first 60 minutes. ** “First-hour total price movement” adds up all the ups and downs during that hour.
[1] Eunchun Park is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness / Fryar Price Risk Management Center of Excellence at the University of Arkansas
Eunchun Park, Christopher N. Boyer, and Clinton L. Neill[1]
The live-to-cutout beef price spread is the difference between the value of boxed beef and the price paid for live cattle and is a commonly used metric in the industry. This article summarizes a recent paper by Park et al. (2025) that used this metric to explore what happens to the differences in these prices when beef packers process capacity changes. Specifically, this paper explores what happens to the price spread when a processing plant goes offline temporarily or permanently.
The key distinction between a temporary and or permanent closure is temporary closures are often unexpected, with short notice, while permanent closures might be more telegraphed or planned. Temporary outages—such as the Tyson Holcomb fire in August 2019 or the COVID-19 disruptions in spring 2020—remove effective capacity without warning. In those periods, the study found the price spread tends to move to a higher level with greater week-to-week volatility, and that wide-band behavior often persists for several weeks before normalizing. By contrast, permanent closures are generally announced in advance, allowing time to adjust cattle flows, freight, and line schedules. Because the industry can prepare, the spread before and after a permanent closure typically resembles normal trading conditions.
Figure 1 illustrates these patterns. The black line shows the weekly live-to-cutout spread. Blue vertical lines denote permanent closures (ConAgra 2000; Tyson 2008; Cargill 2013), while red lines denote temporary outages (Tyson fire 2019; COVID-19 2020). Around permanent closures, the spread looks normal. Around temporary outages, it jumps and stays jumpy for several weeks. The temporary events align with sharp run-ups and a bumpier path in the weeks that follow.
The implications of this study differ by audience. For producers and feedyards, treat the first two to four weeks after an unexpected outage as a high-variance window. Expect a higher average spread and larger week-to-week swings at the same time. Maintain an additional working-capital cushion, widen basis and grid bands in cash-flow plans, and be conservative on marginal pens. If marketing on the grid, expect greater dispersion and review terms that are usually taken for granted when capacity is tight. For lenders and risk managers, stress tests should raise both the level and the variance of the spread, with horizons long enough to cover the typical persistence of the high-regime window.
Permanent closures call for a different approach. When changes are announced and phased in, the market usually adapts without dramatic swings in the spread. The task is primarily logistical—update cattle routing, confirm shackle space, and revise freight and plant schedules—while keeping standard cash-flow settings.
Why rely on the spread? It is public, timely, and can reflect packer margins and producer net prices. When capacity tightens, harvest slows, boxed beef firms, and the spread widens—often before other indicators move. No complex model is required; it is enough to know the usual range for your region and when to widen operating bands.
In short, temporary, unexpected outages create brief intervals when the spread runs higher and volatility increases; plan the first month around that reality. Permanent, telegraphed closures generally allow the industry to adjust with less disruption. Match the playbook to the shock type to reduce hurried decisions when plants stop.
Figure 1. Weekly live-to-cutout beef price spread ($/cwt), 1992–2024. Vertical lines mark processing-capacity shocks: blue = permanent closures (ConAgra 2000; Tyson 2008; Cargill 2013) and red = temporary outages (Tyson Holcomb fire 2019; COVID-19 2020). Temporary shocks coincide with short-lived regime shifts—higher levels and choppier volatility—while permanent closures show little persistent change in the spread.
References
Park, E., Boyer, C. N., and Neill, C. L. (2025). A Markov regime-switching event response model: beef price spread response to processing capacity shocks. Empirical Economics, 68:1039–107.
[1] Eunchun Park is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness / Fryar Price Risk Management Center of Excellence at the University of Arkansas, Christopher N. Boyer is a professor in the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics at the University of Tennessee, and Clinton L. Neill is an adjunct assistant professor Department of Population Medicine and Diagnostic Sciences at Cornell University.
Authors: Susmitha Kalli, Graduate Student, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Georgia; Yangxuan Liu, Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Georgia; Hunter D. Biram, Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness, University of Arkansas; Fayu Chong, Graduate Student, Department of Forest Resources and Environmental Conservation, Virginia Tech University
Federal crop insurance remains a vital risk management tool for peanut producers across the United States. In our previous Southern Ag Today article, we discussed the various crop insurance policies available for peanuts. As with other crops, securing and maintaining insurance coverage for peanuts requires close attention to key administrative deadlines set by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Risk Management Agency (USDA RMA). Two of the most important are the sales closing date and the cancellation date, which determine eligibility and the continuation of coverage for each crop year.
The sales closing date is the final day producers can apply for insurance or make changes to an existing policy. This includes selecting the type and coverage level. The cancellation date is the deadline for producers to notify their insurance provider in writing if they choose not to renew their policy. Policies not canceled by this date are automatically renewed under existing terms. For peanuts, the sales closing date and the cancellation date are the same for a given location and are uniform across all available crop insurance policies.
While these dates remain consistent year to year, their timing varies by state and county. Notably, USDA RMA divides Texas into three distinct regions, each with different deadline dates, whereas other peanut-producing states follow a uniform date statewide, as shown in Table 1 and Figure 1.
These deadlines are especially important for producers who contract with a sheller. Although insurance coverage is available for all insurable peanut acreage, regardless of whether the crop is grown under contract, the valuation of indemnities may differ depending on contract status. Specifically:
Contracted peanuts: When the crop is grown under a qualifying sheller contract, the contract’s base price may be used to calculate coverage, subject to USDA RMA guidelines.
Non-contracted peanuts: When the crop is not contracted, indemnities are based on a price election determined by USDA RMA.
Mixed production: For producers growing both contracted and non-contracted peanuts, coverage can be divided accordingly, provided that all sheller contracts are submitted by the acreage reporting date.
To avoid missing critical deadlines or encountering coverage limitations, producers are strongly encouraged to verify their county-specific requirements using the USDA RMA Actuarial Information Browser. A certified crop insurance agent can also assist in clarifying enrollment options, contract documentation requirements, and eligibility based on production practices. The USDA RMA Agent Locator Tool provides a searchable database that helps producers connect with authorized crop insurance representatives in their state.
Table 1. Peanut Crop Insurance Policies’ Sales Closing Dates and Cancellation Dates by State and County
Region
States and Counties Covered
Dates
South Texas Counties
Includes Jackson, Victoria, Goliad, Bee, Live Oak, McMullen, La Salle, Dimmit, and all Texas counties lying south of this line
Jan 31
Central/Eastern Texas and Most Other States
Covers Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and parts of Texas including El Paso, Hudspeth, Culberson, Reeves, Loving, Winkler, Ector, Upton, Reagan, Sterling, Coke, Tom Green, Concho, McCulloch, San Saba, Mills, Hamilton, Bosque, Johnson, Tarrant, Wise, and Cooke, as well as all Texas counties lying south and east of this boundary
Feb 28
Remaining Areas
Includes all other Texas counties not listed above, along with New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Virginia
Mar 15
Source: Summary of Changes for the Peanut Crop Provisions (07075), U.S. Department of Agriculture
Figure 1. Regional Differences in Sales Closing Dates and Cancelation and Termination Dates Runner-Type Peanut Crop Insurance*
Source: Summary of Changes for the Peanut Crop Provisions (07075), U.S. Department of Agriculture *Insurance availability for other peanut types (Spanish, Valencia, and Virginia) differs by county, but the sales closing dates are the same as shown in this map. To check details for your county, visit: https://public-rma.fpac.usda.gov/apps/MapViewer/dates.html
In Wineries of the Old Mission Peninsula Association v. Peninsula Township (U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, 2025), a group of local wineries sued Peninsula Township, Michigan, claiming that the township’s zoning laws unfairly restricted their ability to operate and grow. The wineries are located on the Old Mission Peninsula, a picturesque region north of Traverse City known for vineyards, fruit farms, and views of Lake Michigan.
Many of the wineries are located on agricultural land, where the township allowed them as “special uses” under its zoning ordinance—but only under strict conditions. These included limits on hours, food service, events, and even the use of outdoor spaces. The township said the rules were meant to preserve rural character, reduce traffic and noise, and protect residents from excessive commercialization.
The wineries saw it differently, arguing that the rules were overly harsh and inconsistent with modern wine tourism. Some rules, like requiring that all wine be made from grapes grown within the township, or that officials pre-approve advertising and events, struck them as both unfair and unconstitutional. The wineries sued under several legal theories, including violations of the First Amendment (free speech and expression), the Commerce Clause (prohibiting discrimination against out-of-state goods), and the Fourteenth Amendment (due process and equal protection).
After years of litigation and an 11-day trial, the federal court largely sided with the wineries. The judge found that the township’s rules on advertising and event approval unlawfully restricted free speech, and that the local-grape requirement violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against wines made with out-of-state fruit. While the township could still regulate land use to manage traffic and protect farmland, the court said it must do so in ways that respect constitutional rights and avoid economic protectionism.
The expert witness for the township, University of Pennsylvania Professor and nationally known writer on farmland preservation, Dr. Thomas Daniels, submitted an expert witness report that essentially argued that agritourism (in this case, wine tastings, weddings, and events) hindered farmland preservation by converting land to commercial operations. The court took the extraordinary step of finding Dr. Daniels’ testimony not credible.
The court particularly questioned the testimony that farmland preservation should keep the value of farmland low so that young farmers and others could easily enter the industry. The expert witness for the wineries challenged that principle, opining that land values need to be sufficient to fund the producers’ retirement.
The court also labeled an intervening group as a Not in My Backyard (NIMBY) group, and the motivations of the township as NIMBYism. The court granted the wineries $50 million in damages. The township’s insurance carrier has filed suit, denying coverage for the judgment.
The Wineries case carries national importance because it reflects a growing struggle across the country: how to balance local land-use control with modern agricultural and tourism economies. Communities across the country face similar tensions as small farms and wineries expand into venues for tastings, weddings, and events. In addition, Dr. Daniels’ position that agritourism hinders farmland preservation may become part of other litigation and policy discussions.
