This year Tennessee celebrates 31 years of partnership with the AgrAbility Project, a national initiative that continues to change the lives of farmers and ranchers with disabilities. Since its establishment in the 1990 Farm Bill and initial federal funding in 1991, AgrAbility has expanded to 21 states—including Tennessee, which launched its program in 1994. In Tennessee alone, AgrAbility has supported more than 1,300 farmers whose physical conditions have limited their ability to farm—offering them new tools, resources, and, most importantly, hope. However, Tennessee is but one of several AgrAbility programs in the South. Other Southern AgrAbility programs include Georgia, South Carolina, Florida, and Texas. Together, these programs help Southern farmers continue to farm in the face of disability.
The core vision of AgrAbility is simple but powerful: to enhance the quality of life for those in agriculture who face disabling conditions. That vision is realized through access to assistive technology, gainful employment opportunities in agriculture, and evidence-based information to help individuals manage and overcome challenges. Tennessee’s program is a collaborative effort among the University of Tennessee Extension, Tennessee State University Extension, the STAR Center (a nonprofit disability organization in Jackson, TN), and the USDA National Institute of Food and Agriculture.
What makes AgrAbility unique is its inclusivity—its services are available to any farmer in the state, regardless of farm size or income. With the average age of farmers steadily increasing, there’s a growing demand for adaptive technologies to address issues such as mobility limitations, hearing and vision impairments, arthritis, and other age-related conditions.
Over time, assistive technologies have become more advanced, and so have the farmers AgrAbility serves. The program’s reach now includes veterans, women, and older farmers in the south —each bringing their own strengths and stories to the field. AgrAbility works with agricultural partners to connect farmers with essential resources and to foster open conversations about farm stress and mental health—topics once left in the shadows.
At its heart, AgrAbility is about resilience, independence, and the unwavering spirit of farmers. With a dedicated team, strong partners, and ongoing support from organizations like the Tennessee Department of Human Services/Vocational Rehabilitation Services, AgrAbility is not just a program—it’s a lifeline.
Here’s to 30 plus years of making farming possible for all.
The Tomato Suspension Agreement (TSA) between the U.S. and Mexico, first established in 1996, was designed to regulate the importation of Mexican tomatoes. This agreement emerged from an antidumping investigation aimed at determining whether imports of fresh tomatoes from Mexico were being sold at less than fair market value. Under the TSA, Mexican tomato producers agreed to sell fresh tomatoes in the U.S. market at set reference prices, and in return, the U.S. suspended the antidumping duty investigation. The first suspension agreement became effective in November 1996. Over the years, the U.S. Department of Commerce and Mexican signatories have entered into revised suspension agreements in 2002, 2008, and 2013, with the most recent becoming effective in September 2019 (Federal Register, 2019).
On April 14, 2025, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced its intent to withdraw from the 2019 Agreement, citing its failure to protect U.S. producers from “unfairly” priced Mexican tomatoes. Upon termination—effective in 90 days—antidumping duties of around 21% will be imposed on most Mexican tomatoes (Spiegelman, 2025). This decision could have a significant impact on imports, benefiting domestic producers. However, these duties (i.e., tariffs) could also reduce the economic activity associated with tomato supply chains and increase consumer prices.
The basic premise of an antidumping investigation is to determine whether imported goods are being sold in the U.S. market at less than fair value, often referred to as “dumping.” This practice can harm domestic producers by depressing local prices and causing financial distress. Concerns about imports of Mexican tomatoes have been driven by a significant surge in imports over the last two decades. Since 1995, imports from Mexico have grown by nearly 700% in value, from $406 million in 1995 to $3.1 billion in 2024. In terms of quantity, imports from Mexico have increased by around 220% (USDA-FAS, 2025).
What is even more concerning is that this growth occurred even as U.S. production declined, and per capita availability increased. In 1995, the year prior to the agreement, domestic tomatoes accounted for over 70% of the total U.S. supply. This situation has now completely reversed, with imported tomatoes accounting for 70% of the total U.S. supply in 2025 (USDA-ERS, 2025a). Almost all imports come from Mexico, which accounted for around 90% of U.S. tomato imports in 2024 (USDA-FAS, 2025). Despite the surge in imports, is there evidence to suggest that domestic prices have been depressed, impacting U.S. tomato growers?
From 1995 to 2024, the U.S. saw a significant rise in the importation of Mexican tomatoes (Figure 1). The quantity of tomatoes imported from Mexico surged from approximately 1.3 billion pounds in 1995 to over 4.4 billion pounds in 2024. Alongside this rise in quantity, import prices also increased, starting at about 31 cents per pound in 1995 and reaching nearly 74 cents per pound in 2024. This upward trend in prices could be the result of the suspension agreements where Mexican signatories agreed to sell at increasingly higher prices. However, various factors, such as increased demand, changes in production costs, and market dynamics, likely contributed to this high correlation. Comparing Mexican tomato import prices to U.S. tomato farm prices and the U.S. Producer Price Index for all fresh vegetables shows little evidence of domestic price depression from imports (Figure 2). There is a positive correlation between import prices and U.S. farm prices, with a consistent upward trend. While it could be argued that prices would have grown at a faster rate without the surge in imports, overall vegetable prices suggest that this is not the case. In fact, import prices often exceeded both U.S. farm prices and overall vegetables prices.
In closing, while increased barriers on Mexican tomatoes might benefit U.S. tomato producers, there are other factors to consider. In 2024, the U.S. imported almost 2.0 million metric tons (over 4.0 billion pounds) of fresh tomatoes from Mexico, valued at more than $3.0 billion. According to a recent study by Texas A&M University, these imports generated an estimated $8.3 billion in total economic impact, including $3.6 billion in direct effects and $4.7 billion in indirect and induced effects, supporting approximately 47,000 U.S. jobs (Ribera et al., 2025). This suggest that there is more at stake if the U.S. eliminates the suspension agreement.
Figure 1. Import price and quantity of Mexican tomatoes: 1995–2024
Source: USDA-FAS (2025)
Figure 2. Comparison of import and domestic prices: 1995–2024
Source(s): The U.S. farm prices was obtained from USDA-ERS (2025b); import prices from USDA-FAS (2025); and the producer price index from BLS (2025), which was adjusted to for comparison purposes.
References
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (2025). Inflation and Prices, Prices – Producer, Commodity Data. https://www.bls.gov/data/
Farmers decide what crops to plant based on factors like crop rotations, expected profits, input costs, and other financial trade-offs. Annual predictions of planted acreage for a crop help agribusiness suppliers plan for seed, fertilizers, pesticides, and equipment needs. Prices of crops and how they compare to competing crops, like corn and cotton, influence planting decisions. In many southern states, corn competes with cotton for land, and the cotton-to-corn price ratio is a key factor in predicting how much land will be dedicated to cotton. Additionally, past planting decisions impact future choices due to crop rotation, which helps manage pests, diseases, and soil health while enhancing yield potential.
To estimate how much cotton farmers will plant in 2025, we built a model that looks at past cotton and corn prices, along with historical cotton acreage data. Data was obtained from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) for 1990 to 2024. One of the most important factors in our model is the cotton-to-corn price ratio, which is calculated by dividing the cotton price (in cents per pound) by the corn price (in dollars per bushel).
By analyzing historical patterns, our model estimates how much cotton (total upland and Pima cotton acreage) will be planted next year based on three main factors: (1) last year’s cotton acreage; (2) the cotton-to-corn price ratio from the previous year; and (3) the expected cotton price for the upcoming year.
Simulated Cotton Planted Acreage in 2025
Using recent estimates from the USDA, we applied our model with a cotton-to-corn price ratio of 14.48 (based on a cotton price of 63.0 cents per pound and corn prices of $4.35 per bushel) as currently estimated by the April 2025 WASDE Report for the 2024 crops. A cotton price of 67.60 cents per pound for the 2025 crop is projected based on the February 2025 reported cotton price by USDA NASS.
Our model predicts that farmers will plant approximately 10.524 million acres of cotton in 2025 (Figure 1), a 5.88% decrease from 2024 (when 11.182 million acres of upland and Pima cotton were planted in total). This is higher than the 9.87 million acres forecast by the USDA Prospective Plantings report published on March 31, 2025. These projections, while containing a degree of uncertainty, help farmers and agribusinesses prepare for the upcoming season by anticipating cotton plantings and allowing adjustments in strategies accordingly.
Figure 1: Projected Probability of Total Upland Cotton and Pima Cotton Planted Acreage for 2025. Higher Points Indicate More Likely Acreage Outcomes for 2025 Based on Simulation Results.
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results (Table 1) show that the previous year’s cotton acreage, the previous year’s cotton-to-corn price ratio, and the current year’s cotton price significantly impact current-year planting.
Table 1: Impact of Historical Cotton Acreage and Cotton-to-Corn Price Ratio on Future Cotton Planting Decisions
Independent variable
Coefficient
t-ratio
0.404*
3.491
256.451*
5.812
31.223***
1.828
272.209
0.117
F-test
22.092
0.688
34
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 99%, 95% and 90%, respectively.
The cattle market has experienced a lot of volatility in recent weeks, especially in the futures market, due to tariff announcements and recession fears. But, prices have rebounded since the first tariff announcements due to fundamental market conditions. Those fundamental conditions include tight supplies of cattle, relatively low feed prices, and grilling season.
Live fed steer prices weighted across all grades averaged $207.70 per cwt the week of April 13th, following the flood of tariff announcements. Prices quickly rebounded to over $212 per cwt. in the ensuing weeks after averaging over $211 per cwt for the three weeks prior to the tariff announcements. Calf and feeder cattle markets across the South experienced price declines during that same week. Georgia auction 500-600 pound steers dropped about $7 per cwt from early April to the week of April 12th before rebounding to $368 per cwt. Mississippi auctions experienced a more dramatic decline, dropping $13 per cwt before recapturing about half of the decline.
Beef production remains relatively close to last year. From January through April 26, beef production is equal to last year. But over the last month production is down 1.3 percent compared to last year. Using the daily slaughter data, fed steer and heifer slaughter is down 2.8 percent in April compared to last April. Heavier weights are continuing to keep beef production high relative to what steer and heifer slaughter would suggest. This is further showcased by the growth in cattle grading prime relative to select. Since March 15, there has been a higher percentage of fed cattle grading prime (about 12 percent) than there has select (about 11.3 percent).
One thing worth watching, that we will monitor in coming SAT’s, is weekly U.S. exports of beef to China. Tariffs appear to have severely damaged exports in the early reported weekly export data. For the week of April 17th,the U.S. exported only 186 metric tons of beef to China. That is the smallest weekly exports since March 2020 at the beginning of Covid. Exports for the week of April 10th totaled 1,431 metric tons. China has been our 3rdlargest export market for beef, following Japan and South Korea. Tariffs appear to have impacted U.S. pork exports similarly. So far, the other fundamentals have overshadowed the impact of reduced trade to China, but that might not be the case for the rest of the year.
This article extends the regional and industry concentration analysis of H-2A patronage trends laid out in a previous Southern Ag Today article. Given the larger shares of the Southern region and crop industries in total H-2A employment figures, we offer some wage-based explanations for these patronage trends.
H-2A employment decisions are anchored on the adverse effect wage rate (AEWR) principle, which was conceived to specifically revert any possible market anomaly when foreign workers are hired under the H-2A program. The Department of Labor (DOL) was tasked to issue a fixed wage rate (AEWR) to mitigate adverse effects on local labor market conditions that may be caused by the employment of underpaid alien workers. A current year’s AEWR is determined based on the results of the previous year’s Farm Labor Survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) among farms with annual sales of $1,000 or more (USDA, 2023). For farm work not devoted to herding or production of livestock on the range (non-range occupations that comprise the bulk of H-2A employers),[1] AEWRs are set at the state level and enforced to apply to all workers regardless of nationality.
Figure 1 plots national average wages over a five-year period (2020-2024) for two farm work positions: farmworkers in crop, nursery, and greenhouse operations (usually accounting for more than 80% of all H-2A workers hired) and farmworkers in farms producing ranch and aquacultural products (which are positions held by about 4% of all H-2A workers). These wages are compared to the national average of state-level AEWRs. An adjusted AEWR level is added to the analysis to account for discrepancies between labor remuneration packages offered to domestic and H-2A workers. The latter not only receive wages conforming to the AEWR benchmark but are also provided with housing, transportation, meal allowances, and fringe benefits as mandated by the program. The plots in Figure 1 indicate that crop, nursery, and greenhouse workers were consistently paid higher than H-2A workers in all years, while the adjusted H-2A wages only exceeded average livestock wages in 2023 and 2024.
The regional wage analyses provide some deviations from the earlier trends (Figure 1), which could be influenced by regional variations in demographic, structural, and economic conditions affecting H-2A employment decisions. Figures 2 and 3 present plots of the domestic wage-AEWR differentials using regional average field and livestock wages, respectively, over the same five-year period. In these plots, a positive gap indicates a higher regional field/livestock wage than its average AEWR.
In Figure 2 (field workers’ wages), the South region’s wage differential is positive only in 2022, while remaining negative in other years. The West, which is the second most popular regional H-2A employer, has consistently maintained a positive field wage-AEWR gap in all years. These trends indicate that while the West farms’ decisions to hire H-2A workers for field work may be motivated by wage considerations (where H-2A labor is cheaper than domestic labor), the South’s decision to hire more expensive H-2A field workers in certain years could have been driven by non-wage factors. Some analysts argue that the higher labor productivity of more expensive H-2A workers rationalizes some farms’ preference for these workers.
In Figure 3, the South posted slightly negative domestic livestock wage-AEWR differentials in 2020 and 2021; it maintained a positive gap for the rest of the period. The West again maintained a positive gap during the entire period. These trends reveal some unique employment predicaments in livestock industries. Given that livestock farms in the country usually rely less on H-2A labor and would rather employ domestic residents, these decisions persist even when domestic livestock wages are higher than the adjusted AEWR. Compared to crop farms, livestock farms are more inclined to seek workers and employ them for a longer tenure as their operations have longer business and production cycles. These farms usually lure prospective workers with training offers that could upgrade their skills and job classification (from unskilled to better paying skilled positions). A follow-up article will present more detailed evidence on livestock farms’ domestic and foreign labor hiring practices.
Figure 1. Adverse Effect Wage Rates (AEWRs) and Farmworkers’ Wages in Crop and Livestock Farms, U.S. Average, 2020-2024
Sources: National Agricultural Statistics Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture and Department of Labor
Note: Adjusted AEWRs include a 5% wage premium of AEWR over domestic wages as determined by Calvin, Martin, and Simnitt (2022). These authors estimate that when all H-2A fringe benefits are factored into the equation, these foreign workers receive a wage premium of $2.55 per hour over their domestic counterparts. However, H-2A employers are not liable to pay Social Security or Federal Unemployment Insurance taxes, thus realizing an 8% saving on payroll taxes. Such tax benefit minimizes the H-2A-domestic wage differential to just about 5 percent.
Figure 2. Gaps Between Adverse Effect Wage Rates (AEWRs) and Field Workers’ Wages, By Production Region, 2020-2024
Sources: National Agricultural Statistics Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture and Department of Labor
Notes: (1) The regional classification of U.S. states are as follows: ATLANTIC states include North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Delaware; MIDWEST states are Minnesota, Iowa, Wisconsin, Illinois, Missouri, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Michigan; PLAINS states are Nebraska, Kansas, Texas, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Oklahoma; WEST states include California, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Alaska, and Hawaii; and the SOUTH states are Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee, South Carolina, and Kentucky.
(2) The Wage Gaps are calculated as the difference between Field Workers’ Wages and AEWR. A positive gap indicates that field workers’ wages are higher than AEWR.
Figure 3. Gaps Between Adverse Effect Wage Rates (AEWRs) and Livestock Workers’ Wages, By Production Region, 2020-2024
Sources: National Agricultural Statistics Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture and Department of Labor
Notes: (1) The regional classification of U.S. states are as follows: ATLANTIC states include North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Delaware; MIDWEST states are Minnesota, Iowa, Wisconsin, Illinois, Missouri, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Michigan; PLAINS states are Nebraska, Kansas, Texas, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Oklahoma; WEST states include California, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Alaska, and Hawaii; and the SOUTH states are Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee, South Carolina, and Kentucky.
(2) The Wage Gaps are calculated as the difference between Livestock Workers’ Wages and AEWR. A positive gap indicates that livestock workers’ wages are higher than AEWR.’
[1] Distinctions in AEWR-setting are made between range and non-range occupations. Non-range workers are employed under jobs with the following Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) titles: graders and sorters of agricultural products; agricultural equipment operators; farmworkers and laborers in crop, nursery, and greenhouse; farmworkers in the farm, ranch, and aquacultural animals; packers and packagers (hand); and all other agricultural workers (Congressional Research Service, 2023).
References:
Calvin, L., P. Martin, and S. Simnitt. (2022). Adjusting to Higher Labor Costs in Selected U.S. Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Industries. EIB-235, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC.
Congressional Research Service. (2023) Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR) Methodology for Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in the United States. Washington DC. Available online at https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12408. Accessed on August 3, 2023.
